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 In this thesis I critically examine theological understandings of the Christian 
doctrine of the imago Dei. Beginning with the work of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and early 
feminist theologians, including Valerie Saiving and Rosemary Radford Ruether, I analyze 
the ways they both expanded upon and applied understandings of the image of God in 
relation to contemporary social issues. Barth and Tillich’s problematic understandings of 
universal human experience are noted and critiqued by these feminist theologians who 
begin to apply Christian doctrine directly to women’s experiences.  
 
 Moving from these sources, I then look specifically to the work of Black and 
Womanist theologians, particularly James Cone and Katie Geneva Cannon, in order to 
understand the liberating potential inherent in the concept of the imago Dei. In assessing 
the ways these theologians stress that the image of God is embodied in the oppressed, I 
affirm the doctrine must be inclusive and responsive to the challenges of suffering and 
marginalization. Following in Cannon’s methodological footsteps, I then explore how an 
engagement with literature can provoke and challenge traditional understandings of 
theological doctrines and generate new insights – particularly through articulating 
perspectives that are occluded or marginalized in theological debate. By examining the 
work of scholars such as Martha Nussbaum, Annaliese van Heijst, Cynthia Wallace, and 
Rebecca Chopp I develop a methodology that enables literature to critique, challenge, and 
emotionally impact upon theological reflection. This method emphasizes that theological 
attention must be focused on those who have been excluded from previous imago Dei 
discussions. 
 
 I then engage in a reading of the interwar novels of Jean Rhys. Rhys is a writer 
whose work raised issues of economic, gendered, and class marginalization as overlapping 
oppressions. Her work enables me to focus upon the question of how those experiencing 
oppression and abuse, that lead to societal isolation and self-hatred, might view themselves 
as included within an imago Dei which focuses directly on their trauma.  
 
My explorations of the effects of trauma upon theological understandings of 
personhood are then deepened through engaging with the work of Shelly Rambo, 
Catherine Keller, Serene Jones, and Mayra Rivera. I articulate the significance of 
embracing the woundedness of humanity and the woundedness of God within the imago 
Dei. This also allows for a radical redefinition of both God’s participation within the world 
and the nature of transcendence. Through examining Kathryn Tanner’s work on 
transcendence, I move towards a rejection of oppressive power and towards an 
understanding of transcendence as loving empowerment that seeks to restore and redeem 
the wounds suffered both by humanity and God. The conclusion of this thesis then argues 
that mutual woundedness connects God and humanity, allowing an imaging of God which 
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 I sit on the train from Glasgow to Liverpool, headed for a solo two-day trip in order 
to allow myself both peace and joy during an annual weekend that I often call my ‘Dark 
Days.’ This third anniversary of loss is honoured as I allow myself to wallow for two days 
without work, without people trying to cheer me, and without the guilt I often feel for not 
being ‘better.’ 
 Grief has taught me a lot in these last three years, and while I often lament having 
to compound it through working on a thesis about trauma, I also realize it has helped me. I 
wonder what I would be like, or rather, how much more guilty and sad I would be if I did 
not have this thesis to help me process. It was not planned. I chose the topic before the 
tragic events, but the bulk of the work happened after.  As I have heard is common while 
in the midst of a doctoral thesis, I am almost always thinking about my work even during 
‘weekends off.’ 
 So I sit, looking out the window of the train. Watching this still new-to-me country 
slide by as I think. I am so glad I can take the train to a new-to-me city, spend some time 
making fresh memories even as I am focused on old ones. And as I think about how much 
I am looking forward to seeing Liverpool, to checking another box on my wish list, I also 
think about how much the me of three or four years ago would not understand about this 
weekend. I would never have gone alone before. I love being around people—I am an 
extrovert; I long to have a person with me at all times. I am also a bit anxious and doing 
new things alone is often scary. Or it used to be. Now, most of my life is spent doing new 
things on my own, so I have gotten used to it, good at it even. I enjoy dinner at restaurants 
on my own or going to the cinema by myself. I laugh because I remember when my 
brother first got divorced, he would go to see movies by himself. My mom told me about 
it, and I was horrified. “How can he go alone?” I asked. I kept asking him if he wanted 
company. He didn’t. And now I understand. 
 This tragedy in my life is complicated. Complicated because it was so many 
different things at once. I was working at a small Christian university—a place, I thought, 
that had helped me discover my passion in a vocation. I began to believe I could finally 
‘settle down’ and work at my career. But faculty changes and departmental politics 
happened, and I found myself in the middle of a very bitter battle between my gender and 
the direction that the dean of the theology department wanted to take. Replacing most of 




become a kind of family—was a team of Southern Baptist men. I was passed over for 
promotion by a man with less experience. I was threatened with termination for attending a 
conference, while one of the male faculty was given extra time to go to his conference 
during the same week. After giving a talk in chapel, the new dean ‘joked’ that it was good 
I wasn’t preaching in church so he wouldn’t have to stone me. I finally reached my 
breaking point when the administration moved me into the English department. They said 
it was a promotion, even though there was no title or salary change. I was only allowed to 
teach one course, and I was told I would never receive another promotion, because I was 
actually not qualified to be in the English department.  
 This is only a part of my tragedy, though. This is the start of it. 
 The stress, anxiety, and harassment had taken me to my lowest. And it was then 
that my dog, Lizzy, died. And one month later, my brother-in-law died. Both were very 
unexpected. A few months later, my beloved Aunt Peggy died. I know all of this would 
have caused great grief for me whenever it happened, but the timing of losing my constant, 
joyful dog seemed like a punishment. Losing family members threw me into a depression I 
had never experienced before. I can barely even remember those months. It was in this 
depression that I moved to Scotland, purposefully getting away in the hopes that I could 
heal. 
 And so, this anniversary weekend is when I mourn many things. Who I was. Who I 
thought I was going to be. My deeply loved dog, Lizzy. Kevin, who had been married to 
my sister for twenty-three years, since I was eleven, and was just like my blood. I mourned 
my beloved theology department family, as we had all been removed from that department 
by then. I mourned the futures we had tried to build for our students. I mourned the life I 
had once loved and which now seemed like a terrible memory. I found that in the midst of 
systemic, organized misogyny, I was unable to do anything other than survive. Eventually, 
I realized that for me survival actually meant escape, even though I originally saw it as 
losing. I plunged into a period of intense grief and mourning. Instead of overcoming 
circumstances, meeting my goals, and feeling like one made in the image of God, I felt 
beaten and desperate. I found myself unable to perform simple tasks, the trauma of the 
situation affecting even the most mundane areas of my life. The wounds left by the layers 
of trauma exposed even more, less-obvious wounds which I had been hiding for years. 
 This weekend anniversary helps me to remember all of this. I remember it as grief 
but also as redemption. Because what I have learned from the trauma itself and the years 
that followed is that healing doesn’t look like I thought it would. Healing has looked like 




change—of scenery, of friends, of day-to-day life. Healing looks like weekend trips to a 
new city alone, just so that I can allow myself to cry as much as I want or laugh as much as 
I want. As I sit on that train, I just keep thinking about how exciting it will be to do 
whatever I want. There are things I want to see, but I keep the list short in case I decide 
something else has caught my eye. I will take pictures, but I won’t send them until I’m 
back in Glasgow. This weekend is for me. It is for the me from before, who is not the me 
now, nor the me I will become. 
 And this is what healing has meant to me. That there is freedom, both in allowing 
myself to mourn and weep and allowing myself to hope. I do not need to be anything else, 
because what really has happened in my healing is that I have stopped running. I have 
finally realized what my counsellor meant when she told me I needed to believe that God 
loved the me I was, rather than the me I was trying to be. I have stopped trying to become 
something and have decided to let that version of me arrive at her leisure. 
 
A Journey 
  I begin my thesis with a reflective prologue because as I have worked through this 
research, I have become aware of my need to both locate myself in the research and also 
outside of it. I obviously have personal ties to the topic of this thesis, yet I have also 
become aware of the danger of not acknowledging my own limitation in studying trauma. 
As philosopher Lorraine Code states in her chapter of Feminist Epistemologies, belief in a 
“view from nowhere… presupposes a universal, homogenous, and essential ‘human 
nature’ that allows knowers to be substitutable for one another.”1 The idea of a universal 
human experience is not only provably inaccurate, but unhelpful, particularly in my 
research. Instead, as Code argues for, I sought not only to understand my own experience 
and viewpoint, but to then break that down by knowing the lives and experiences of others. 
The structure of this thesis follows that process—therefore, I must first understand and 
explain my own standpoint.  
 I began to think about what it meant to be made in the imago Dei when I first 
encountered the predominant theories about the concept in seminary. I had struggled 
throughout my life to feel as if I ‘fit in’, and so grasping at this doctrine was another search 
for my sense of self. I had been raised in an Evangelical home, attending primarily 
Evangelical churches. I had never heard other than Evangelical theological theories about 
 
1 Lorraine Code, “Taking Subjectivity into Account,” in Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and 




things like the atonement, free will, or the imago Dei. So, I was inspired learning from 
twentieth century theologian Karl Barth. His insistence on God as the sole actor in our 
redemption always gave me relief.2 To think that I did not have to be perfect to be loved by 
God was refreshing. His theory of reconciliation as our salvation also provided me a much-
needed shift in thinking. However, even in the theology he gave me, I was still unsatisfied 
with his anthropology.  Still feeling out of place in seminary, particularly as I was only one 
of two women in the program, I hoped that regardless of my success, fulfilment, or ability 
to become, I was still one of these images, and I could not find this in Barth. I wanted to 
remove the image from any kind of requirement on me or my abilities, and to believe 
instead that I could merely survive. Most importantly, I began to believe that to be in 
God’s image did not have to mean fulfilling other people’s expectations of myself, but 
instead would be something that I could believe at my lowest moments. This belief could 
bring me out of the darkness and carry me through the places I could not walk. 
I began to study more diverse theology, as well. Global theology, liberation and 
process theology, and particularly feminist theology all opened my eyes to ways I had 
believed theological theories simply because of my background rather than because they 
made most sense. As I read through various literature, I kept coming back to the ways 
women, and other marginalized people, are unable to simply overcome the obstacles, 
oppressions, or traumas that prevent them from recognizing the image in themselves. 
Therefore, not only is it important that I recognize where I stand in this thesis, but it is 
essential that I decentre myself. In order to allow diverse experiences to inform my 
research, I have to “interactively”3 know others. As philosopher Sandra Harding explains 
the need for me to see how marginalized people experience trauma. She states: 
 
Knowledge claims are always socially situated, and the failure by dominant groups 
critically and systematically to interrogate their advanced social situation and the 
 
2 “Hence it follows that the work of God in the working of the creature, and His revelation in the revealing of 
the creature, can never be ascribed to the creature, but only and always to God Himself. That which works is 
His co-operating love. That which speaks is His co-operating Word. And for that working and speaking the 
creature on its side has no capacity. It is not, then, the creature which works in God’s working, but God 
Himself who works on and in His own working. God alone is and remains eternal love.” (Karl Barth, Church 
Dogmatics: III/3 [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960] 111.) 




effect of such advantages on their beliefs leaves their social situation a 
scientifically and epistemologically disadvantaged one for generating knowledge.4 
 
While theology has helped broaden and deepen my understanding of God and the 
world, I have always found literature (particularly from the period between the World 
Wars) to teach me in profound ways. It has been a helpful tool in understanding the larger 
world, as well as locating how I experience it. I am especially drawn to books that allow us 
to see complex characters not as role models, but instead as demonstrations of truths about 
life. As a teenager, I discovered amongst my mother’s books The Great Gatsby. I was 
enraptured by the book and the world it created, so I read everything that F. Scott 
Fitzgerald wrote. I loved his ability to construct such a beautiful world that was 
simultaneously so deeply broken. I saw Gatsby as a tragic figure who was unable to really 
know himself. His self-hatred was the primary theme that I perceived through the novel, 
but I also recognized Fitzgerald’s return to it throughout his other works. He wrote of men 
desperately trying to be something better, hoping that the money and fame and prestige and 
company would all fix the wounds of their pasts. I admired the lack of happy endings, too. 
In particular, in the short story, “Babylon Revisited,” we see the effects of what Fitzgerald 
believes is a poisonous drive of the ‘American Dream.’ Having lost his wife and lost 
custody of his daughter, Charlie Wales tries to fix his life. Yet no one believes he is better, 
and he ends the story still alone and sorrowful. Charlie, disconnected from community, 
does not find redemption for his trauma and wounds.  
 It is in Fitzgerald’s attempts to demonstrate the fruitlessness of this type of 
achievement that I began to connect trauma to my dissatisfaction in imago Dei theories. I 
realized that I had been trying to become not just a theologian, but one without an 
adjective. Instead of a relational theology, done in conversation and in community, I 
thought it better to seek an “unbiased” doctrine—something which I now understand is 
impossible, no matter who attempts it. I wanted to shed essential aspects of my life because 
they seemed like obstacles. Like Gatsby, I was trying to recreate myself as someone I 
imagined I should be but who did not really exist. However, I realized, my imago Dei 
could not be in a belief that I had to deny parts of myself; by doing that I would have been 
all surface and no substance, no truth, just like Gatsby’s elaborate façade. I am a woman. I 
am white. I have lived, and I have the scars and memories that come along with that. These 
 
4 Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: ‘What is Strong Objectivity?’” in Feminist 




parts of me are the lenses through which I see and am seen. My place in the world matters. 
As philosopher Giorgio Agamben said, “…it is only through recognition by others that 
man can constitute himself a person.”5 It is not that others put an identity on me, but that I 
know myself through the recognition of others. I know myself both in how I am similar to 
and different from people around me. I know things about myself because of how I relate 
to other people, how I react to them, and how I am affected by them. Agamben goes on to 
explain that we mask ourselves, trying to be seen in certain ways, but this is not truly being 
known. He says, “What we must search for is simply the figure of the living being, for that 
face beyond the mask…”6 I need to know myself, but also others, as we are actually. Not 
in what we strive to be. 
 Therefore, it became necessary to examine the imago Dei in terms of characters 
who I had initially thought were not like me. Or, rather, were more like me than I wanted 
to believe. I wanted to see what could happen if the hero of the story did not overcome, did 
not ‘learn to love herself.’ Could I believe that someone who ‘failed’ was, exactly as they 
are, also made in God’s image? And what would this do to my understanding of God? 
How can a flawed, wounded person image a perfect God? And if they could, could I?  
 The novels of Jean Rhys are similar to Fitzgerald’s in time period, geographical 
location (for some), and beautiful prose. Again, you see a world artfully described that 
removes the mask of achievement. Her characters, in various ways, attempt to hide, fix, or 
change who they are in order to become who they wish they were. Rhys’ incredible, ahead-
of-her-time understanding of intersectional oppression makes clear that the women have 
had little choice in their circumstances. The women of Rhys’ novels have been abused, 
oppressed, and neglected.  They do not always make ‘good’ decisions, but they are not the 
privileged men of Fitzgerald’s stories, throwing away or wasting opportunity. You feel for 
these women, but you also get angry at them. You wish you could help them, and you wish 
they would help themselves. You want someone to be nice to them, and you want them to 
stop being so mean to some people and trusting of the wrong people. The women are 
complicated, but Rhys does not help them out of their trouble. Rhys’ novels also do not 
have happy endings, but rather complex demonstrations of how multiple layers of suffering 
leave people without the possibility of so-called happiness. 
 
5 Giorgio Agamben, Nudities, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Redwood City, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 46. 




In examining different theories of the imago Dei, various understandings and 
conceptions of God, and diving deeply into the complicated world of Jean Rhys, I have 
discovered a way to understand the image of God that is always present in the wounds, the 
hurt, and the joys we carry with us. I can now see that I was never supposed to strive to 
become God, but instead to allow an intertwined relationship with myself, God, and the 
world in order to redeem the wounds I have. I do not try to go back to a clean slate, a 
version of myself that did not suffer, nor do I pretend these wounds are gone or were 
somehow actually good things. I see that I may suffer again, but these sufferings and my 
failings do not remove my imago Dei. If I want to believe, as Christian theology teaches, 
that everyone is made in the image of God, I must start with understanding how the image 
is present even when we do not see it or feel it. When we cannot acknowledge our own 
achievements, or when we merely survive the life we are in, we must be able to 
simultaneously acknowledge God with us. I cannot ask any longer how I am meant to 
become the image of God, but instead say that I am in every stage of life part of the imago 
Dei and allow that to transform how I move in the world.  
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis, then, is much like my train journey. Though this journey has personal 
impact, it is also one I find vital for theological work. It is necessary that theology is able 
to specifically identify the imago Dei in a broken, traumatized humanity. In not clearly 
demonstrating how the image is reflected in those who most need to be seen as part of the 
image, we have allowed the theory to be exclusionary and to perpetuate oppression.    
My work is in three main sections. The first section, comprised of chapters one and 
two, will work through various helpful and foundational theories. Chapter One briefly 
examines the works of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich before moving into an overview of early 
feminist theologians’ responses to them. In examining Barth and Tillich, I wish to first 
understand why they were so helpful in my initial theological reconstruction. The focus 
Barth has on relationship and the work of God has been very influential in my personal 
theology, and I need to begin there in order to give a proper foundation to my own work. 
Tillich, similarly, allowed my early theological convictions to incorporate my experiences. 
His method of correlation was the first experience I had of seeing theology interact 
practically with life. However, as I demonstrate through feminist responses to them, their 
work was still lacking in many ways. In understanding how Valerie Saiving, Judith 
Plaskow, Mary Daly, and Rosemary Radford Ruether interacted with these men and other 




Chapter Two is an examination of Black and womanist theology, particularly the 
work of Katie Geneva Cannon. The challenges Black theology offers to the work of those 
in Chapter One are essential to expand theology in order that it not be seen as 
predominantly white, especially in its application. Cannon’s theology is foundational, and 
her method allows it to become practical and active. Through this chapter, I have able to 
again identify how strength and the ability to overcome have been too predominant in most 
imago Dei understanding. 
In the second section I turn to literature as a theological resource. I will explain and 
defend my methodology in Chapter Three, looking at both the ways Cannon has combined 
literature and theology well, and the ways in which I think it can be critiqued and 
developed. In understanding the arguments of philosophers like Martha Nussbaum and 
Anneleise van Heijst, I develop a method of examining literature that challenges my 
theology and prepares me to rebuild it with important questions in mind. Therefore, as I 
explain, I work to remove the desire to ignore or inappropriately ‘heal’ trauma and 
oppression, and to allow the work of Jean Rhys to challenge how I will reconstruct my 
imago Dei theory. This leads me to Chapters Four and Five, where I analyse the four 
interwar novels of Rhys, seeing what traits her characters share and how they might inform 
my theology. In Rhys, I do not get answers, but instead I am able to narrow my focus. Her 
characters, amateur sex workers—women who are excluded from society who also begin 
to exclude themselves—offer challenges to my implicit bias toward those who ‘help 
themselves.’ As Fitzgerald’s work is often credited for critiquing the American Dream, 
Rhys’ work truly critiques the social hierarchies we often do not question. She is not 
simply arguing for equality between genders, but she layers various obstacles for her 
characters to give us an understanding of how economic, national, and gendered bias 
works together to exclude the most vulnerable populations. Her women are outcasts even 
from the groups they (seemingly) should be part of, but they are also not mere victims. In 
not only showing how the women have been abused, she explains how they then turn on 
others. In different ways, they each try to make someone even lower than themselves so 
that they can feel ‘better than.’ It is this principle that ultimately breaks apart the former 
imago Dei theologies I held, forcing me to reconstruct my theory based on my encounter 
with Rhys’ fictional world. 
The final section is the reconstruction of my imago Dei theory. Examining first 
theologies of trauma, in Chapter Six, I see how various theologians have emphasized the 
need to acknowledge and redeem trauma. These theologians, particularly Shelley Rambo 




this chapter, I develop not only a better understanding of trauma, but also the immanence 
of God. Because of a renewed understanding of immanence, I also look at the focus of God 
as primary actor, seeing how allowing God to be active and present also removes the need 
for us to ‘overcome’ those things that demean us in order to reflect the image of God. Yet, 
because of the challenges raised by Keller’s panentheism (in which I critique her 
understanding of God’s agency in transformation of people’s lives), I also need to examine 
my understanding of who God is. 
This leads to Chapter Seven, where I explore Kathryn Tanner’s radical definitions 
of transcendence and immanence. By seeing how redefining these terms has allowed 
Tanner to reconcile aspects of Barth’s theology of transcendence with her political 
theology requiring activism, I can also reconcile my belief in God as an active and unique 
being within the world with the trauma that I must acknowledge. Redefining transcendence 
then allows me to understand God as essentially connected to human trauma and wounds, 
leading me to a new definition of the imago Dei. This new understanding allows a paradox 
of hope and trauma, aligning the image with the grief of the broken. 
 Working on this thesis has been therapeutic for me to reconstruct my theological 
understandings. Yet it has also forced me to see the various ways I was both abusing 
myself and others. I realize that my trauma does not stop me from also inflicting harm, but 
that it also can allow me to connect with others in their own trauma. There is importance in 
how I understand what trauma can restore. 
 This train trip to Liverpool is not long. A couple of hours, and I am in a new city. 
I’m here to explore a place I’ve heard so much about. I’m here, alone on Valentine’s Day 
no less, to spend a night in a hotel room with takeaway and wine while I cry about loss. 
I’m also here to gain things. As I ride a tour bus around, I make friends with a couple 
visiting from the States. They complement me on my bravery. I smile and thank them, 
laughing inside at how a previous version of me would have been aghast to see this trip. It 
is a quick journey, but one I am grateful to take. Much like this journey I’ve been on for 
years, it introduces me to new people and hope and, as I stand in the pouring rain looking 





















1. The Image of God Explored: Examining 20th Century Theological 
Foundations 
Introduction 
In order to critique and restructure an understanding of the imago Dei that speaks to 
the concerns of women like myself, as well as those of others who are further marginalized 
by oppressive cultural and theological understandings, I will begin in this chapter by 
examining the work of those theologians who first challenged my previous understandings 
of the imago Dei. As I learned about the influential work of twentieth century neo-
orthodox theology, particularly the work of Karl Barth, I began to see the way in which 
God and humanity relate in new and more practical ways. Further, the methodology of 
Paul Tillich allowed me to see that rather than believing the imago Dei to be a theoretical 
concept not easily grasped, it could radically impact my daily life. Therefore, in this 
chapter I will look first at the work of Karl Barth, and the very practical aspects of his 
theology. Secondly, I will examine the work of Paul Tillich, whose work both directly 
addresses some of Barth’s conclusions and is often used in formulating responses to Barth 
by feminist and liberation theologians. Finally, I will briefly discuss some early feminist 
developments and critiques of the work of these and other influential male theologians. 
These mirror the questions I wish to pose and also show me the direction in which I need 
to travel in order to address the challenges that motivate this research. 
What follows is therefore not a comprehensive or in-depth discussion of these 
figures, but instead the beginning of road map I am constructing to explore the imago Dei 
in its complexity. Understanding the foundation upon which I began this exploration is 
vital and these first steps will continue to impact upon more comprehensive analyses as I 
move through the various ways in which contemporary theological work has expanded 
upon this important doctrine.  
Exploring Barth’s Theory of the Imago Dei 
 Karl Barth’s influence in systematic theology marks arguably one of the most 
important shifts in theology in the contemporary age. References to his work appear in a 
wide range of theological texts, from systematic to practical. Some of these contain 
critiques of his patriarchal approach, as well as noting other areas of concern. These are 
significant but it is also important to highlight the important contribution his theology 




“compromised in the face of the ideology of war”, 7 a compromise he believed had 
discredited liberal theology during the years leading up to the First World War,8 Barth 
sought to demonstrate the ways theological work could address social issues while 
maintaining a commitment to orthodox principles. Thus Barth did not divorce his theology 
from his context, but instead worked directly in response to the horrors of the wars and the 
Holocaust and steadfastly critiqued the ways Christian theology was being used to justify 
oppression and genocide.9 Particularly important in Barth’s work is the focus on God’s 
work in the world, which Barth sees as specifically accomplished in the Incarnation of 
Christ. In order to understand his imago Dei theory, I will thus begin with his work on 
Christology, and then on the nature of God, focusing particularly on how these impact his 
theory of humanity. 
 It is through the Incarnation that God’s reconciliation work is completed, fulfilling 
the will of God. As Barth said, “All things in heaven and earth are the objects of the divine 
purpose. But this purpose is not disclosed in all things; it is disclosed only in man. [sic]10 
The cosmos surrounding man is not alien to God.”11 Barth believed, primarily, that the 
purpose of God is to restore Creation. He sees this focus on reconciliation as central to 
understanding God’s freedom and love. Because God freely choses to love Creation, and 
therefore reconcile with it, “this desire and decision for union with creatures in Jesus Christ 
was…the ground and basis of the creation of the world itself.”12 This restoration was 
always intended to be undertaken through the Incarnation, and in fact, creation was set in 
motion for “no other reason than to enter into covenant fellowship with it…”13 This 
 
7 Stanley J. Grenz & Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1992), 67. 
8 “He was scandalized to find that nearly all of his liberal professors publicly supported Kaiser Wilhelm II’s 
war effort.” Aaron T. Smith, A Theology of the Third Article: Karl Barth and the Spirit of the Word, 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014), 17. 
9 “Liberal theology left no resources for self-critique in that it located the life and power of God in the 
fulfillment of idiosyncratic human goods. Now patriotism, collective achievement, and racial purity were 
endowed with divine significance and made relevant to salvation…. Against this, Barth took a definite 
theological posture, which endured throughout his life’s work.” Smith, Third Article, 17.  
10 It had been custom for ‘man’ to indicate ‘human,’ and while some take the time to ‘translate’ this term 
according to our current standards, I believe it is important to leave the words as they stand. Even as ‘man’ 
was supposed to stand for all humans, this is clearly a symbol of women’s separation from God. Discussions 
revolve around ‘man and God,’ rather than ‘woman and God.’  
11 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/2, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark: 1960), 16. 





restoration is achieved through Christ and reconciles God and humanity. Therefore, for 
Barth, God’s purpose and work in the world is embodied in Christ. He says: 
 
[Jesus] is the creaturely being who as such embodies the sovereignty of God, or 
conversely the sovereignty of God which as such actualizes this creaturely being. 
He is the creaturely being whose existence consists in His fulfillment of the will of 
God. And finally He is the creaturely being who as such not only exists from God 
and in God but absolutely for God instead of for Himself.14 
 
As stated, God works purposefully toward the restoration and reconciliation of Creation, 
which as embodied by Christ is then passed to humanity in order to continue that work. He 
says, “For the Creator Himself has turned to His creature not only in general but most 
particularly.”15 Relationship with this creature is, then, of primary importance, and “He 
who is the Creator of man is also the Creator of the cosmos, and His purpose towards the 
latter, although hidden as such, is none other than His revealed purpose for us.”16 This 
purpose of restoration is not solely God’s, as it has now become humanity’s purpose as 
well. However, the brokenness of humanity leaves us unable to accomplish this task. Barth 
argues it is always in and through Christ as God and Man that the divide is restored. Barth 
says, “Even the fact that man is the creation of God, standing as such in a special relation 
to God, is a fact that is not accessible to human thought and perception otherwise than 
through the Word of God [Christ].”17 Christ is the enactor, allowing humanity to be able to 
see God and participate in relationship with God.  
In this, we see that for Barth, God’s omnipotence is all-encompassing. God acts 
and in so doing, enables humanity to act. By bringing humanity into the work of God, 
again focused on the restoration of Creation, Barth states that all work done is located 
within this encompassing will of the One God. This means “God is one and indivisible in 
His working….[the Trinity] does not imply the existence of separate and divine 
departments and branches of authority.”18 Barth’s belief that the Triune God acts as One in 
purpose is thus transposed to the human as also acting in this one purpose. He continues: 
 
This is the fundamental consideration on the basis of which we regard it as 
legitimate and necessary to enquire specifically about the command of God the 
 
14 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/2, 133. 
15 Ibid., 3. 
16 Ibid., 18. 
17 Ibid., 25. 




Creator at the conclusion of the doctrine of creation….For the work of creation 
itself is not separate, nor is it a mere part of the one whole command, but the one 
whole command in this particular form.19 
 
God’s work, done through the activity of the Trinity and then passed on to humanity, is 
always focused on this primary goal of restored relationship. In centralizing this goal, 
Barth is then able to see each action of humanity as either for reconciliation or against it 
(and thus against God). Yet it is also important to continually stress the significance Barth 
places on all salvific activity being primarily the work of God. No reconciling activity can 
happen apart from God.20  
  
The Nature of Humanity and Sin  
As humans are unable to act according to God’s will without God first reconciling 
with us, the understanding of human activity must first be centred, again, on Christ. The 
Incarnation is the definitive reconciling act, and so humanity, in replicating Christ’s action, 
must itself be understood through Christ. This is the important shift Barth makes to shape 
the concept of the ‘Human’ through prioritizing Christ. Rather than centring the discussion 
of humanity upon people, Barth says, “It is from within this context that theological 
anthropology must interpret man. But in so doing it interprets man himself in his inner 
reality.”21  When Barth then uses this framework to discuss the Christian’s call to be Christ 
to the world, this means human activity continues the activity of Christ. The reconciling 
work that humans do is participation in the continued reconciliation of the Incarnation. 
Barth says of humanity: 
 
They are not simply and directly the covenant-partners of God as His creature; they 
are destined to become this. And this means concretely that they are destined to 
participate in the benefits of the fellow-humanity of that One, to be delivered by 
Him…. From the very first, even in their creatureliness, they stand in the light 
 
19 Ibid., 35. 
20 “Hence it follows that the work of God in the working of the creature, and His revelation in the revealing 
of the creature, can never be ascribed to the creature, but only and always to God Himself. That which works 
is His co-operating love. That which speaks is His co-operating Word. And for that working and speaking the 
creature on its side has no capacity. It is not, then, the creature which works in God’s working, but God 
Himself who works on and in His own working. God alone is and remains eternal love.” (CD III/3, 
Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1960), 111. 




which is shed by Him. But if they are in His light, they cannot be dark in 
themselves, but bright with His light.22 
 
However, human beings are not God and sin disrupts their participation in God’s 
reconciling work. Sin, in Barth’s view, is the replacement of God with self. He explains 
that “Sin in its totality is always pride.”23 As with his other doctrines, Barth understands 
sin Christologically. Sin manifests itself as the human acting in place of God and 
participating in evil that opposes the work of God in Christ. Going against the work of 
Christ can be seen as attempting to usurp the hierarchy of God over humanity or, simply 
stated, attempting to be powerful outside of God’s will. Any such human action then 
represents a failure in fulfilling who we were created to be, because it is done apart from 
reconciliation with God. Actions that perpetuate the destruction of Creation, like sloth or 
deceit, can only be overcome by the work of Christ in reconciling with Creation.  
In Barth’s context, we can see the work of the Nazi party as a model for what it 
means to act directly against God. The destruction of other human lives, deceit about God 
and God’s purpose, and the attempt to elevate some new view of the right ordering of 
creation directly contradict Christ himself. In analysing Barth’s view of sin, Aaron T. 
Smith says, “Sin is perpetual criminal offense, unjustified reversal of life and death, the 
relationship in which we stand with God….It is robbing God of his due majesty and glory 
by placing ourselves first and him second.”24 Understanding how Barth perceives the 
doctrine of humanity as having practical consequences for how life should be lived in the 
world enables us appreciate the importance he places on rightly conforming our 
theological approach to God’s revelation. To understand God in any way apart from the 
specific life and work of Christ is, in Barth’s view, not only not to know God but also to 
work against God’s reconciling purposes in the world. 
The Nature of God 
In this context, Barth’s work on the Trinity, and especially the Spirit, can give 
practical insights into God’s continuing work of restoration after the Incarnation. Barth’s 
analogy of the Trinity as Revealor, Revelation, and Revealedness25 indicate a unity in 
 
22 Ibid., 225. 
23 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961), 414. 
24 Smith, Third Article, 26. 
25 This analogy can be seen in many explanations of Barth’s trinitarian doctrine, but can also be seen in CD 





action. As Arvin M. Gouw explains, “In the revelation-based trinity, the unity of God lies 
in the essence of God. But in the reconciliation-based trinity, the unity of God lies in the 
bond of the Holy Spirit.”26 As stated, the Triune God works as a unified whole in the act of 
reconciliation, but Barth locates our bond to that act in the process of Christ as Revelation 
and the Spirit as bonding us to that Revelation. The Spirit, now the direct presence of God 
in the world, works through humanity in a cooperative mission to continue the purpose of 
God.  
In his book on Barth’s pneumatology, Aaron T. Smith says, “As Spirit of the Word, 
God exists and is known in the time of his acts, in his history with humankind.”27 God’s 
acts are now linked to the Church’s acts as the Church acts in accordance with God’s will 
and nature, seen through Christ. Barth sees this as a progression of activity in the world, 
moving from the first person of God to the third that is connected to us. He explains that 
this progression highlights the relationship between God and humans as well, saying, “it 
leaves the Creator and the creature and their mutual relationship within the bracket of the 
credo.”28 This credo, the Christian belief about God, states that God freely created out of 
God’s own loving desire to be in relationship with Creation. Again, I quote Barth: 
 
It is the noetic basis of creation. When and as we know what free and absolutely 
basic and controlling grace is—the grace of God revealed to us in Jesus Christ as 
the remission of sins and the resurrection of the dead, as the kingdom of God—only 
then do we know, but then we know for certain, what creation is, who the Creator is 
confronting man, and what it means to be the creature of this Creator…”29 
 
It is from the beginning demonstrative of the character of God, in the actions of creation 
and Incarnation, to be reconciled with and in restored relationship with humanity.  
Yet while God works toward reconciliation, humans in their brokenness (sin) are 
still distinct from God. They are, he emphasizes, “the creature man, who would not exist 
without God, who exists only by His will, who has contributed nothing to Him…”30 This 
distinction reminds us of the broken aspects of humanity--pride and disunity, which keep 
 
Reconciler and Redeemer does not imply the existence of separate divine departments and branches of 
authority…. Always in the ethical event God commands and man acts in all three spheres at once.” 
26 Arvin M. Gouw, “Transcendence and Immanence of the Trinity in Barth and Lossky,” Dialogo 
Conferences and Journal, 2 no. 2 (2015), 28. doi: 10.18638/dialogo.2015.2.2.2. 
27 Smith, Third Article, 165. 






humanity from fully participating in the reconciliation of Christ. Therefore, demonstrating 
Christ’s reconciling relationship between God and the world also highlights distinction 
between humans, and shows that relationship among humanity is a practical outworking of 
this doctrine. In explaining this, Barth employs an understanding of relationship based 
upon the I-Thou encounter.31 This event is firstly one through which Jesus brings humans 
into their true humanity. Jesus takes the confession of “I am” and then requires us to 
respond to that. As Barth says, “In thinking and pronouncing this word [I], I do not remain 
in isolation.”32 As Jesus says ‘I’, we relate to Him and then say ‘I’, relating to others. 
Furthermore, our response is as the ‘Thou’. We are both ‘Thou’ to Jesus and to each other.  
 The Spirit ‘reforms’ us to a humanity reflecting Christ. To be truly human is, as 
previously stated, to be like Christ. Smith explains, “It is the life and action of the Spirit to 
overcome our reality with God’s, to be the self-determinative capacity of God for us.”33 It 
is therefore, as Lisa P. Stephenson points out, an imago trinitatis that humans display. She 
says, “Therefore, humans display the imago Dei in a twofold sense: by being created as a 
‘Thou’ whom God as an ‘I’ can confront and … existing in an I-Thou relationship to one 
another.”34 Barth’s focus in this area is consistently on two things: that humans display the 
imago Dei in relation to both God and each other, and that God is the primary agent 
enabling humans to do this. Stephenson explains that there are four principles to Barth’s 
appropriation of model of the I-Thou relationship as it applies to mutual relationships 
within humanity. She defines these as: 
 
1. Begin with one person looking the other in the eye. 
2. There is to be mutual speaking and hearing between the two persons. Although 
openness within an encounter is vital and lays the groundwork for humans, they 
must go beyond being open and move into the experience of speech. 
3. Mutual assistance is provided between the two persons. 
4. This conception resists the precedence of individuality and points persons 
toward the other. It rejects the Cartesian ‘I think, therefore I am’ philosophy in 
which it is possible to be an ‘I’ without a ‘Thou’. In addition, this conception of 
the imago Dei embraces the totality of the human person. The image is not to 
 
31 Barth was influenced by Martin Buber’s book I and Thou, published in 1923, which explains Buber’s 
understanding of humanity’s relationship with God. Barth, and others, used this concept in developing his 
own understanding as I discuss here. 
32 Ibid., 244. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
34 Lisa P. Stephenson, “Directed, ordered and related: The male and female interpersonal relation in Karl 




be found only in one aspect of a person (e.g. soul, reason), but includes all 
aspects [of selfhood].35 
The Image of God 
 This brief review of Barth’s theology demonstrates the holistic understanding that 
underpins Barth’s relational model of the imago Dei. It implies much more than a mere 
concession that humans image God by being in relationship with each other or even with 
God. The relationship required demands more than an ideal form of love. Instead, Barth 
stresses that this loving relationship is working toward a shared purpose. We do not simply 
love each other in the theoretical sense, but rather we must also practically impact upon 
each other and recognize how we each interact in order to reconcile with God. Once again, 
it is important to be aware of Barth’s context, and his concern that proper theology leads to 
better society (as evidenced particularly in his opposition to the German Christian Church 
of Nazism36). 
 
Relationship as Liberation 
The focus Barth places on Christ’s work and his centring human action on the 
purposes of God has been significant in some forms of liberation theology.37 In her essay 
on this topic, Jane A. Barter says, “The idea of liberation cannot, according to Barth, be 
grounded in theories of the self or society; but instead, must be given its content in the 
concrete historical encounter of God with humanity in Jesus Christ.”38 This establishes the 
purpose of reconciliation as paramount, in light of God’s reconciliation with all of 
humanity. It then works to prevent human motives or selfishness from damaging the work 
of liberation, and thus can keep liberation open to all people. This liberative work does not 
mean the person will be freed from oppression, but that the oppressed can be confident in 
being liberated to both self-actualization and participation in the divine purpose. She 
explains, “In Christ, the Christian is liberated to service of God and neighbour.”39 The 
person is able to act in the mission of reconciliation and extend this mission of reconciled 
relationship to others. In both Barter’s and Stephenson’s assessments, Barth’s relational 
 
35 Stephenson, “Directed, ordered and related,” 447-448. 
36 “Barth’s theology is able to take a prophetic stance toward the world, a strength that clearly demonstrated 
in his early denunciation of Nazism as a form of idolatry…” Grenz, 20th Century Theology, 75. 
37 See my later discussion of James Cone, Chapter Two, page 49. 
38 Jane A. Barter, “A Theology of Liberation in Barth's Church Dogmatics IV/3,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 53, no. 2. (2000). Cambridge University Press: 154–76. doi:10.1017/S0036930600050717. 




imago Dei allows people to work toward better and mutual I-Thou relationships, which 
would theoretically reduce oppression. Liberation in context of reconciliation allows for 
the restoration of both the oppressed and the oppressor, ideally. The overthrow of these 
oppressive relationships would be achieved with a perfected living out of the I-Thou 
relationship. This mode of living would mirror the Trinity, bringing humans closer to 
living in accordance with God’s purposes for creation. He explains: 
 
In its basic form humanity is fellow-humanity. Everything else which is to be 
described as human nature and essence stands under this sign to the extent that it is 
human. It if is not fellow-human, if it is not in some way an approximation to being 
in the encounter of I and Thou, it is not human.40 
 
Through this understanding, our human relationships must more closely replicate the 
mutuality of the Trinity, and thus become more focused on reconciliation. As Barth 
emphasizes of the Trinity, “The perichoresis of God’s three modes of being does not 
destroy their independence.”41 Emphasizing the unity and independence of the Trinity 
again, Barth allows for their differing actions toward the same will. While Barth sees each 
member’s action as unique, the outcome (restoration) is the same. Humanity, then, should 
likewise act toward this same goal, even as individual works and circumstances differ. 
God’s outward empowering work restores creation, giving it the ability to return this love 
to God and to Creation as a whole. 
 
Relationship as Hierarchy 
This argument for a reconciling and restorative relationships between humans 
appears ideal and has been elaborated upon by many theologians. It is particularly 
influential in liberation or practical theologies. However, while Barth’s argument for the 
imago Dei rests initially on action and restorative relationship, there are significant 
problems in how he actually applies this to real relationships between people. Specifically, 
Barth still holds to a divinely ordered and implicitly hierarchical understanding of gender 
relations. Stephenson points out that, “Barth believes that when the female follows the 
male initiative, the female actualises the fellowship that they both participate in 
together.”42 This model of hierarchy is, as Stephenson notes, intended to promote:  
 
 
40 Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/2, 285. 
41 Barth, Church Dogmatics: III/4, 33. 




mutual initiative and mutual response between the male and female, [but] Barth’s 
model of an ordered, interpersonal relation between male and female does not 
exhibit mutual initiative and response between the two sexes and thus does not 
reflect the quality and character of the internal interpersonal relation of the 
Godhead.43 
 
The outworking of Barth’s relational model depends on his argument that relations reflect 
the created order. Barth sees the imago Dei as being hierarchical largely because this 
relational model is taken to be a mirroring of the Trinity44; including an inherent imbalance 
in power dynamics between men and women that are seen as directly contributing to the 
purposes of God. Stephenson explains, “The male is not a person because he is first, or 
superordinate, or the leader. The female is not a person because she is second, or 
subordinate, or the follower.”45 Instead, it is within the interaction they have with each 
other that personhood is achieved. Having come first, men initiate, and thus hold the role 
of initiator in the relationship between man and woman. This reflects the Triune order for 
Barth. The Father sends, Christ reveals God, and the Spirit bonds. Man, Barth maintains, 
“is ordered, related and directed to her very differently from what she is to him.”46 Though 
Barth claims equality for women ontologically, they are relationally to respond to men, as 
Christ and the Spirit relationally respond to the Father. Gouw explains, “As an outflowing 
of this divine essence, the trinity exists as three persons in the divine energies, yet the 
Father is the source of this outflowing, maintaining the monarchy of the Father.”47 Barth 
mirrors this functional hierarchy in men and women, saying, “If order does not prevail in 
the being and fellowship of man and woman…the only alternative is disorder….A 
precedes B, and B follows A. Order means succession. It means preceding and following. 
It means super- and sub-ordination..”48 Barth believes that this inequality really displays 
equality, because “it affects equally all whom it concerns.”49 However, he proceeds to say 
that man is “taking the lead as the inspirer, leader and initiator”50 and any rebellion from 
the woman on this is akin to disorder, which as previously stated is sin. This understanding 
of both God and humanity leaves a very real, and demonstrably problematic, order of 
 
43 Ibid., 444. 
44 It is best to look at Barth’s “revelation” analogy of the Trinity, as seen on page 21, footnote 25. 
45 Stephenson, 446. 
46 Barth, Church Dogmatics III/4, 164. 
47 Gouw, “Transcendence and Immanence,” 30. 






power—it is not true equality but instead circumstantial equality. Men hold power in the 
initiation, as God is ultimately the only powerful being in the God-human relationship. 
This contrast of power must be acknowledged and, as I will explain, many have seen this 
inequality as ultimately detrimental to the Barthian imago Dei theory. 
It cannot be ignored that in this model, there exists an obstacle between women and 
God. In emphasizing the leadership position of men, obedience is then the function of 
women, whether they are ontologically equal or not. While many have tried to deny this 
has practical consequences in women’s lives51, the damage this can cause has been 
researched and documented.52 The practical outcome of Barth’s theology represents a real 
problem, no matter how he strives to claim equality for the sexes. If women are 
subordinate in function, they are surely in some manner also subordinate in ontology—just 
as humans are ontologically subordinate to God. Barth argues that man leads woman in 
doing the work of God, but also argues that we are fully human in our participation in 
God’s work. This is a clear statement about the divide between women and God.  
 
Paul Tillich’s Advocacy of Courage 
 A contemporary of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich did most of his substantial work after 
leaving Germany due to his opposition to Hitler’s regime. Because of his critical opinions 
and radical teaching, he had been released from his professorship at the University of 
Marburg but was then invited to teach at Union Theological Seminary. Due to his 
circumstances, his most influential works were published both in English and German. 
Like Barth, Tillich is to be numbered amongst those striving for social change through 
theological work. Yet though they have obvious similarities, Barth and Tillich disagreed 
on foundational doctrines, particularly the Otherness of God. Unlike Barth, Tillich saw 
God as essentially connected to humanity, and thus rejects the notion of a contrasting 
 
51 I cite Smith’s defense of Barth, “However, the language of ‘command and reception,’ or ‘super-ordination 
and subordination’ should be taken neither to indicate a form of ontological deficiency in the Godhead nor to 
justify, on such a basis, male-female hierarchy in humanity.” (Smith, Third Article, 3). This may be 
comforting to some of Barth’s followers, but a theoretical equality that is not functional is no better than an 
ontological hierarchy.  
52 Please see an academic study of abuse: Westenberg, Leonie. “‘When She Calls for Help’—Domestic 
Violence in Christian Families,” Social Sciences 6, no. 3 (2017): 71. 






power dynamic between God and humans that Barth upholds. Furthermore, Tillich’s model 
of theology, based on the method of correlation, begins in a very different way from 
Barth’s. Rather than seeing the world first through Christ, Tillich believed it was necessary 
to begin with the questions the world articulates in cultural forms and address these 
through theological answers. This existentialist approach to theology then centred his work 
on being. He sought to explore both the beingness of humanity, but also of God. It is 
through these connections that Tillich’s imago Dei theory is developed. 
 Tillich states, “Theology, as a function of the Christian church, must serve the 
needs of the church.”53 This opening sentence of his Systematic Theology frames the work 
as focused on the need to serve the church by speaking of God comprehensively to “every 
new generation.”54 As he explains his focus in the ‘Introduction’, in which he cites works 
from Barth to Martin Luther, the challenge is bring together an “emphasis on the eternal 
truth over against the human situation and its demands.”55 In contrast to Barth, however, 
Tillich is determined to remain attentive to humanity through this linking of divine 
disclosure and contemporary human concerns. He describes his method of correlation as 
the defining gesture of theology: 
 
Theology formulates the questions implied in human existence, and theology 
formulates the answers implied in divine self-manifestation under the guidance of 
the questions implied in human existence. This is a circle which drives man to a 
point where question and answer are not separated.56 
 
This move “evoked the protest of theologians such as Karl Barth, who were afraid that any 
kind of divine-human correlation makes God partly dependent on man.”57 Because human 
questions and divine answers are no longer separated in Tillich’s thinking the formation of 
the God-human relationship does not rely on the clear division Barth insists upon between 
God and humanity. They are in a correlative relationship, which “means something real for 
both sides.”58 While Tillich implies a correlative theological approach can encompass a 
plethora of questions, he still determines, “The basic theological question is the question of 
 
53 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (London: James Nisbet and Company Limited, 1968), 2. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., 5. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 68. 




God.”59  This is not in opposition to other questions, though, but rather frames the basic 
question of being. As he links question and answer, Tillich affirms, “God is the answer to 
the question implied in being.”60 This prompts the movement towards asking “What is 
being-itself?”61 Tillich’s answer to this is God. God is not simply the “highest being” or “a 
being alongside others” but instead “it is possible to say that He is the power of being in 
everything and above everything, the infinite power of being.”62 This relocates the notion 
of power, as well. Rather than the Barthian insistence that God is the primary actor, the 
only source of power, it locates power as a mediated relation between God and creation.  
The Nature of God 
God is the power that gives being to Creation but is not opposed to it. There is no 
contradiction, no divide, between God and Creation. Thus, Tillich argues that God can be 
known through symbolic understanding63, and we must focus on the significance of that 
symbolism. As Tillich continues to examine the nature of God, his work on the Spirit and 
the Trinitarian principles further explores the work of God in the world. He begins by 
considering God as Spirit, “the most embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the 
divine life.”64 Spirit, for Tillich, is the unity of the body and mind, not a part but instead 
the “all-embracing function in which all elements of the structure of being participate.”65 
Therefore, the Godhead does not have a “person” who is Spirit, but rather is holistically 
Spirit. This does not mean Tillich denies the Trinity, but instead sees the Trinitarian 
principles as movements of God within Godself. He explains the first principle as the basis 
of the Godhead, or “the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its 
origin.”66 The second principle cannot be reduced to logos but is instead the creativity of 
the Godhead. In this, he arrives at the understanding that the third principle, the Spirit, 
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unites the two principles and “is in a way the whole.”67 The Spirit allows the Godhead to 
be effective in majesty and creativity. It is through this empowering view of God that 
Tillich desires humans to determine their place in Creation. As the question-answer circle 
is posed, humans understand their own being through the understanding of God’s being. In 
seeing God as Spirit, Tillich states that it is Spirit that gives life, creation is grounded in 
God as Being-Itself and so also grounded in the processes of God’s existence.  
It is important to note that in declaring God as Being-Itself, Tillich is directly 
rejecting a common interpretation of the doctrine of transcendence—that God is other than 
or infinitely separated from Creation.68 This rejection is in accordance with his rejection of 
the idea of absolute difference and separation between God and humanity. This motif then 
extends to a general rejection of difference and/or separation in humanity itself, other to 
emphasize the pitfalls of stressing distinctions between people or allowing difference to 
assume undue importance. However, this is less helpful than it may seem in dealing with 
oppression or marginalized groups. Erasing differences, no matter how well intentioned, 
may prevent us from grappling with the oppressive features of differential social realities 
and nor does it allow for the goods of human difference to be affirmed. I will continue to 
examine this later in this chapter. 
The Nature of Humanity and Sin 
Tillich’s work on being did not end with Systematic Theology. His work The 
Courage to Be (1952) was published a year later and continued exploring the idea of 
‘nonbeing’. In his biography of Tillich, Andrew S. Finstuen explains, “In contrast to the 
collectivist and individualist solutions to the human situation, Tillich advanced an 
explicitly Protestant form of courage in response to the three threats of nonbeing.”69 These 
threats of nonbeing are what Tillich termed ‘anxieties’. Rather than circumstantial fears or 
references to mental health, Tillich specifically defines anxieties as deeply rooted 
existential fears. Therefore, anxiety appears “in three forms” which are connected to “fate 
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and death…emptiness and loss of meaning…[and] that of guilt and condemnation.”70 
Anxiety in these forms is thus common to all people and not linked to a lack of resilience 
or specific fear inducing circumstances. Fear of death, for example, is not the fear of a 
sudden or imminent threat, but the general fear of death that defines existence. The three 
fears together combine into the general fear of nonbeing—the person will either cease to 
be literally or symbolically, through loneliness or ostracization. Here I note similarities to 
the I-Thou model discussed previously in that understandings of human brokenness are 
centred on isolation and non-participation in the I-Thou relationship. 
 Tillich’s discussion of these anxieties relates to his understanding of the doctrine of 
sin. Rather than linking sin to specific actions, Tillich likens it to separation from God. In 
Systematic Theology he says, “The state of existence is the state of estrangement. Man is 
estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself.”71 In his 
essay on Tillich’s doctrine of humanity, David E. Roberts writes, “Sin disrupts essential 
unity between man and God. It is the attempt to centre life, power, and meaning in one’s 
own finite self.”72 Tillich argues that humanity, in the desire to find worth and self-
sufficiency, separates from the life which God gives, and seeks instead to assert being in an 
overly individualistic manner. Sin is not manifest in specific choices or deeds but, “is an 
expression of man’s estrangement from God, from men, from himself.”73 In Courage To 
Be, he explains that this estrangement is then felt in the “anxiety of meaninglessness.”74  
 As anxiety is revealed through a person’s struggle with the fear of nonbeing, the 
fear of ostracization from society, whichever way this is manifested, also continues to 
affect the person’s ability to connect. He explains that this disconnection produces a 
continuous searching, “one is driven from devotion to one object to devotion to another 
and again on to another.…Everything is tried and nothing satisfies.”75 Finally, the person’s 
anxiety, in its most extreme form, gives in to despair. Roberts continues:  
 
Man’s inability to overcome the estrangements which characterize sin produces 
despair. As Kierkegaard saw, despair has two elements: first, self-hatred, including 
the will to self-annihilation; and secondly, the feeling that man cannot escape from 
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himself, accompanied by the extreme measures he takes to try to escape (such as 
flight into mental illness, mental disease, intoxication, accidents).76 
 
Following Søren Kierkegaard’s understanding of despair, Tillich argues that anxiety must 
turn to courage rather than despair, for the only other option to dealing with despair is 
neurosis. “Neurosis is the way of avoiding nonbeing by avoiding being,”77 as he explains, 
and this avoidance of being leads to affirming something which the person is not. This 
avoidance of being stops the person from making “responsible decisions” or “any kind of 
moral action.”78 While Tillich attempts to separate the concept of nonbeing from this 
pathological anxiety, or neurosis, he clearly states that the person is now self-destructive, 
increasingly far from restoring their essential being and relationship with God (Being-
Itself). As this anxiety continues, Tillich says, “the warnings of fear no longer have an 
effect” and “life vanishes.”79 This is how Tillich understands sin as leading to death. It is 
not the physical cause but rather, “One desires annihilation in order to escape death in its 
nature, not only as end, but also as guilt.”80 
 To be inwardly focused is also to disconnect from God (Being-Itself), which 
disconnects us from others (beings), and thus we to cease to be. To overcome this sin, the 
person must restore relation with God. They must overcome alienation by recognition of 
connection to God, to creation, and turn towards an outward focus. Yet, even within the 
state of disconnection there is a sense of God. As George Pattison explains: 
  
Tillich nevertheless resists what he calls the heterodox view that the substance of 
human life is as such originally fallen, since, even in the state of separation, there 
remains a consciousness of God. Paradoxically, therefore, the reality of sin 
becomes evidence for God!”81  
 
God draws near, because as Tillich argues, estrangement from God actually generates 
evidence of God. Even as we pull away, we are always aware of God and that we are 
denying our true essence.  
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The Image of God 
Therefore, anxiety cannot merely remain anxiety, but must move toward courage. 
As Tillich begins to define courage in The Courage to Be, he says it is recognition of self 
regardless of oppression. “Courage is the affirmation of one’s essential nature, one’s inner 
aim or entelechy, but it is an affirmation which has in itself the character ‘in spite of.’”82 
This idea of in spite of holds much weight for the whole of Tillich’s argument. ‘In spite of’ 
is the use of the anxiety of non-being to reclaim being, the overthrowing of outside forces 
or inside voices trying to alienate us from our nature and beginning to become in active 
and thoughtful ways. The person who reclaims this, who allows their anxiety of non-being 
to shift into becoming, then fully embraces their stature as human. They are no longer 
restrained by oppression. The anxiety of non-being is defeated. Pattison reminds us that 
this is always done in conjunction with and in connection to God—although once again 
this is connection to our true selves as well. Pattison says: 
 
No matter how deeply separated we may have become from our essential being and 
no matter how fragmented and conflicted our lives may have become, we retain an 
implicit sense for what would make us whole. The isolated individual wants love, 
the empty formalist craves depth and content, the chaotic child unconsciously 
yearns for boundaries, and so on. Nevertheless, in the situation of estrangement, we 
cannot give ourselves what we need. In art or utopian imagery we can envisage 
how a fulfilled life might look but mostly, it seems, we cannot attain it.83 
 
As stated in Tillich’s conceptual frame anxiety is necessary for us to be able to turn toward 
courage, and as we experience anxiety, we develop courage. Anxiety is necessary for us to 
understand our ability to partake in the relationship with Being-Itself and to return to our 
true essence. Tillich claims this is done through vitality. Vitality, which he calls “power of 
life,” means that humans “can transcend any situation in any direction.”84 Humans, when 
encountering situations, are able to overcome the difficulties of the situation and be 
“beyond” them. Tillich says this is through being linked to the essence of being, to have 
courage in spite of the situation one is faced with. As he states, “He can transcend any 
given situation in any direction and this possibility drives him to create beyond himself. 
Vitality is the power of creating beyond oneself without losing oneself.”85 He uses this 
concept of “in spite of” repeatedly to show that the circumstances will continue to oppress, 
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to divert the person from overcoming, but that the possibility to overcome lies within the 
person’s connection to Being-Itself and their true being. Regardless of the situation, for 
Tillich, anxiety can properly lead to the courage to overcome. 
Tillich’s definition of courage needs to be interrogated further here. Courage is not 
a lack of fear, but the conscious decision to overcome the anxiety of nonbeing. Tillich is 
not speaking of courage in the face of specific circumstances; he discusses how the desire 
to reclaim being propels the person to see any oppression or any situation as unable to 
destroy their essential being. The person then feels connected to society, or their own 
community, and thus does not see the situation as ultimately threatening to this part of their 
being. Vitality has given way to courage. He says: 
  
Courage as a human act, as a matter of valuation, is an ethical concept Courage as 
the universal and essential self-affirmation of one’s being is an ontological concept. 
The courage to be is the ethical act in which man affirms his own being in spite of 
those elements of his existence which conflict with his essential self-affirmation.86 
 
This idea of courage as reclamation of self, in whatever form this takes for the individual 
person, becomes particularly meaningful when brought back into conjunction with his 
method of correlation. Tillich’s method removes the barrier between religious and secular 
life, allowing the two to be deeply integrated with each other. However, there is still a 
tension in this situation, as Tillich points to the tension of being both in the world and 
outside of it. David E. Roberts explains: 
  
Being a self means that man is both over against the world, as a subject, and in the 
world, as an object. He is so separated form everything as to be able to look at it 
and act upon it; he so belongs to the world that he is an episode in the process. But 
each factor determines the other.87 
 
This leads us to understanding Tillich’s relational model of the imago Dei. As Barth 
worked to emphasize the imago Dei as action mirroring the Triune God, Tillich also links 
relationship (with each other or with God) to action. Once a person has the courage to 
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Courage for the Marginalized? 
Tillich’s work on the issue of becoming, and his understanding of the imago Dei, 
directly includes and supports the experience of the marginalized—those experiencing a 
variety of oppressions and sufferings. The Courage to Be discusses how humanity can 
overcome various difficulties, diverse anxieties, giving hope to those who do not currently 
see themselves in the imago Dei. All of this is both important and helpful, especially in 
terms of allowing women and other similarly marginalized peoples to claim full 
participation in the image, or truly, in the identity of being human.  
To ask questions about life is the starting point for Tillich, and this is precisely why 
his contribution has been so significant to the work of feminist theology. As Krista Hughes 
says, “the self ought to be reconsidered altogether: as that which is internally constituted 
by its relations with others.”88 Like Tillich, Hughes is seeking to demonstrate that people 
are both separate and connected to the world around them. People are shaped by their 
experiences, and so those experiences, cultures, or other people must be included when 
examining the self. Theological work with standpoint epistemology focuses on this same 
need,89 to constitute the self in relation with others. As many feminist theologians 
demonstrate, understanding anxieties and their movement toward courage are not merely 
theoretical concepts, but in fact have very practical implications for women’s lives.  
Feminist Theology’s Response 
 In this frame Tillich’s work has an empowering aspect. Nevertheless, just as 
Barth’s interpretation of the imago Dei is inherently restrictive due to its retention of 
notions of ordered hierarchy, Tillich’s imago Dei is restrictive in its assumption of 
universal human experience. Both, truly, are issues of power. While Barth is clearly 
allowing unequal power to exist within humanity, Tillich does not adequately address the 
fact that unequal power is a reality in the world. To fully understand the implications of 
this issue within theology, I turn to the formative works of Valerie Saiving, Judith 
Plaskow, Mary Daly, and Rosemary Radford Ruether. As they address prominent 
understandings developed by various male theologians, they develop theology more 
attuned to the lives of the marginalized. 
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Valerie Saiving: The Reclamation of ‘Selfishness’ 
In 1960, Valerie Saiving published “The Human Situation: A Feminine View” in 
The Journal of Religion. This is widely regarded as marking the emergence of feminist 
theology in the contemporary context. In this essay, Saiving criticized the dominant white 
male views of sin and personhood, focusing primarily on their representation in the 
theological thinking of Reinhold Niebuhr. Her work became a critical reference point for 
emerging feminist theologians directly influencing several key thinkers including Mary 
Daly and Judith Plaskow90.  
In “The Human Situation,” Saiving begins by addressing specifically the problem 
of assuming universal experience. She says, “This alone should put us on guard, especially 
since contemporary theologians constantly remind us that one of man’s strongest 
temptations is to identify his own limited perspective with universal truth.”91 Because she 
begins with scepticism that a ‘man’s’ theology is universal, she can consider the concept of 
anxiety from a distance. Seeing that anxiety is characterized by “fear for the survival of the 
self and its values”92 it follows that the anxiety of man is pride. As she points out, “Man 
knows he is merely a part of the whole, but he tries to convince himself and others that he 
is the whole.”93  
Women have a different experience, though, according to Saiving. Looking 
specifically at the anthropological work of two women, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, 
she highlights the different societal roles women undertake. In the dominant view, as 
exemplified in Barth, men are to take the lead and women are to follow. While men are 
taught to develop individuality to differentiate themselves, a woman “will, in a broad 
sense, merely take her mother’s place.”94 Saiving says that a man “must prove himself” 
while for a woman “all she needs to do to realize her full femininity is to wait.”95  This 
waiting takes several forms in the woman’s life. First, she waits for her body to begin 
menstruation, the first step into womanhood. Then she waits to become pregnant, 
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something Saiving says is a passive role for women. The man impregnates the woman, 
even if it is within a consensual relationship. She waits to breastfeed, to serve her family, 
and then to see this complete in menopause.  
Yet all of this was changing, in Saiving’s view, because of cultural transformations. 
Now that (white) women were not entirely overwhelmed with domestic labour, there were 
opportunities for them to exercise greater agency and explore the active development of 
their achievements. As women began to have careers, to work outside the home, to 
progress in these “masculine” ways, Saiving says the anxieties of women must be 
specifically addressed. For Saiving, it is clear that women differ from men, but that this 
does not equal subordination. She says, “They want…to be both women and full human 
beings.”96 Niebuhr’s concept of sin as pride, that she is directly addressing here, does not 
thus equate to women. Women are instead trying to discover how to be fully human, 
because, as Saiving argues, women’s ‘sin’ is selflessness. She locates women’s sin in 
trivializing themselves and their work, and in looking to “others for one’s own self-
definition.”97 For Saiving, it is important for both men and women to overcome their 
respective sins in order to work in the cooperative way Barth and Tillich desire. Women 
will not return to the place of follower, she proclaims, and this is a good thing. She argued 
that in doing this, society would recapture the love, freely given by God and then mirrored 
by humanity, that many theologians (including Barth) see as redemptive/restorative.98  
Judith Plaskow: Essential Selfhood 
Saiving’s work directly influenced the Jewish theologian Judith Plaskow. Her 
book, Sex, Sin and Grace: Women’s Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Paul Tillich (1975), is introduced with a review of Saiving’s essay. Using Saiving as a 
starting point, she examines Niebuhr’s and Tillich’s theologies of sin and grace. Like 
Saiving, she sees women’s experience in society as characterized by passivity. She says, 
“Women have passively conformed to expectations of them,” but at the same time have 
“enrich[ed] it.”99 In examining this experience, she posits that a main problem within 
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women’s lives is “that women do not shape their own experience, but allow their life 
choices to be made for them by others.”100  
After establishing her analysis of women’s experience in society, Plaskow turns to 
Niebuhr’s understanding of sin. Like Saiving, she views it as inadequate. However, 
Plaskow does not remain satisfied with Saiving’s analysis either. Instead, she sees sin as 
linked to finitude. She says: 
  
Human nature as finite freedom poses a danger but it also imposes a responsibility. 
Human beings can ignore their finitude, but they can also fail to live up to the 
obligations of their freedom. The refusal of self-transcendence ought to be, if one 
uses Niebuhr’s categories, no less a sin than pride—a sin against oneself, against 
other persons, and against God. If pride is the attempt to usurp the place of God, 
sensuality is the denial of creation in his image.101 
 
Further, Plaskow does not see a viable solution in Tillich’s doctrine of sin. While it 
seems to be able to transcend the male specific views of Niebuhr, she sees it as having 
ultimately the same consequences. The problem with Tillich’s method is specifically in his 
understanding of self. She says, “Tillich establishes selfhood, in the ontological sense, as a 
primal reality.”102 This cannot work, as Saiving has already demonstrated. “Essential 
selfhood…does not in itself exist,” she explains.103 While aspects of Tillich’s work can be 
used to understand women’s experience, it is grounded in the assumptions of a male 
experience. Plaskow states, “Just as he does not provide the philosophical basis for 
understanding sins of self-negation in the doctrine of sin, so he does not clearly explain 
how such sins are affected by the dynamics of acceptance.”104 
Plaskow concludes her book with an optimistic view of experience. Rather than 
being concerned with developing a universal viewpoint, she welcomes the diversity. She 
says, “If there is no universal experience, there are significant human experiences which 
many groups share and which may be illuminated through concern with particular 
experience….Human particularity represents not just limit but also possibility.”105 
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Mary Daly: God and Women 
Tillich’s influence is especially obvious in Mary Daly’s Beyond God the Father: 
Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (1973). Daly begins her book with a radical 
revisioning of God, which is largely inspired by the failings she sees in theologians like 
Barth. She believes that Barth, Niebuhr, and others “spend energy answering questions that 
women are not really asking.”106 Rather than focusing on what women need and want, 
these theologians are merely placating them by attempts to argue that the assertions of Paul  
on women and other “problematic” areas of the Bible are not to be read as  misogynistic. 
This is unacceptable. However, in her re-examination of Christian theology, she finds 
much common ground with Tillich, and especially his work in The Courage to Be.  
Daly begins her critique with the traditional concept of God as a being. If God is a 
being, separate from the created world, then God still “functions to legitimate the existing 
social, economic, and political status quo, in which women and other victimized groups are 
subordinate.”107 Daly believes that some (men) in the human race will appear to most 
resemble God if God is a specific being, and that this will necessarily entail the separation 
of other people from God – as well as continuing patterns of male domination. As Daly 
famously said, “If God is male, then the male is God.”108 Moreover, to see God in the 
traditional sense of a being is to see God as over and against creation, detached from it and 
thus idealizing a harmful detachment from the created order. She says, “it is damaging and 
implicitly compatible with sexism if it encourages detachment from the reality of the 
human struggle against oppression in its concrete manifestations.”109 Daly believes that 
specific forms of oppression must be addressed, and so in discussing both God and being, 
as Laurel C. Schneider says, “She finds it essential to place non-being squarely within the 
experience of structural evil and the oppression of women under patriarchy.”110  However, 
women have the potentiality to create, in the image of God, a new world. Daly argues that 
women can overcome nonbeing by overthrowing the patriarchal structure that is currently 
crushing them. 
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Daly’s next step in re-examining the language used to define God is to move past 
Tillich’s argument for God as Being-Itself. While Tillich argues for God as the power of 
being, Daly takes this image further in describing God as action. Through emphasizing the 
active nature of Being-Itself, God becomes “Verb” rather than “Noun.”111 God is no longer 
simply Being-Itself, or the power of being, but instead God is the active verb of “Be-
ing.”112 Daly says, “Women who are experiencing the shock of nonbeing and the surge of 
self-affirmation against this are inclined to perceive transcendence as the Verb in which we 
participate—live, move, and have our being.”113 
Second, with specific reference to women’s situation, she critiques Tillich’s 
understanding of courage. She has rightly addressed a main difficulty within it in that it 
“lacks specific grounding in the concrete experiences of the oppressed.”114 This leads her 
to question the practical outworkings of his theological argument. Detached from the 
specifics of oppression, or rather, the specifics of sexism, it must remain a detached and 
purposeless theology. Tillich’s work does not specifically address sexism, and so cannot 
further human overcoming as Daly believes we must. Instead, we should talk of God by 
encouraging humanity to move toward the “androgynous mode of living, toward 
transcendence.”115 While all humanity is threatened by nonbeing, as Tillich claims, Daly 
believes that the consequence of this falls most heavily upon women in a patriarchal 
society. It is therefore crucial that they respond with courage, As she states, “I am 
suggesting that at this point in history women are in a unique sense called to be the bearers 
of existential courage in society.”116 As Tillich argued for three phases or types of anxiety, 
Daly says that women have an added anxiety that is especially difficult to overcome—the 
anxiety manifest in guilt at rejecting social norms. She explains, “The anxiety of guilt over 
refusing to do what society demands, a guilt which can hold one in its grip long after it has 
been recognized as false.”117 Yet when a woman is able to deal with this added anxiety, 
and to overcome it, this allows her to reach “higher levels of intellectual discovery or 
creativity;”118 which is the great courage Daly promotes. 
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Despite her strong critique Daly continues to use the language of Tillich in her 
analysis. She continues to argue for the courage to be in the face of anxiety of nonbeing, 
just as Tillich does, and to even accept both a greater awareness of the self and the whole 
of society as the outcome. However, the woman has a special responsibility to reject 
incorporation into this society, striving to create a new one in which she is no longer 
oppressed. It is vital to remember that Daly argues that humans’ ability to transcend is how 
they can reflect the image of God. She says, “It is the creative potential itself in human 
beings that is the image of God.”119 
While Daly’s work represents a vital reshaping of Tillich’s approach that engages 
with the transformative role that women can play there are aspects of her work that are still 
open to question and critique. In seeking to move beyond male understandings of God she 
also moves entirely beyond the male-centred religious traditions of Western culture.120 
This means abandoning this sacred inheritance entirely. The move to recreate society apart 
from religion is not one supported by all feminist theologians. In their own critiques of 
Barth, Tillich, of Daly’s contemporaries, chose to remain within the religion that had 
formed their understandings of the sacred.121 For example, in her essay on Daly, Judith 
Plaskow explains that while Daly chose to leave Christianity, her decision to stay within 
Judaism was influenced by Daly’s encouragement to remain and “highlight and expose 
areas of oppression.”122  
Rosemary Radford Ruether: God in Relationship  
Rosemary Radford Ruether is a leading Catholic feminist theologian who has 
worked prominently in the areas of liberation theology and ecofeminist theology. Her 
commitment to the Catholic church is apparent in her work, which often focusses upon 
how churches can work to “achieve justice.”123 She is also an important voice in my work 
here, as she remained committed to Christianity even in working to deconstruct much of its 
patriarchal heritage. 
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Ruether, like other second-wave feminists, was concerned with the masculine 
language surrounding talk of God.  Like Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, a New Testament 
scholar and another early feminist theologian, she worked with a ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’, in interpreting sacred texts and traditions. This reveals that much of the 
language of the Bible is patriarchal and thus must be re-examined and redefined in order to 
allow for the full participation of women in humanity. Her early work particularly focused 
on the “existing social hierarchy and system of power” that had been justified through this 
problematic language.124 Like Daly, she believed that referring to God in masculine terms 
was exclusionary of women, but moreover she believed it did not fully encompass the 
character of God. Instead, she discussed God’s being as an “empowering matrix.”125 By 
defining God in this manner, Ruether believed it demonstrated the all-encompassing nature 
of God. God is “beneath and around us as an encompassing source of life and renewal.”126 
Ruether’s reason for avoiding gendered analogies for God, or, like her fellow 
feminist theologians deciding to use feminine language particularly, is primarily motivated 
by her concern not to limit God. She argued against the limitations gendered forms place 
upon God, the disconnect from continuing faith in Christianity which some feminist talk of 
God assumed (particularly the goddess language popular with some feminists like Carol 
Christ), and her continuing belief in the ineffability of God. She explains: 
 
Christian theology has always recognized, theoretically, that all language for God is 
analogical or metaphorical, not literal….To take one image drawn from one gender 
and in one sociological context as the normative possessors of the image of God 
and the representatives of God on earth. This is idolatry.127 
 
In essence, Ruether was taking Barth’s “otherness” doctrine to its own conclusions, 
arguing that even his insistence on the male pronouns for God and the hierarchy model he 
proposed was imposing too much knowledge upon God. In an edited volume representing 
the early days of Reuther’s work, Pamela Cooper-White says, “Theologically, at least one 
wing of the liberal feminist method could be seen…in the appropriation of the thought and 
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method of major nineteenth- and twentieth-century theologians, such as Karl Barth…”128 
This appropriation, Cooper-White argues, allowed continued attempts to achieve equality 
with men. However, Ruether’s theology proves her desire is to not simply gain equality 
with men, but rather to mend broken relationships women have with God. Ruether rejected 
the hierarchy Barth and others had continued. As Clifford explains, “This hierarchy creates 
an unnecessary distance between women and the God to whom they pray that can present 
difficulties for women in their spirituality.”129 
 Important in understanding Ruether’s theology is her desire to not only elevate 
women, but to affirm their place in their faith traditions. Unlike Daly and others who left 
Christianity and turned their backs on traditional forms of religion, Ruether believed 
women could affirm Christianity and work within the tradition to dismantle sexism. In her 
work, there is a critique of the past, a seeking of alternatives supported by biblical or extra-
biblical traditions, and finally a construction of a theology that affirms “women’s 
personhood, her equality in the image of God, her equal redeemability, her participation in 
prophecy, teaching, and leadership.”130 Ultimately, Ruether believed that by focusing on 
more authentic understandings of God would contribute to the end of sexist oppression of 
women. She says: 
 
The patriarchal distortion of all tradition throws feminist theology back upon the 
primary intuitions of religious experience itself: namely, the belief in a divine 
foundation of reality which is ultimately good, which does not wish evil or create 
evil, but affirms and upholds our autonomous personhood as women, in whose 
image we are made.131 
 
Reuther is thus advocating that women should question the motives of previous 
interpretations, translations, doctrines, and teachings of faith and begin to build a theology 
that more genuinely reflects and responds to the nature of God. If God is loving, good, and 
upholds life, then theology must affirm those characteristics. Ruether argues that these 
understandings of God do not align with the hierarchical and power-focused theologies 
previously constructed. Most importantly, Ruether’s theology enforces an equal standing 
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within the imago Dei that directly speaks to the experiences, including the diverse kinds of 
experiences, of women. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have been able to distinguish aspects of imago Dei theologies that 
remain helpful, while identifying areas in which they remain lacking. In analysing Barth 
and Tillich, I continue to maintain their importance in affirming principles such as God’s 
participation in the world, the deep connection the world has with God, and the need to 
recognize the power that can come from this. Continuing to the feminist theologies, I have 
emphasized that this power of God is meant for the marginalized in particular—God 
empowers the powerless, and is active and present to everyone, not just the privileged. 
Recognizing that too much desire for individual power leads to oppression of the ‘other’, I 
can continue to challenge my own theology to be one of reconciliation. 
While each of the theologies I have examined above have expanded understandings 
of both God and humanity in relationship with God—to varying degrees of inclusiveness--
I am also keenly aware of the social privilege each standpoint implicitly maintains. These 
theologies have contributed much of value in enabling understandings the imago Dei that 
relate to my own experiences and those of many other women like me. However, I realize 
that I must also understand how these types of theologies function within a context of 
systematic marginalization. While I certainly respond to the work of the feminist 
theologians who have articulated responses to Barth and Tillich similar to those outlined 
above, I am still left with a sense of unease. As I asked in relation to Tillich’s 
existentialism, “I do not see how someone who is experiencing violent or life-threatening 
suffering is helped by being admonished to ‘overcome anxiety.’” I cannot assume that my 
growing ability to see myself in relationship to God applies in the experience of those who 
have not had the same support and opportunities I have benefited from. Here, I truly must 
begin to decentre my own standpoint and allow other views to challenge how I recognize 





2. The Image of God for the Oppressed: Focusing on Lived Truths  
Introduction 
As outlined in chapter one, I am searching for a more transformative and inclusive 
understanding of the imago Dei than those which have prevailed in the past. Barth’s 
Christocentric theology vivifies the image in terms of reconciliation. God is reconciled to 
humanity through Christ, and the image of God is restored in us by participation in this 
relationship.  This reconciliation is displayed by imitating Christ’s actions during his life 
and through restored relationships with others. For Tillich, the image is a source of 
existential courage. We connect to our anxiety and use it to develop the courage which will 
in turn enable us to partake in Being-Itself (God) and transcend our circumstances.  
 While these theological models have helpful aspects, I was unsatisfied because 
neither addressed my context as a woman nor the feminist critique of theologies based on 
male-centred perspectives. Specifically, I had experienced profound personal devaluation 
because of my gender and neither of these theories addressed the way in which women, in 
particular, struggle to affirm the imago Dei in relation to their own identities. Thus, I was 
encouraged by the work of those feminist theologians who have directly responded to the 
dominant theological traditions I have represented through Barth and Tillich. Pioneering 
feminist theologians, inspired by Valerie Saiving, voiced the need for women to reclaim 
their own value in the face of societal oppression. Furthermore, through Saiving’s rejection 
of the universalizing notion of sin as pride (identified as a facet of male experience in 
particular) I came to understand how doctrinal perspectives can be challenged and revised 
through engaging with the diversity of human experiences. 
In truth, however, the theology being developed by these white feminist 
theologians, still focused largely on universalizing categorizations of experiences and 
existential conditions. As has been widely discussed the feminist theologians of the second 
wave did not adequately take into account the different types of oppressions women of 
colour faced.132 Moreover, during the period in which these feminist voices emerged Civil 
Rights movements and liberation theologies were advocating more radical forms of 
engagement equipped to speak to real experiences of marginalized groups and promote 
transformation. As Womanist theologian Keri Day explains in her chapter “Doctrine of 
 




God in African American Theology,”133 rightly stated, “Concepts of God could either 
cultivate the conditions for the possibility of human equality, justice, and transcendence or 
frustrate these attempts altogether.”134 I am aware of and acknowledge the many missteps 
white feminists have taken in this regard. As theologian Mary Hunt states, “White 
feminists have made and continue to make a lot of mistakes. Experiences of race, 
nationality, gender, class, sexual orientation, and access to resources create conditions of 
inequality that persist over generations.”135  
 As stated, in research that seeks a more inclusive and liberatory vision of the imago 
Dei, I must challenge my own privileged location and listen to those who are speaking 
from the margins. In this chapter, I therefore begin with a review of insights from Black 
Theology that contribute to my project. I begin with James Cone’s engagement with and 
critique of Barth; a critique that raises challenges to my own theological presuppositions. 
Following this, I will move to examine work of Womanist theologians, focusing on the 
influential theologian and ethicist Katie Geneva Cannon. Through Cannon’s distinct 
theological method, my understanding of the imago Dei is not only enlarged but becomes 
more focused. Cannon’s theology challenges my understanding both by raising questions I 
need to address and by giving me further tools to reconstruct my own theological 
perspective. Her development of the doctrine of imago Dei links theological examination, 
historical contexts, and practical applications to demonstrate the real implications this 
doctrine has upon cultures. In her theology, I am able to see how she can continually re-
examine her own bias and desires in order to strive for the most ethical theological 
anthropology possible. Furthermore, she is able to see common ground in otherwise 
differing theologies, explaining how they can all inform her own understanding.  
 Through this exploration of Black and Womanist theology, I will seek to expand 
both my perception of the doctrines of the imago Dei and understanding of God, clearly 
aligning them with the practical and social activism the theologians in chapter one of this 
thesis were also advocating. By embracing the work of Black and Womanist theologians, 
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not only can interpretations of these doctrines become more inclusive, but issues of 
theological methodology will emerge with greater clarity.  
Black Theology and the Doctrine of God 
Womanist theologian Keri Day’s analysis of an African American doctrine of God 
demonstrates that theology in African American contexts is “in part…against a white 
theological backdrop that did not take racial equality and justice seriously in its 
constructions of God.”136 Therefore an important aspect of Black theology is the response 
it makes to white theology, the oppression suffered under white supremacy, and the ways 
in which these two things are related. As a result, Black theologians often begin 
theological analysis with a re-examination of the image of God in theology.137 As stated 
previously, Mary Daly argued in a different context, “If God is male then the male is 
God.”138 If images of God are modelled on the figures of powerful white men who control, 
judge, and exercise authority then we are at risk of losing the image of God who shares the 
suffering of those who are oppressed. Furthermore, the beliefs humanity holds about God 
are enacted in the way we approach human relationships. As Day says, “Enslaved Africans 
recognized that one’s theological anthropology (being the nature of humanity in relation to 
God) was directly connected to one’s construction of God.”139 And so, it is fundamental to 
Black Theology to begin with challenges and revisions of the doctrine of God. After doing 
this, I will be able to present a better understanding of the imago Dei prevalent in Black 
Theology. 
Theological work has been highly significant for Black activists and religious 
thinkers in the United States. As James Cone and Gayraud S. Wilmore state, “Our 
interpretation of history, its tragedies and its triumphs, has come out of our encounter with 
God, and our understanding of God has come out of our historical struggle.”140 For Black 
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theology, God’s interaction with the world and presence in the world are vital. Unlike 
Barth’s understanding, here God’s immanent involvement with creation had to be 
emphasized in order to affirm the worth of Christianity to people whose lives were 
structured by systemic injustice. Stanley Grenz explains, “If God is real, then this God 
must be involved in the struggles of the present to bring about liberation from 
oppression.”141 While Barth argued for the importance of God’s separation from the world 
in order to avoid adjusting our theology to popular cultural norms, as he accused the Nazi 
party of doing, Black theology recognized the importance of God’s activity in the world. 
Without an understanding of God’s connection and presence in this current time, it was 
understood, Christianity would become merely a theoretical belief system without saving 
potential. 
The influential forebear of Black Theology Howard Thurman142 argued that “the 
divine personhood of God grounds and makes possible the absolute value and worth of all 
human persons.”143 Thurman’s understanding was particularly focused on the idea of love 
in community. In his mystical theology each person was endowed with a “Divine Spark” 
which connected them to God.144 The Fall, or sin, is understood as a separation from God 
due to selfish desires. As a person returns to God, their spark gradually unites them with 
God and transforms them into people who seek loving connection with others. In 
Thurman’s thinking, the more loving and more focused upon others a person becomes, the 
more they are connected to God. 
 Thurman’s theology here is not completely dissimilar to Barth’s, though. As in 
Barth’s ‘I-Thou’ understanding of the image of God,145 Thurman emphasized that the 
consequence of knowing God would be reflected in our interactions with other humans. 
Thurman says, “To speak of the love for humanity is meaningless. There is no such thing 
as humanity. What we call humanity has a name, was born, lives on a street, gets hungry, 
needs all the particular things we need.”146 Loving others means loving them in their 
particular place, understanding the particular person, and being concerned with their 
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particular needs. However, Thurman’s approach is more particular than Barth’s as he calls 
for an active stance against distinct oppressions such as systemic racism and the violence it 
generates. Thurman’s theology clearly embraces an activist stance but from the 1970’s 
onwards many African American theologians wished to go further than him in challenging 
what came to be described as ‘soft’ theological discussions.147 As Day describes, there 
were increasing calls for black liberation theologies148 which proclaimed that 
understandings of God must speak directly to social structures and challenge the evils of 
systemic oppression. A leading figure in this development was the theologian James Cone.  
James Cone: Theology is Anthropology 
For Cone, theology is always human-talk about God.149 It is impossible to separate 
the forms this talk takes from concrete human situations—historically, culturally, and 
experientially. The tendency of white theology to assume a “universal” viewpoint is, Cone 
and other liberation theologians would argue, naïve at best and deceitful at worst. As he 
stated, people’s theology “cannot be divorced from their place and time in a definite 
history and culture.”150 Cone accepts Ludwig Feuerbach’s dictum: “Theology is 
anthropology”151 in the sense that it is always rooted in the world we find ourselves in and 
constructs horizons to support our human longings.  Through Cone’s anthropological 
theology, God is imaged as actively siding with the oppressed, requiring a committed 
stance against oppression and systemic injustice, and suffering with the “poor and weak of 
society.”152  
 But Cone’s thinking on these issues does not entail an entire repudiation of former 
theological thinking on the imago Dei. Importantly, Cone began his theological work 
studying Karl Barth. Cone’s doctoral dissertation, “The Doctrine of Man in the Theology 
of Karl Barth,” was an examination of Barth’s theological anthropology, from which Cone 
was able to build a framework for his own black theological thinking. In interrogating the 
development of Barth’s theological anthropology Cone writes,  
 
In liberal Christianity, it is not God who determines the religious relationship; it is 
[thinking] man [who relies on reason to know God]. We must not forget that Barth 
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began his career as a liberal theologian. The first World War [however] shattered 
his hope of the Kingdom of God on earth. In due time Barth was led from his 
anthropocentric conception of Christianity to a thorough-going theocentric 
conception.153 
 
Understanding Barth’s historical context is vital to understanding the evolution of Barth’s 
work, and Cone points out the way this context shaped Barth’s conception of God’s 
otherness. Barth’s influence on Cone’s future work here is clear. Barth, along with his 
dialectical contemporaries, sought to understand Christianity’s place in the developing 
crises of World Wars I and II and in particular address the theological responsibility for the 
nationalistic, racist ideologies of these wars.154 Cone’s theology, like Barth’s, is 
contextually located understanding of “what we have understood God to be doing….”155 
These theologies are, intrinsically, methods of working against injustice.156 However, as J. 
Kameron Carter says, “Cone was not seeking to do ‘white theology’ in (Barthian) 
blackface.”157 His was not a mere adaptation of dialectical theology in African American 
context, but instead, a utilization of the tools of white Western theology in order to push 
theological examination further, and to more actively locate that examination in the context 
of African Americans. His desire to develop a theology for the Black Power movement 
allowed him to examine Barth’s theology and turn it “into a critique of white theology.”158 
From God to Humanity 
My exploration has thus far been focused on the image of God in human lives 
within a Christian perspective, and this work is primarily undertaken ‘in light of Christ.’ 
This is particularly the case in Black theology. In his essay “Black theology and human 
purpose,” theologian and ethicist Riggins R. Earl, Jr. states, 
 
In black theology, the notion of human purpose is closely tied to a perception of 
Jesus. In this sense, human purpose (or theological anthropology) is connected to 
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Christology (or the life and import of Jesus the Christ). It is the human being, Jesus, 
who models human purpose.159  
 
Rather than notions of overcoming (as with Tillich’s courage) and empowered imitation 
(as with Barth’s Christology), Black theology is specifically looking toward Jesus to 
understand human nature and purpose. In a significant move, the ministry of Jesus and his 
sacrifice are used to question traditional understandings of self-denial that are 
commonplace in white theologies160 Earl argues that we must rethink self-denial in 
connection to people who are not wilfully sacrificial but who are forced to make sacrifices 
because of structural oppression. Specifically, it must be understood that African 
Americans were not wilfully practicing self-denial by being slaves to others. This type of 
enforced ‘loss of self’ conflicts with what Earl understands as ethical becoming. He says, 
“Philosophically and socially, the idea of self-denial must be viewed as the primal ethical 
act that is foundational to the self’s developmental sense of agential identity and 
accountability.”161 Self-denial, then, must be a voluntary act demonstrating the person’s 
agency in choosing to serve the other, not a forced servitude.  
 Furthermore, self-denial is not to be practiced with disregard to the self. Earl 
connects his theology to that of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, one of the few white theologians he 
believes demonstrates an understanding of different types of denial. He argues that 
Bonhoeffer rejects understandings of self-denial as a type of “suicide.”162 Instead 
Bonhoeffer states that, “To deny oneself is to be aware only of Christ and no more of self, 
to see only him who goes before and no more the road which is too hard for us. Once more 
all that self-denial can say is, ‘He leads the way, keep close to him.’”163 This type of self-
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denial is a movement of the self to become like Christ, to be near to Christ, and it enables 
us to endure suffering because Christ leads the way.  
 In recognizing these important distinctions between modes of self-denial, Black 
theologians work to understand the humanity of those whose selfhood is forcibly destroyed 
by an oppressor. Cone images this recognition as welcoming the advent of a ‘Black 
Messiah’ who helps black people to ‘deny the false white Messiah’ they have been offered 
and recognize God’s salvific solidarity with their struggles.164 Cone and other Black 
theologians argue that this Black Messiah has liberative potential for Black people, and 
that this form of Christocentric theology allows Black people to regain their agency and 
sense of humanity - even as they continue to be oppressed at the present time. There is 
hope for the future for, as Cone emphasizes, Jesus was resurrected as the sign of God’s 
resurrecting power. The kingdom is this resurrection. Therefore, “Jesus is now my story, 
which sustains and holds me together in struggle.”165 
Developing Cone’s theme further, Earl connects the narrative of Jesus to the work 
of leaders of the Civil Rights movement, including Martin Luther King, Jr. In his civil 
disobedience Cone believed King demonstrated how Black people can share in Jesus’ 
redemptive work. Earl states: 
  
James Cone correctly saw that, especially as embodied in King, obedience to the 
way of the Cross of Jesus, which symbolizes self-denial, leads to self-actualization. 
For King and Cone, self-denial commanded by Jesus empowers the oppressed to 
assert human purpose in a nonpassive, self-agential manner.166 
 
In this frame action taken by the oppressed to regain agency is discipleship to Jesus. To do 
work to free others from similar oppression is the way of the Cross.   
 In his examination of liberation theology, philosopher and theologian Cornel West 
argues that in this practical application of liberation theology, serious and comprehensive 
understandings of the various strains of these theologies is required. He argues that “the 
major intellectual task of liberation theologians is to continue to re-examine and reshape 
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the traditional doctrines of the church…”167 In keeping with this, Black theology is also 
required to continue examining itself over and over. Importantly, Black theology must 
examine its treatment of Black women and their role in liberation theology. As Cone 
states, “Although Black women represent more than one-half of the population in the 
Black community and 75 percent in the Black Church, their experience has not been 
visibly present in the development of Black Theology.”168 The feminism that had arisen in 
the 1960s and 70s, as I discussed in chapter one, was implicitly focused on the privileged 
status of white women. Similarly, the work of Saiving and Plaskow and other feminist 
theologians was unable to be inclusive in extending the imago Dei to comprehend Black 
women’s particular circumstances.169 Saiving and Plaskow focus on women’s need to 
recover from the ‘sin’ of selflessness, yet they still focus on issues truly only applicable to 
privileged women - such as the right to enter the workforce voluntarily. Saiving, 
particularly, locates hope in the movement of women from the “traditional” role of 
housewife to have their own meaningful careers. This perspective, based upon white 
women’s experience, does not consider the fact that most Black women were already 
working outside the home; not because of their desire to achieve autonomous selfhood but 
because of economic necessity.170  
Black theology, as it emerged, while arguing for the liberation of Black people, was 
also unable to address the specific to the circumstances of Black women. As Cone admits, 
“It was not until I was challenged by Black and other Third World women that I became 
aware that the significance of feminism was not exhausted by the White women’s 
movement.”171 In acknowledging that Black women were being ignored by both liberation 
theologies, Cone insists that the work of Black women theologians is vital “to do justice to 
this issue.”172 
The Need for Womanism  
Liberation for all women needs to include diverse experiences of what reclamation 
of self might look like. This liberation cannot be assumed to apply in exactly the same 
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form to all women, and therefore must be embodied in various and differing contexts. 
Black theology and Feminist theology offered insufficient resources to comprehend the 
multi-layered oppression of Black women. Being oppressed in terms of both their 
blackness and their gender, even within the Black community itself, necessitated the 
production of theological thinking that would specifically address their concerns. As 
theological reflection must be practiced with the particularity of human experience in 
mind, it became clear that feminist theology had to be challenged. Much as Cone used 
some of the tools of white theology to construct his own work, womanism both uses the 
resources of Black and feminist theology and creates its own vivid, new theological vision. 
This, as theologian Cheryl Kirk-Duggan explains, is womanist theology:  
 
Womanist theology emerged as a corrective discipline during the 1980s, concerned 
about the plight of black women in the United States, of global African diasporan 
women, ultimately the wholeness of all persons across gender, race, class, age, and 
ability.173 
 
This intersectional theology draws inspiration from the work of Alice Walker, as Black 
women voiced their own experiences. Kirk-Duggan cites the origins of this as being 
 
[W]hen scholar-activist Katie G. Cannon adapted Walker’s definition as an 
analytical rubric. She recognized that neither traditional feminist theology, which 
problematized gender, nor traditional black theology, which problematized race, 
provided all the categories needed for her world, which included poor black 
women, “the least of these.”174 
 
This need for womanism is explained further by Katie Cannon: 
 
The womanist writing consciousness does not obscure or deny the existence of 
tridimensional oppression but rather through full, sharp awareness of race, sex, and 
class oppression we present the liberating possibilities that also exist….Whether we 
begin with paradigms created by mentors of European and Euro-American ancestry 
or with theoretical constructs emerging from the oral traditions in the African 
Diaspora or with a dialectical, syncretistic interplay between the two, we must 
answer the inescapable questions of appropriation and reciprocity.175 
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Cannon’s acknowledgement of the complex relationship between theologies is also seen in 
the way other womanists respond to and discuss certain feminist texts. In response to early 
white feminist texts, theologian J. Cameron Carter explains that Black women “have been 
positioned in such a way as to receive actual and figurative violence against and 
domination of their bodies not just by white males but by men of any race with white 
women’s participation.”176 As I outlined in the previous chapter, feminist theology 
struggled to grasp the way Black women had been positioned as prime representative of 
abjected, sinful bodies against men’s (primarily white men’s) disembodied goodness. 
Womanists made clear that while white women are seen as embodied (and thus tied to the 
“flesh” in a way white men are not), they still are granted some agency. If they perform in 
appropriate ways—wife, mother, homemaker, modest, chaste, etc.—they can “overcome” 
their fleshly nature. They are, in some respects at least, able to express choices through 
their bodies. Black women, however, have not in many historical and contemporary 
contexts been able to make their own decisions concerning whether to marry and when to 
stay at home raising their babies etc. 177  They have been often subjected to the violence of 
rape without legal redress and in terms of this they stand in a fundamentally different 
relationship to their bodies. As Carter explains,  
 
But if this is a statement of white women’s existence in relationship to man (she 
is for [the white] man), its deepest presumption is that (white) woman does 
indeed possess a body. She is man’s complement. But this is precisely what the 
colonial experience—and related to this, modern slavery—refused to black and 
similarly positioned (indigenous) women. In their situation, just as lands were 
deemed unknown and empty (terra nullius / terra incognita), the people of those 
lands (and in the case of slaves, those brought into those lands to work it) were 
deemed unknown and empty. They were not just reducible to their bodies as their 
original possessions (as in the case of white women). They lacked even this; 
possession of the body for them was not a possibility.178 
 
In advocating revised understandings of personhood for Black women, Delores 
Williams continues to explore the identification with Jesus that is so important within 
Black Christianity maintaining that the main focus of this should be on Jesus’ life and 
ministry, rather than his suffering and death. She argues that redemption comes through 
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participation in the liberative ministry of Jesus, which entails the work toward “self-
actualization, self-control, and self-care” as well as ministry to others.179 She thus moves 
the focus from Jesus’ suffering to his call to discipleship, and argues that in the experience 
of Black people, caring for themselves is a valid response to that calling. It also has 
kingdom significance. The survival and progress of Black people resisting the oppression 
of slavery and its legacy in a racist social order broadens human purpose and unites them 
in Christ’s mission. 
 Womanist theologian M. Shawn Copeland similarly calls for a Christ-centred 
embodied theology that can bring freedom to Black people. In her text, Enfleshing 
Freedom: Body, Race, and Being, she lays out five points she believes connect their bodies 
to what becomes an empowering interpretation of the doctrine of the imago Dei. These 
points are: 
 
That the body is a site and mediation of divine revelation; that the body shapes 
human existence as relational and social; that the creativity of the Triune God is 
manifested in differences of gender, race, and sexuality; that solidarity is a set of 
body practices; and that the Eucharist orders and transforms our bodies as the body 
of Christ.180 
 
These five points direct her theological anthropology to bring about a freedom that does 
not require situational change, overcoming, or reconciliation with oppressors to become 
actualised. Instead, the imago Dei is already seen in the lived, embodied existence of 
people. For black people, Copeland says slavery “deformed these convictions.”181 It 
attempted to destroy potential in black people and to “displace God” within them. 182 In 
order to redeem the imago Dei in black people she calls for them “to love their flesh, to 
love their bodies, to love themselves and one another into wholeness”183 in the present and 
in future hope. 
 This call for self-love is prevalent in Black theology. It is not the kind of love much 
white theology calls for; the disconnected “love your neighbour” mandate that requires me 
to abrogate my personhood. Instead, it envisages a dignity of self-love even in the presence 
of oppression. This dignity is formed from the lived practice of respectful love in a 
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community of oppressed people who, whilst unable to practice self-determination, 
nevertheless continue to deny the oppressors claims they are lesser beings. To fully 
understand the nature of this dignity, I turn now to Katie Geneva Cannon and her 
presentation of dignity as a kind of “quiet grace.”184  
Katie Geneva Cannon: Restoring the Imago Dei 
In a tribute to the life and work of Cannon, Beverly Rose Wallace explains “Dr 
Katie Cannon described herself as a womanist liberation ethicist called to ‘debunk, 
unmask, and disentangle the historically conditioned value judgments and power relations 
that undergird the particularities of race, sex, and class oppression.’”185 Her work 
challenges the theology of anyone dealing with sexism, racism, or classism. Wallace 
maintains that Cannon demonstrated:  
 
Black women are the most vulnerable and the most exploited members of the 
American society. The structure of the capitalist political economy in which Black 
people are commodities combined with patriarchal contempt for women has caused 
the Black woman to experience oppression that knows no ethical or physical 
bounds.186 
 
Rather than understanding theology from a Black man’s perspective on suffering, or a 
white woman’s perspective on sexism, Cannon argues that we must include the lived 
experience of Black women. Not only does this acknowledge the insights of Black women, 
it offers a powerful critique and enrichment of all theology. Rather than limiting the effects 
womanist theology can have on society to Black women, womanists sought to develop it 
into a global theology that could help all people. The focus for womanists was toward 
“organiz[ing] toward the love, justice-making, and transformation of all people.”187 For 
Cannon, this included focusing on the pedagogical approach to this theology. She desired 
to teach and empower Black women to work against oppressive systems.188 In order to 
understand how Cannon’s view of the image of God is developed, I will work through her 
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theology by first understanding the significance of the history of slavery before moving to 
her development of dignity in the face of oppression. 
In light of her practical approach to womanist theology, the starting point of 
Cannon’s thinking in relation to the imago Dei is the fact that African Americans 
experience the world differently because of the chattel slavery and ongoing oppression 
they have been subjected to. She states: 
 
The legalization of chattel slavery meant that the overwhelming majority of Blacks 
lived permanently in subhuman status. No objective circumstance—education, 
skill, dress, or bearing—could modify this fundamentally racist arrangement. This 
mode of racial domination meant that as chattel slaves none of my ancestors were 
human beings legally, culturally, socially, or politically.”189 
 
As Christian theologians debate the imago Dei, they must recognize that the notion that 
human beings are connected to God through the social roles they assume, their creative 
actions or their recognition of divine ‘giftings’ must be challenged. While white 
theologians discussed these theories as being the “primary location” of the image190, Black 
people were often granted neither the education nor the opportunities to embody God’s 
image in these ways. For centuries, Black people were rendered legally subhuman and 
strong cultural constraints meant these positive aspects of their imago Dei were denied.  A 
strong connection to God was, however, developed through their experience of suffering 
and oppression. This understanding is crucial for Cannon’s work, in which she highlights 
the importance of understanding how slavery and subsequent oppression have affected 
Black life, and thus must have a role in the development of a more comprehensive 
understanding of imago Dei. A doctrine of the image of God in humanity must be able to 
address the specifics of the human, and as Cannon explains, that must confront the 
“suffering, oppression and exploitation of Black people in society.”191 The oppression 
placed upon them cannot be held to limit their participation in the imago Dei. Rather, 
womanist theology provides “healing opportunities that expose the muddles and messes of 
sexism, racism, and classism.”192 Instead of seeing these oppressions as diminishing the 
humanity of Black women (and others around the world), they can become ways of seeing 
the world correctly and helping others to also embrace their wholeness. Therefore, in 
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Cannon’s work, an understanding of humanity requires confrontation with the oppression 
that damages the marginalised’ s understanding of their humanity. But how can oppression 
be overcome when the evil is so great? Cannon has a hopeful answer to this question,  
 
‘Can God create a rock that God can’t pick up?’—is the fundamental query that 
deals with the traditional theological problem concerning transgressions that 
proceed directly from human sin—structures of domination, subordination and 
constraints that reinforce and reproduce hierarchies based on race, sex, class, and 
sexual orientation.193  
 
Cannon sees God’s work as already addressing this problem through Christ. Like other 
black theologians she declares God’s work to liberate is focused in Jesus. Jesus’ 
incarnation, life and death, is God’s answer to the evil of sin and suffering. Thus, Christ 
represents the Divine working alongside, and even through, the suffering Black people 
endure. Cannon’s work in womanism allows people to see how theology, particularly 
Christian theology and biblical studies, has been used to further oppress people, but then it 
also offers hope in redeeming these practices for liberation rather than oppression.194 
Quiet Grace as Resistance 
As the above makes clear, for Cannon, there must be an understanding of the imago 
Dei that is not found in asserting an agency that Black women were not allowed to 
exercise. Instead, it is found in the dignity central to Black theology that comes from the 
resources not of an individual person but rather from the strength of the community. As 
Kirk-Duggan explains, Cannon’s praxis is informed by her focus on double consciousness. 
She says, “She embodies and features an epistemological privilege of the oppressed…”195 
In doing this, Cannon is able to examine and utilize previous texts, particularly biblical 
texts and other theologies, to further correct the distortions within these. Kirk-Duggan 
continues, “The corrective is paradoxical, simultaneously exposing injustice while 
nurturing and witnessing womanist consciousness.”196 In working through texts and 
histories like this, Cannon is able to both expose the reality of life’s difficulties while 
inspiring action toward a wholeness that can overcome these problems. Through this, her 
work examines that of other Black theologians.  In the final chapter of Black Womanist 
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Ethics, Cannon demonstrates this corrective by exploring an understanding of dignity, 
drawing particularly on the iconic examples of Thurman and King. 
To begin, Cannon explains that the “cultural and historical support available…was 
the balm of the Black religious heritage.”197 In the work of these two men, she sees a focus 
on “the ethical themes of imago dei, love as grounded in justice, and the irreplaceable 
nature of community.”198 Developing this theme Cannon lays out the ways community can 
develop in Black women the inner dignity needed to continue in their struggle. She 
explains that there are three themes she sees in their developments of theological 
anthropology: 1) ethical themes of the imago Dei, 2) love as grounded in justice, and 3) the 
irreplaceable nature of community.199  
Both King and Thurman begin by asserting that all people possess the imago Dei, 
and that it is vital to affirm this in generating liberatory theological visions. For Thurman, 
understanding the existence of the image in humans allows each individual person to 
recognize and accept their worth, giving them purpose and power. He believes this 
affirmation will give meaning to each person’s life, allowing them to transform their 
circumstances, even when facing obstacles and limitations. Much like Tillich, Thurman 
seems to believe this existential courage will allow the person to see beyond circumstantial 
injustice and move toward actions that empower. King, similarly, believes that each 
person’s possession of the image grants them inalienable rights which convey to them both 
freedoms and social responsibility. It also means they are morally unjustified in injuring 
another person--which would deface the image of God within them.  
Secondly, both men see a focus on love as central to the imago Dei. For Thurman, 
this love requires reconciliation and acknowledgment of others’ possession of the image. 
In this, Thurman calls for people to meet each other “where he is”200 in order to treat the 
person appropriately. King’s conception of love is focused on relationship. Believing that 
love for God extends into love for neighbour, King called for love for enemies as well as 
community, and required it to be an “active, dynamic and determined” love.201  
Finally, Cannon demonstrates how after these two principles, each highlight 
community as essential. Thurman sees humanity as essentially one, “all life is one, arising 
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out of a common center—God.”202 King, meanwhile, affirms this unity in practical terms. 
Because of the community rising from our relationships to God and others, we must work 
practically to end injustice and form a true, realized community in the world.  
Having brought into dialogue these important and influential perspectives Cannon 
then proceeds to apply their conclusions specifically to the situation of Black women. She 
explains that for Thurman, these principles must bring Black women to “translate the 
formulation of God’s love into the actual phenomena of her human existence.”203 Each 
woman can see her worth in her circumstances and her character. She can transcend her 
self-doubt through seeing and recognizing the love and faith in her community. From 
King, Cannon explains that Black women are fully members of the “beloved community,” 
and are thus responsible for the active work toward ending injustice and freeing themselves 
and others.204 They are important actors in the work of righting society. 
It is through developing these perspectives that Cannon is then able to define her 
own three characterisations of the image of God in black women: “invisible dignity, quiet 
grace, and unshouted courage.”205 These themes underlie the active work Black women 
can do, regardless of their circumstances, to participate in God’s transforming work. As 
Cannon explains the lack of ability to exert conventional forms of agency means that 
imago Dei theories that require overcoming or active autonomy do not speak to many 
black women. Yet black women who cannot escape oppression are still able to live out the 
ideals articulated by King and Thurman and can practice them by affirming their own 
worth and importance in the community. Like King and Thurman, Cannon is particularly 
invested in emphasizing connection to spiritual roots and emboldening Black women to 
“seek the realization of their dignity as persons”206 through this communal inheritance.  
 In explaining Cannon’s definition of dignity, Karin Sporre further examines the 
“three virtues”207 mentioned above. These may be the only option for those whose survival 
depends on finding the resources to endure oppressive circumstances they are unable to 
change. As Cannon observes, “one can see that all human beings ought to have equal 
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value, but that it does not follow that they actually have equal value.”208 Not possessing 
equal value will affect their actions, and so Cannon says that in the face of oppression, 
Black women, particularly, exhibit a quiet grace that demonstrates their dignity and 
therefore their imago Dei. This quiet grace can be the kind of resistance a person needs in 
order to connect to their imago Dei. For Cannon, even in the direst circumstances, a Black 
woman’s belief that “What is happening to me is not right!”209 is her resistance. This moral 
resistance nourishes the life of Black people and means that there can be a way to freedom, 
for the community if not the individual person. This is not resignation to oppression, but 
the maintenance of dignity that challenges the oppressive regime established. 
 For Black women, then, displaying this self-belief with dignity can be salvific to 
their communities as a whole. They do not need to perform ‘heroic’ tasks, but instead pass 
on the belief in dignity. It is this communal belief that restores the experience of the imago 
Dei that the oppressive system denies. Sporre explains that Cannon’s work demonstrates 
this communal value—the community “can form, encompass and promote an alternative 
value basis.”210 This community is vital. Cannon stresses regularly “how disastrous it can 
be for an individual who does not live in and through her or his community.”211 
Cannon’s community-focused work looks toward the goal of elevating the dignity 
of Black people. In doing this, she develops an understanding of social justice as a 
Christian imperative and asks how this vision could be accomplished while oppression 
exists. This means that reconciliation and redemption are reclaimed as goals for this world 
rather than simply heavenly promises. She says, “In every sphere where Blacks were 
circumscribed and their legal rights denied, the Black Church called its members to a 
commitment of perfecting social change and exacting social righteousness here on 
earth.”212 Cannon’s call for these actions is about praxis, not theory. It is not to hope for a 
redeemed heaven, but to give courage to women to stand up to injustice in even small 
ways.   
  Stating that “Christians are morally bound to cooperate with the forces of good and 
equally bound to refuse cooperation with evil,”213 Cannon practices what Stephen G. Ray, 
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Jr. describes as sacred rhetoric.214 In demonstrating this praxis, this functional and active 
theology, she is linking each person to God through their work in the community and their 
own dignity. Ray says: 
 
[T]his enactment of sacred rhetoric in the public discourse of Katie Cannon: 1) 
restores the divine subjectivity of those made in the image of God but ensnared in 
the wickedness of slavery, and 2) unmasks the demonic subjection of the Christian 
faith to the powers of this world mediated through corrupted notions or relationality 
inscribed through the notion of race.215  
 
 Through her focus on silent dignity, Cannon is reimagining the imago Dei as Saiving had 
also attempted. Yet Cannon is also shifting the emphasis from equal participation in 
society, to affirmation of worth in the face of social inequality. When unable to end their 
oppression, Black women can still acknowledge that they do not deserve the suffering they 
endure. Instead, they deserve to be acknowledged as full members of the community, in 
possession of the imago Dei. 
Challenges Remain 
Reading Cannon in conversation with Barth and Tillich, Cannon’s affirmation of 
the work of Black women is not a full repudiation of their theoretical concepts, but a step 
forward in a more comprehensive understanding of the image of God in humanity. Barth’s 
Christocentric theology is an obvious influence in Black theology, and practically 
demonstrated in the ways Cannon depicts the imago Dei. Furthermore, like Saiving and 
Plaskow, Cannon recognizes that the specific ways in which a person claims their imago 
Dei are important. Women must recognize their worth, and for Cannon, Black women 
must recognize how their contributions can sustain and renew their community. This study 
of Cannon’s work has given me needed challenges—to see ‘ordinary’ lives and work as 
inherently valuable and necessary in community, and to reject requirements for individuals 
to overcome systemic injustice and oppression in order to embody the divine. Cannon’s 
work to utilize multiple theories is also vital to my own work, as I seek to expand the 
discussion of the imago Dei beyond its current terms. 
Cannon’s focus upon a multi-oppressed group, articulates an understanding of 
humanity that locates experience within its social context. While Tillich discussed 
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anxieties in theory, Cannon discusses the reality of people who face physical destruction 
daily. She recognizes the difficulties of people who must both fight against the evils of 
oppression while working with or for their oppressors. It is in these real lived experiences 
that Cannon’s understanding of the imago Dei is embodied. She says:  
 
When the soul feels God’s presence, individuals are grasped by the divine essence, 
which heightens awareness of options and possibilities. This built-in sense of the 
Creator provides oppressed people with ultimate meaning and the ability to 
transform circumstances.216 
 
For Cannon, each person is located within a set of circumstances and community, and thus 
finds their purpose within that experience. This experiential understanding means that each 
human’s purpose is unique, equal, and accessible. As Daly pointed out, it is important to 
recognize one’s self in connection to God.217 The work that “ordinary” Black women 
perform within their communities is not, in fact, ordinary, but it is work in cooperation 
with the divine. It entails doing the work of Christ in the specific location where one lives. 
It is a practical recognition and application of the I-Thou relationship and of the courage to 
be. In her book Feminist Theory and Christian Theology, Serene Jones discusses theories 
surrounding feminist communities. She explains 
 
[The] utopian, normative dimension of feminist theories of community has its own 
set of challenges and insights. One challenge is that the everyday experiences of 
women often resist utopian visions of a better future…. Irresolvable conflicts leave 
us unable to imagine the way it should be—for example, communal conflicts in 
which both sides share the cause of justice and the burden of guilt. We also 
experience great sufferings that social accounts of oppression cannot exhaustively 
explain…. Feminist theories of community need to incorporate such experiences 
into their utopian vision.218 
 
This need to not only acknowledge but include the suffering and oppression women face is 
built into Cannon’s theology, while continuing to look toward the utopia of redemption. 
These communities allow individuals to see their worth, their dignity, and their connection 
to each other. The hope is for the heroic arc of the person—that they will overcome the 
trauma of oppression, even if it is only by internally acknowledging that they deserved 
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better. In Sheldon George’s book Trauma and Race, he acknowledges that this overcoming 
is a psychological redemption of identity. Rather than identifying primarily as a racial 
Other, George wants African Americans to find a jouissance that transcends their race.219 
George, like Cannon, wants the Black person to be able to experience a wholeness that 
sees their personhood as worthy and part of the community.   
 It is here that I see the needed next step from Cannon’s development of the imago 
Dei. Where Cannon emphasizes the communal aspect of Black women’s work, and the 
importance of pointing out their unique ability to bring redemption to a racially torn 
society, I begin to wonder about the continued focus on dignity that undergirds her work. 
In each of the theologians I have examined, the focus remains primarily on the person’s 
ability to perceive their place in God’s reconnecting work, to recognize the imago Dei and 
then accept the courage it instils in them, or to overcome oppression or destruction. These 
qualities are obviously ideal. It is understandable to want everyone to recognize their own 
worth and place in the world, so that they can understand how they might participate in the 
divine work of redemption. Copeland points this out in her work, explaining that we must 
remember the slaves and others who were unable to escape their oppression. Some 
continue to live with their masters, and many continue to be oppressed. Yet, she still points 
to resistance and the inner overcoming of this bondage in a manner much like Tillich’s 
“courage.” She argues that they can overcome by “making means of their suffering” and 
“defined themselves and dismantled the images that had been used to control them.”220 The 
desire is always that the person is able to recognize the image in themselves, especially in 
resistance to those who oppose it. 
 In her text, In Search of Human Dignity: Essays in Theology, Ethics and 
Education, Karin Sporre examines Cannon’s work in dignity and raises questions about the 
focus on this aspect. She begins by linking oppression and sin, saying  
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In a situation where unequal power relations exist, those with power in the 
relationship also have the power to control the moral situations, which sometimes 
means the power to identify which situations should be called moral, understand 
the situations based on their own perception, and also describe the possible 
alternatives for action.221 
 
If those in power are able to define morality as well, finding dignity may be a more 
complicated issue than discovering or developing love for oneself. The means to survive 
may, in fact, be deemed ‘immoral’ and even believed to be immoral by the person required 
to perform them. This disconnect may cause dignity, love for oneself, to be out of reach for 
a person who is unable to see that the morality of the powerful is disingenuous.  
 Cannon argues for dignity found within community—particularly the community 
of Black women. Within this community, a person can recognize and adopt their own 
dignity. The community embodies the individual and elevates them, regardless of any shift 
in oppression or circumstances. 
 Found in community, this dignity is in embracing the value of oneself. Cannon says 
that when she stopped being a ‘people pleaser’ she was able to see her own worth, which 
she says was to “experience God’s presence within herself.”222 In her Christian theology, 
this was both an experience of God’s presence and an embrace of God in her. Once again, 
Sporre points out, Cannon has anchored her dignity in something outside of herself.223 I 
therefore echo Sporre’s question, asking if the experience of being someone is a necessity, 
of being someone in oneself, in spite of, independent of, or rather maybe above the feeling 
of being less valued that follows the depreciation that comes out of submission in 
relationship. What of those who lack community, or the outside voice that tells them they 
are valued? What about those who do not have dignity, or who, because they believe 
themselves to be acting immorally, feel they have lost their dignity? 
 Sporre continues her examination of human dignity also asserting that developing 
this quiet (silent) grace, or dignity, can affect resistance against oppression. Yet, as she’s 
pointed out, developing this dignity may require an outside support. Whether communal or 
spiritual, there seems a need for relationship in order to restore the ability to embrace of 
one’s own value. 
Thus, there is still the question of how to continue to see the image of God in a 
person who lacks this means to accomplish such work. Having established the need to 
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reject actions as a demonstration of the imago Dei, I now must also examine how internal 
dignity must be understood. If a person cannot or will not see their own humanity, how are 
we to see it for them? Again, I am confronted with the difficult task of asking whether the 
image of God is still retained by people who do not overcome, who do not find courage, or 
who in fact perpetuate their own isolation or destruction. Is there a point in which a person 




















3. Literature as a Challenge to Theology: Forming a Methodology 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I began to engage with the challenges of Black and 
Womanist theology – particularly as these related to the imago Dei. I traced the ways in 
which understandings had been formed out of engagement with dominant theological 
traditions but also out of the specific contexts and insights of Black people. I also showed 
how this theology had become a significant resource for empowerment in the face of 
oppression and also how it reflected the spiritual vitality of Black Christian experience.    
My chapter focused particularly upon the work of Katie Geneva Cannon pertaining 
to the imago Dei and specifically her desire to emphasize the importance of community in 
constituting the image. In pursuing this insight further, it is now important to more fully 
explore how she sees that community embodied, as well as the methods she utilizes to 
explore the nature of Black communal life. Particularly significant for my thesis is the way 
Cannon employed literature, and specifically Black women’s literature in her theological 
reflection. As Cannon had to primarily draw upon theological sources based upon male 
experience in her research, she turned to women’s literature as a source of the female 
wisdom required as she sought to develop her community-focused ethics. I will 
particularly look at her work with the literature of Zora Neale Hurston, as it is central to 
Cannon’s methodology.   
 While understanding how this engagement with literature informs her stance on 
the silent grace of the oppressed, and by seeing how she links this to practical outcomes for 
the Black community, I must also comprehend the manner in which Cannon intertwines 
her theology with literary analysis. The drawing together of literature and theology is 
certainly not unique to Cannon, though she is a foundational proponent of it.224 I will begin 
this chapter by examining Cannon’s particular method of engaging theology and literature. 
Her approach is invaluable, but it is not unproblematic and so I will consider some of the 
interdisciplinary conversations between literature and theology that raise challenges to 
Cannon’s method. This will lead me to a review of the way in which other scholars have 
sought to pursue this interdisciplinary work. My intention here is to build my own 
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understanding of the ways in which literature might make an invaluable contribution to 
theological reflection and then to lay out my own methodology for the next steps in my 
research. 
Katie Cannon and Zora Neale Hurston 
 As Cannon sought a theology that could empower the Black community, she 
looked to construct this from primary sources that originated within the Black community 
itself. For Cannon, very significant resources were to be found in the literary work of 
Black women. These works seemed, to Cannon, to present the best evidence of the real 
lives of Black women whose experiences were frequently obscured in historical and 
cultural studies. She turned particularly to the work of the anthropologist, activist, and 
acute observer of Black life, Zora Neale Hurston. Cannon’s work centring the literature of 
Hurston underpins her theology, and informs her image of the Black community, and 
particularly Black women. In responding to Hurston’s work Cannon explains, “Hurston 
insisted that Black women seek the realization of their dignity as persons.”225 She sees this 
realization depicted in Hurston’s fictional writing which provides many examples of 
ordinary Black women actively achieving their personhood and affirming their worth. By 
looking to these examples, Cannon raises her challenges to existing theories of the imago 
Dei and is also able to answer those challenges with her development of the concept of 
‘silent grace’. As stated, in both allowing Hurston’s work to challenge and then inform her 
theology, Cannon also demonstrates an influential model for engagement between 
literature and theology. 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, in Black Womanist Ethics, Cannon says “The real-
lived texture of Black life requires moral agency that may run contrary to the ethical 
boundaries of mainline Protestantism.”226 While she is searching for an understanding of 
what allows Black women to achieve the imago Dei through silent grace, she allows that, 
because of the oppression Black women face, they may have to act against the ‘moral 
code’ of the society in order to become truly moral. To demonstrate what it may look like 
to achieve Black agency, she looks to Hurston’s novels - specifically as they focus on a 
character’s achievement of silent grace. While Hurston’s characters may be individually 
embodying this, Cannon believes the whole Black community can be empowered by their 
presence and contribution.  
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Theology Through Reading the Novels of Hurston  
In explaining her use of Black women’s literature, Cannon begins by stating the 
foundational goal. Black theology works to understand social justice as a Christian 
imperative, often specifically linking it to the active work of the Black Church and leaders 
like Martin Luther King, Jr. This means that reconciliation and redemption are reclaimed 
as goals for this world rather than only heavenly promises. She says, “In every sphere 
where Blacks were circumscribed and their legal rights denied, the Black Church called its 
members to a commitment of perfecting social change and exacting social righteousness 
here on earth.”227 Seeing humanity as emblematic of Christ in Black theology goes farther 
than Barth’s desire to see Christ as the epitome of the imago Dei. Here, there is a deeper 
focus on the liberative qualities of Christ’s life and ministry. As I discussed in Chapter 
One, Barth’s admonition is that “In Christ, the Christian is liberated to service of God and 
neighbor” 228 which enacts an I-Thou relationship.229 This is further developed in Black 
theology because the social circumstances of the neighbour must be understood for the 
relationship to be liberating. As I explained, there is the need to look the other in the eye—
to recognize their experiences and situation. Hurston’s books are used to understand the 
reality of Black lives, as showing how sight can be achieved. For Cannon, this means 
Hurston’s novels must be read as mirroring reality, demonstrating real experienced 
oppression.  
 The novels are not just meant to give insight, however. Because Black theology 
stressed that “Christians are morally bound to cooperate with the forces of good and 
equally bound to refuse cooperation with evil,”230 Cannon also uses literary works to 
interrogate how Black women do this. The unique activism of Black women, who are both 
oppressed in their race and their gender, means that they had to find distinctive ways to 
carry forward this reconciling work. She says, “Hurston insisted that Black women seek 
the realization of their dignity as persons.”231 She sees this realization depicted in 
Hurston’s work, which provides examples of ordinary Black women actively achieving 
their personhood and agency. By looking to these examples, Cannon is able to develop a 
theology of humanity through the insights of the people most often denied their humanity.  
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Zora Neale Hurston 
 As Cannon points out, “Zora Neale Hurston was the most prolific Black woman 
writer in America from 1920 to 1950.”232 Producing dozens of works, Hurston’s 
description of the Black community showed ‘stoutheartedness’ and demonstrated “the 
Black woman as a moral agent.”233 In weaving together stories of community, culture, and 
realistic actions taken against  suffering, Hurston was able to give life to Tillich’s idea of 
‘the courage to be’. Black women in Hurston’s novels did not give in to anxieties, but 
instead overcame violence and poverty. Cannon recognizes the autobiographical aspects of 
Hurston’s work as well. She argues that Hurston “and her female characters are Black 
women who learn to glean directives for living in the here-and-now.”234 Years before 
King’s definition of the imago Dei,235 Hurston recognized that women’s achievement of 
agency requires working within the system they experience. To overcome, to have 
courage, Hurston and her characters work with what they have, work with whom they can, 
toward the betterment of themselves and the people they love. She says, “Women who live 
in the circle of life must discern the genuine choices available or else they will be 
characterized by one or more of the following disparaging folk metaphors: mule, spit, cut, 
rut in the road, chewed-up and discarded sugar cane, or wishbone.”236 Cannon believes that 
in seeing the courage of the characters in Hurston’s novels, has the potential to imbue the 
Black community with the silent grace she discusses in her theology. Acknowledging the 
dignity of various characters allows Black women to see their own dignity, and the dignity 
of all Black women, not as striving to resemble white women or achieve white priorities, 
but instead to recognize their own unique selves. 
 In order to see how Hurston displays this courage for Cannon, I will briefly explore 
this with reference to Hurston’s most popular novel, Their Eyes Were Watching God. In 
the novel, protagonist Janie journeys through the narrative to discover her “full 
humanity.”237 In a series of experiences, encounters, and challenges, Janie is able to shed 
the false identity she was burdened with. Cannon points out that this process is similar to 
Hurston’s overcoming of her father’s rhetoric about her. He claimed she “was going to be 
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hung before [she] was grown.”238 Her ambition, passion, and “sassy tongue” would destroy 
her. Similarly, Janie is taught that she is “not allowed to exist naturally and freely” because 
of her race and gender.239 Hurston uses characters like Janie to “demythologize whole 
bodies of so-called social legitimacy.”240 Janie’s Nanny presented her with codes of 
behaviour that had saved her as a slave woman, but as Hurston delves into Janie’s story we 
realize that these codes no longer hold for her. Janie is not a slave woman. She is not 
Nanny. She works hard to discover her own agency, as Hurston did, and by doing so leads 
her community forward from the “behavioural codes” that were formerly required during 
slavery. Cannon states, “Moral agency is exemplified each time Janie stands against 
critical dilution of her personhood.”241 Janie rejects the morality and models of ‘success’ 
that have been forced upon her community by the systemic racism in the United States. 
Instead, she seeks to reclaim her dignity by doing what is morally right for her as a Black 
woman. This distinction is vital in Cannon’s silent grace.  
 For Cannon, Hurston’s work in such stories is restorative work. As womanist and 
novelist Alice Walker demonstrates, Hurston’s work embodies “racial health: a sense of 
Black people as complete, complex, undiminished human beings, a sense that is lacking in 
so much black writing and literature.”242 Walker believes this love of Black people and 
Black communities stems from an inherent love of herself. Hurston’s “confidence in 
herself”243 is a unique feature for Walker, and she links it to her choosing to locate herself 
within a Black community that lived a self-organising life rather living in a multi-ethnic 
environment. In this context Black people were not defining themselves continually in 
terms of their responses to racism but rather “had enormous respect for themselves and for 
their ability to govern themselves.”244 Walker also sees Hurston’s respect for herself as a 
revolutionary act. She did not desire to be white, nor male, and lived proudly even after she 
was ostracized by her own community and lived in extreme poverty.245 Walker wishes 
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Hurston could have found a “family she never had”246 to support her work and bitterly 
bemoans her rejection, “We are a people. A people do not throw their geniuses away.”247 
Nevertheless, she applauds, as does Cannon her rejection of the oppression of trying to ‘be 
white’. The theology of Cannon is pointedly aimed at restoring Black women (and by 
extension, the Black community) in order that they might assume identity on their own 
terms.  
 Through Hurston’s eyes, Black women can claim their lives as their own and begin 
to make decisions for it. For Janie, the seemingly simple act of falling in love becomes 
liberation that others theorized about. Janie was able to shed the “false images that said 
that as a Black and as a woman she is not allowed to exist naturally and freely.”248 At the 
end of the novel, Janie has rejected “male domination and the empty materialism of white 
culture.”249 She is then able to find love with her third husband, Tea Cake, who is 18 years 
younger than she is. It is her developed agency that allows her to reject societal norms and 
marry a man who frees her soul rather than the “stable” men her grandmother wanted for 
her. Janie is able to make her own life choices and lives as a full human being. This 
restoration models what Hurston desired for the Black community, and is the lesson 
demonstrated through all her books. Black agency can never be achieved by imitating 
white standards. 
 As I discussed in Chapter One, Tillich’s concept of the “courage to be” is to choose 
life over annihilation, but he describes this primarily through the language of psychological 
neurosis. His primary concern is that a person decides to have courage in the face of 
anxiety. Yet for Janie, this decision to have courage is to decide to be herself despite the 
social outcome. If Nanny’s concern that Janie choose a man who can support her is 
practically correct, Janie is essentially choosing functional non-survival but survival of her 
humanity. Tillich does not take into account how choosing to be fully oneself could be 
detrimental to a person within their social context, but Hurston offers examples of people 
who are able to do this and yet still survive. Cannon’s point in using the example set by 
these women in her work is that they are demonstrating a specific courage in the face of 
oppression, rather than a universal form of existential courage.  
 Because of this difference perspective upon courage, Cannon is reimagining the 
imago Dei in ways similar to Saiving: it is the recognition of one’s agency and full 
 
246 Ibid., 92. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Cannon, Ethics, 132. 




humanity. Yet Cannon is also shifting the focus from the ability to participate fully in 
society, as Saiving outlines it, to agency rooted in an inherent worthiness. Cannon’s 
agency allows women the recognition of their humanity apart from, and despite of, the 
expectations or requirements an oppressive society may inflict upon them. Furthermore, 
their silent dignity can spread throughout the community, with the effect of enabling the 
Black community to experience their imago Dei despite the racism that attempts to strip 
them of it. 
Hurston’s Literature in Cannon’s Theology 
In this analysis, it is understandable that Cannon insists theologians ought to 
answer directly to the experiences of their community. As she states, “As long as the 
white-male experience continues to be established as the ethical norm, Black women, 
Black men and others will suffer unequivocal oppression.”250 Not only must we understand 
the lived experiences of Black people, but they must be included consistently in 
theological thinking. It is inappropriate to frame theology, or theological theories, around 
the experiences of the privileged. By engaging with black women’s literature, Cannon is 
rejecting the idea that white-male experiences are the ‘norm’, and also allowing Black 
women to see their own lives and experiences central to theological reflection. 
 Secondly, Cannon is focused on helping Black people to “purge themselves of self-
hate, thus asserting their own human validity.”251 In pointing to the silent grace 
demonstrated or achieved in Hurston’s novels, Black women can see it achieved in their 
own lives. This correlation allows them to begin asserting their own silent grace, their own 
unshouted courage, and then to pass it along to the community. The communal love she 
sees in Black liberation theology is passed not through theological texts, but through this 
‘wisdom’ literature.  
 However, while Cannon’s partnership of literature and theology is empowering it 
does contain a troubling insistence on reading literature ‘as reality’. As many scholars have 
pointed out this is to deny the fictive and creative aspects of literature as ‘art’ and 
furthermore supports a dangerous tendency to engage only with literature which confirms a 
pre-existing view of the world rather than texts that inspire or challenge us to see things 
differently (as I will discuss further in this chapter, through the work of philosopher 
Anneleise van Heijst).  If theology is to engage with literature on its own terms it is 
 





important to acknowledge that this will be a complex and sometimes ambiguous process 
and that literature might provoke us to encounter things we would rather avoid. Similarly, 
while Hurston’s works are undoubtedly inspiring, it is difficult to see how one character’s 
personal journey, their ‘grasp’ of the imago Dei, is passed through the community to 
generate wider transformation, as the other characters do not similarly achieve this. 
Cannon approaches Hurston’s works looking specifically for this communal outcome, and 
therefore Hurston is read as a support to Cannon rather than a creative challenge to her 
theology.  With this unease in mind I turn to see how others have engaged with literature in 
theological reflection and engage with their methodology before outlining my own. 
Literature and Theology as a Methodology 
I have gained much from Cannon’s example of interdisciplinary work and see it as 
a very productive way of developing insights into areas that are frequently marginalized in 
theological discourse.   It is an excellent example of how engagement with literature has 
opened up many important new trajectories in theological studies. As I shall now go on to 
explore, attention to literature in the ongoing development of theological work has allowed 
more inclusive examinations of such important topics as suffering, trauma, intersectional 
feminism, etc. My focus in this next section of the chapter will be on an example of 
interdisciplinary reflection upon suffering, as this topic leads directly on from the work the 
work of Cannon and also relates directly to my own concerns in this thesis. 
As stated, Cannon’s inclusion of literature in the development of her theology 
allows her to open theology to insights not typically included in a predominantly white 
male-centric study. Similarly motivated, Cynthia R. Wallace’s book, Of Women Borne, 
focusses on the ethics of suffering as revealed through close readings of literary texts 
written by women. Through looking at her work, I can continue to expand my own 
understanding how literature can challenge established theories of the imago Dei, and how 
I might approach literature to further facilitate my own work on this theme. 
 Wallace begins by emphasizing the importance of not seeing literature as being 
simply to be exploited or “used” by theology. It is not a crutch to prop up previously held 
theological beliefs, or to prove the validity of particular theological stances. She says, 
“…literature’s potential to do good in the realm of material justice is strongest when it is 




open attention, with a heightened awareness to its singularity.”252 As such, Wallace 
chooses literature that does not provide answers, but instead provokes questions. She says 
 
Seeking to do justice to the relationship between word and flesh, I lay out the 
hypothesis that guides this book—that contemporary literary writings by women 
challenge and correct the ethical systems of redemptive sacrifice…253 
 
Wallace demonstrates that by reading specific literary works, the questions and needs of 
the sufferer, particularly women sufferers, that are not addressed in more traditional, 
theoretical theology are able to be articulated. In terms of literary texts from minority or 
nondominant groups, she asks whether they make a particularly important contribution by 
reminding us of the inadequacy of the dominant symbolic system to address their 
challenges: “Is the existing language, the existing symbolic, even adequate…or is there 
always something more, some differend, that exceeds the given system of signs?”254 
 Wallace’s hypothesis is that by engaging with literary texts that portray  a “nuanced 
ethics of suffering,” the reader enters into an “ethical relationship with both the text and 
the material world.”255  This relationship will allow the reader to understand the varied 
types of suffering and call for action against this. It is not enough, she argues, to “do 
nothing”256  after developing the knowledge of suffering. In fact, her definition of 
liberation theology could be transposed here: “…[it] refuses the binaries not just of 
spiritual/material but also of mind/body: it fundamentally links embodied action with 
metaphysical contemplation.”257  Wallace’s ethic in the face of suffering is developed by 
both contemplation on the reality of suffering and action to overcome it. She also requires 
an active change on the part of the reader in a true engagement with the text. As I look 
back at Cannon’s work, the emphasis on developing a supportive community of 
transformative action is similar. Cannon’s desire is that the literature of Hurston will 
encourage the Black community to support each other, to see their own dignity, and to take 
any possible actions toward ending their oppression. Wallace hopes for the same outcomes 
in her reader—that they must support those they are now in an ethical community with (for 
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Wallace, this is generally those who are marginalized in their suffering) and do what they 
can to end that oppression. 
 Wallace continues to emphasize this requirement throughout her work. While the 
various narratives she examines bring many questions, she insists we also return to the 
question of “What is suffering and what do we do about it?” Importantly, Wallace also 
insists that suffering cannot be ranked, nor can it be dismissed based on worthiness. We 
cannot decide that a person deserves to suffer, but instead must remain committed to both 
listen to those suffering, to take action after understanding the suffering, and to allow 
ourselves to be changed by the experience. 
Her chapter on Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie deals with this topic directly. 
Adichie’s book, Half of a Yellow Sun, presents a narrative of people living through the 
Biafran War.258 Narrated through three perspectives, the novel “undermines the single 
story, highlighting by its form that stories are always multiple.”259 As it recounts the 1967-
70 civil war in Nigeria, it highlights issues of colonialism and poverty, but also political, 
gendered, and religious hierarchies. Her novel, though, clearly argues against ranking 
suffering or prioritizing it. She then expands the designation of sufferer, asking “Who is 
the most guilty?”260 No longer is it simply a matter of whose suffering is more important, 
but how can the varieties of suffering, even of those who seem guilty, point us in the 
direction of transformation. Wallace affirms the play of different narratives to give many 
perspectives, to open the discussion of suffering beyond narrow boundaries and thus 
generate a larger recognition of what causes suffering. She ties these to a central call. What 
will we do now that we see suffering as complex and varied?  
  Complex understanding of suffering must embrace the ways our suffering affects 
us physically and emotionally. Our physical selves, wounds to them or oppression power 
over them, are linked directly to our emotional states. Furthermore, literature provokes us 
to begin to imagine how the many faceted aspects of suffering can be responded to. As 
Wallace reflects the ‘both-and’ qualities of literature are particularly significant: 
 
In other words, literature both means something about the world in which we live 
and also means something about what it is to mean anything at all….it seems to me 
that the texts I have been discussing in these pages have shown the both-and duality 
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of literature as both a space for representing things as they are and for hinting at the 
imaginative potential of how things could be.261 
 
Representation here is not meant to refer to accurate accounts of specific people, but 
instead to the ethical dilemmas in which we find ourselves. We are to be challenged by 
literature to come to new and better actions on behalf of others and ourselves. Cannon asks 
us to see Hurston’s characters as real so that we wrestle with the ways we understand and 
act on behalf of Black women. Wallace’s challenge is rather different. She is reading 
literature to see complex problems represented and to allow those problems to redefine our 
understanding of suffering.  
It is the need to allow literature to break open our understanding, to give us 
actionable empathy for others, that also motivates me to turn to literature that asks 
questions as much as it provides understanding. As Wallace has shown, these works can 
then move us towards a more open and nuanced theological approach. Again, in a slightly 
different way to Cannon she is emphasizing that while literature may reveal something of 
lived experience, we should not require of it heroic character examples or happy endings. 
As she states, “Suffering must be named, exposed, critiqued, and, at times, chosen, in the 
name of risky but merciful love…”262 If literary works help us to name suffering they also 
teach us that we might have to let go of the requirement that it is presented as being 
overcome within the text. Instead, it is to challenge to the reader to move after putting 
down the book. As theologian Heather Walton says, “…Literature leads us back towards 
the dark and damp, sacred places where words and forms disintegrate.”263 It is then we turn 
to  reconstruct a theology that must answer these challenges, or, from Walton “Theology 
seizes language to illuminate and instruct.”264  
As Walton points out in her book Literature, theology and feminism (2007), for 
those who have been marginalized, allowing literature to challenge preconceived notions is 
an important tool. They look to literature to “challenge, deconstruct and even dismantle the 
machinery of theological power out of fidelity to a divine encounter that literature has 
pressed upon them.”265 For Cannon, experiencing the divine through the novels of Hurston 
motivated her to pass those lessons on through her reconstructed theology. Allowing the 
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works of Hurston to give testimony to Black women’s experiences enabled her to then 
construct her theology around “the real nature of the human condition”266and foreground 
black women’s experience. Wallace takes the challenges of inclusivity seriously, but her 
goal is to allow literature to challenge and complexify theological terms and provoke us to 
imagine changed worlds. As I seek to expand my own theological thinking on the imago 
Dei, I am also pressed by Wallace’s final admonition to her readers, “What will you do, 
once your hands are again free?”267 
Literature that Challenges Us 
In light of this challenge, I turn to philosopher Martha Nussbaum, who has written 
extensively on the engagement between literature and philosophy. While her focus is 
primarily on philosophical responses to moral issues, her insights into how these can be 
revisioned through readings of literature are particularly helpful. They have become 
influential within discussions of the uses of literature within theology.268 Nussbaum’s 
philosophical work aims to actively change and impact people and achieve transformation. 
Rather than philosophers avoiding literature because it ‘improperly’ evokes emotional and 
empathetic responses, she argues that when we allow the text to speak, it is able to move us 
into change that includes action. I find it helpful to quote her here at length: 
 
I have argued that the arts, by nourishing the ability to look on human finitude with 
delight, assist the personality in its struggle with ambivalence and helplessness. 
Now, thinking about compassion, we may extend this point. . .. We can easily see 
that such works of art promote compassion in their audience by inviting both 
empathy and the judgment of similar possibilities. They also work more directly to 
construct the constituent judgments of compassion, the judgment of seriousness and 
the judgment of nondesert. Moreover, they typically have normatively plausible 
and helpful views of these things: tragedies do not resolve around a shipment of 
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In two of her books, Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990) and 
Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001), Nussbaum argues that 
literature is an invaluable resource for philosophy. As stated, this method has been adopted 
by theologians doing similar work. Seeing literature as a helpful supplement to theology 
helps theologians demonstrate the practical aspects of theology and to connect difficult or 
seemingly abstract doctrines to emotional aspects of life. However, this method can be 
seen as undervaluing literature or even behaving as if literature, or other forms of art, were 
merely there to soften and aestheticize what might be very disturbing theological doctrines. 
While some of Nussbaum’s methods are helpful, it is important to keep this critique in 
mind. To refrain from simply using literature as a support, it must be emphasized that we 
must be constantly attuned to the challenges it might force upon us. 
 To gain greater clarity on the way Nussbaum sees literature and philosophy in 
productive relationships I turn now to her book Love’s Knowledge. In the introduction, she 
cites Henry James’ The Golden Bowl, which she will further evaluate later. James’ work, 
she claims, demonstrates the fact that some “truths about human life can only be fittingly 
and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist.”270  
Philosophical language is obtuse and unable to affect our emotions, and therefore the best 
way to demonstrate philosophical truths is through the affective language of story. A story 
told can shift attachments and emotions, causing the philosophy it implicitly embodies to 
genuinely impact the reader. Similarly to Cannon, Nussbaum sees literature as a means to 
gain greater understanding of real-world experiences. However, Nussbaum is not as 
focused upon literature as a depiction of undisclosed aspects of reality, but instead on 
literature as moral and emotional guide. 
 Most important, here, is Nussbaum’s goal for a better form of moral philosophy. 
She is not motivated by merely understanding a truth. Instead, she wants the truth to lead 
to active change. People should behave differently after learning the truth, which can only 
be done if they are emotionally affected by the truth encountered. This idea of emotional 
connection is further developed in her later book: Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence 
of Emotions. Here she intricately links emotional identification to compassion, which she 
believes is integral to creating connections between human beings. She begins by laying 
out her belief that emotion is inevitably linked to connection, examining if “the object of 
 





emotion is always valued for some relation it bears to one’s own flourishing.”271 She tells 
us of the death of her mother, the events surrounding it and how she emotionally reacted 
throughout the time, and connects this to emotional ties we can develop to literary 
characters. She says: 
 
The object of the emotion is seen as important for some role it plays in the 
person’s’ own life. I do not go about fearing any and every catastrophe anywhere in 
the world, nor (so it seems) do I fear any and every catastrophe that I know to be 
bad in important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of damages impending that 
cut to the heart of my own cherished relationships and projects. What inspires grief 
is the death of someone beloved, someone who has been an important part of one’s 
own life.272 
 
In Nussbaum’s example, this connection is obvious. It is her mother who has died. 
However, Nussbaum continues her work to demonstrate that we need not have this 
intimate sense of a connection to a person to attribute value for them in this way. We can 
develop a connection through imagination, as it is a “a bridge that allows the other to 
become an object of our compassion.”273 Like Wallace, Nussbaum is envisaging literature 
as actively changing the reader. However, while Wallace emphasizes how literature 
embodies complexity and provokes imaginings of change, her emphasis is on the 
emotional responses of connection and compassion. These are for Nussbaum vital 
components of working towards a just social order and should be reassessed as such. 
Nussbaum challenges us to ask: 
 
[W]hat positive contribution do emotions, as such, make to ethical deliberation, 
both personal and public? … Why should a social order cultivate or appeal to 
emotions, rather than simply creating a system of just rules, and a set of institutions 
to support it?274 
How Not to ‘Use’ Literature  
 Nussbaum and Wallace have helped strengthen my understanding of how reading 
literature is not only a means of representing marginalized experience and providing moral 
examples but also might become a source of imaginative and affective insight. However, I 
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am still wary of the “use” (abuse) of literature in this partnership. Similarly, while 
Cannon’s inspiration from Hurston inspired me, I am still unsure that it challenged and 
shaped her theology rather than justifying it. As I seek to ensure I allow literature to 
challenge and inform the theological research that I am pursuing in this thesis, I now turn 
to the Dutch theological ethicist, Anneliese van Heijst. 
Anneliese van Heijst’s book Longing for the Fall (1995) specifically argues against 
reading literature as a clear portrayal of real life which can then be used as a means of 
evidencing certain predetermined perspectives. Instead, she seeks to use literary forms to 
highlight the need for certain radical changes in theology and our understanding of 
theological queries. In explaining the title of her book, she emphasizes that the ‘fall’ she 
longs for is this letting go of old, harmful dogmas or outmoded stands on religious 
concerns. She begins by acknowledging the situation of women has been particularly badly 
served in this way in that their selfhood was continually denied in theological discourses 
which require the subjugation of selfhood to God. “In short, women are required to lose a 
self they never actually had. They are becoming a self consisted of self-sacrifice or loss of 
self. They are still only hesitantly learning to cast off the role of eternal loser.”275 Her goal 
is to change how women view themselves theologically, in order to prevent them being 
constituted on the basis of ‘self-sacrifice’, and thus become empowered to grasp their own 
dignity. They must, essentially, lose the sacrificial self. This loss is, as she terms it, 
allowing oneself to fall. She explains 
 
In both the physical and the psychological senses, falling is losing one’s grip and 
being given up to a movement over which one no longer has any control. This can 
be harmful and threatening, but it does not, as such, have to be unpleasant, as the 
cliché, “falling in love” indicates.276 
 
Van Heijst proceeds to demonstrate how losing oneself, as she has defined it, allows the 
reader to gain. It is here that we see clearly how van Heijst’s correlation of literature and 
theology (and philosophy more generally) is employed for challenges and the change 
literature can bring. Literature should be able to deliver a critique of theology and disturb 
traditional models and doctrines by forcing the reader to let go of preconceived beliefs. For 
van Heijst, this requires a reader to be open to the work of the text, letting it speak and 
shape our imaginings - before bringing our own values or principles to it. Van Heijst’s 
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perspective can both helpfully critique Cannon’s position and add to the lessons learned 
from her and the other scholars discussed thus far. 
 
To Lose Oneself in Text 
Following on from her analysis of falling Van Heijst describes interpretation as a 
loss of self in the text. The reader must note and be willing to set aside the various 
assumptions and goals they bring to the text and embrace its difference enabling them to 
“encounter radical alterity.”277 She is aware the reader cannot lose their self completely, 
but instead she encourages them to become better aware of the many layers that make up 
each of us. For Cannon, this would mean not overly identifying with the characters in 
Hurston’s novels, but instead to see how they may be even critiquing her own view of 
Black women. Van Heijst wants us to recognize the layered ways we live—again, 
Cannon’s world and that of Hurston’s novels cannot be exactly the same, since their 
contexts are not the same. Furthermore, we are not simply a gender, or sex, or race, or 
class, but we are all of these things and many more. Allowing ourselves to ‘fall’ into a text 
connects us better with each of these intersections—we can see how our own differences 
with the text highlight things we may not have understood before. For instance, Cannon 
might see that Janie did not have the educational opportunities she had. How might this 
have changed the silent dignity she identified? Would it have become even more impactful 
in this frame? Van Heijst argues that the feminist loss of self, one of three types she 
identifies, “allows [the reader] to be addressed, confused, and advised by the alterity of the 
text, but does bring her/his values and her/his self-respect into the interpretation.”278 
 In order to allow the text to fully challenge assumed world views and 
understandings there are a number of obstacles to be overcome. Van Heijst contends that 
many theological readings of literature attempt to recreate or shift symbols and images in 
order to create a cultural system of their liking. In this, they are using the novel to create 
new symbols and myths that support previously held beliefs. Van Heijst’s mode of 
interpretation seeks to avoid this pitfall, though it seems she is pessimistic this ideal can be 
perfectly achieved as no reader is purely motivated.279 She insists, though, that the text 
cannot be approached as a support to an already developed thesis, but instead must be 
allowed to critique and complicate matters.  
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 In line with this, Van Heijst’s second objection is to those who “[read] literary 
texts, namely, as testimonies to experience and as statements.”280 Literature is fiction, and 
this fact is important in the framing of literature and theology. Fiction is “constructed 
representation,” and the text has a determinative status in what the reader takes away from 
it—it must become a moral guide as Nussbaum believes.281 This critique is also an 
important warning to anyone seeking to use literature in theological reflection. To confuse 
the areas of fiction and reality, especially by assuming veracity of literary works, ignores 
the importance ways in which literature differs from reality. In particular, every aspect of 
the characters exists to produce the multi-layered meanings of the text, but to view it as 
realistic allows us to forget these important aspects. 
 Van Heijst requires that we focus on our reader-centeredness.282 By being aware of 
our own bias and desires, we can better surrender to the text as an encounter with that 
which is different and beyond us. She argues we must lose ourselves in reading literature 
for theological purposes, rather than centring upon ourselves. Yet, we can only do this by 
being self-reflexively aware of our own selves and what we are bringing to and requiring 
from our reading encounter.  
It is here I wish to register my own important qualification of the approach van 
Heijst is advocating. Whilst the emphasis upon literature embodying alterity for us rather 
than connecting us to reality is a valuable challenge to conventional ways of reading, I 
would still wish to affirm Cannon’s perspective that we can still discover much about lived 
experience from literature. Furthermore, Cannon’s insistence that we value the female 
author and her insights and wisdom is largely missing from van Heiijst’s poststructuralist 
perspective on literature. In understanding the author’s context, we can often discover 
important ways of understanding the text. In both instances, the reader can allow 
themselves to become sensitive to the text that do not prevent it from making its own 
radical challenge. I do not believe that the one approach excludes the other – although they 
clearly stand in some tension. As van Heijst herself states reading in these ways enables us 
to “develop a new sensitivity for the contingencies of human existence.”283 In this way, 
literature retains its power to shift our vision and is not a support or supplement to 
theology but instead prompts radical shifts in our thinking.  
 
 
280 Ibid., 261. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid., 264. 




Rebecca Chopp’s Theopoetics 
Van Heijst takes us further in our explorations of how literature can reshape 
theological thinking, yet I remain concerned by her insistence that literature is not, and 
cannot be read as, a representation of reality.  Thus, in this final examination of the 
engagement between literature and theology I turn to the ground-breaking essay by 
Rebecca Chopp, “Theology and the Poetics of Testimony.”284 Chopp goes further than van 
Heijst in exploring the way in which particular forms of communication are best able to 
testify and provoke change, particularly demonstrating the way an author can use ‘poetics’ 
as a means to communicate things that are impossible to express in conventional terms, 
particularly trauma. In Chopp’s explorations, however, it is clear that while literature is not 
merely narrative, it can provide us with a powerful testimony about reality an in particular 
about the realities of human suffering. 
The poetics of testimony inquire into the ability to communicate not just the 
circumstances or facts of an event. Instead, it explores what it means to testify to their 
meaning. In her essay, Chopp describes the preface to the Russian poet Anna Akhmatova’s 
collection, “Requiem.” In this preface, Akhmatova describes her experience returning, day 
after day, to stand outside a prison for 17 months, waiting to see her son. Rather than 
explain the weather or other such facts about these vigils, she gives us this image.  
 
Standing behind me was a woman, with lips blue from cold…and asked me in a 
whisper (everyone whispered there): 
 ‘Can you describe this?’ 
 And I said, ‘I can.’285 
 
The intimate moment between women gives us not simply a picture, but an emotional 
connection. This scene allows us to empathize, to experience the line outside the prison 
rather than simply knowing about it. We can join the women in this moment but more than 
this it points to the power of the poet to form words about what are unspeakable things. 
Chopp explains this kind of performative description of the queue as Akhmatova’s inviting 
us not only to fully know the event, but to also make moral judgments about it. This, 
Chopp states, is the purpose of the poetics of testimony. “The poetics of testimony, 
expressed in a variety of particular and distinct forms, is fundamentally concerned with 
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human and earthly survival and transformation, and thus renders a moral claim on human 
existence.”286 By allowing testimony to shape our understandings, she believes this will in 
turn affect theology.  Such testimony points to a “reality outside the ordinary”287  and 
enables us to begin seeing the world in terms of diverse experiences. It allows us to hear 
from those who are different, and not only hear but begin to understand. It allows us to 
think in terms of hope and survival for not just ourselves, but for everyone. This is the 
point of testimonies. Chopp says, “Testimonies are neither subjective nor objective; they 
are collective and social.”288 Testimony is important to bring awareness, to give voice to a 
people or situation, and so is not merely giving detail. Instead, testimony highlights that 
which is important to the speaker. In light of trauma, this testimony can give a voice to the 
pain suffered, particularly if the listener has not had similar experiences. It is not narrative, 
but it offers deep insight into others’ realities. 
 This concept of a collective testimony is important in light of standpoint 
epistemology. Philosopher Sandra Harding explains how feminist standpoint epistemology 
enables women to “provide points for asking new, critical questions about not only those 
women’s lives but also about men’s lives and, most importantly, the causal relations 
between them.”289  This starting point involves allowing testimonies from diverse voices. 
As Terrence Des Pres says, “Conscience…is a social achievement.”290 As Chopp 
demonstrates, testimony has the purpose of convincing society (or the listener, at least) of a 
moral need or fact. It is meant to shape, to change the mindset of those who have not 
experienced the events of the testimony. The goal of this is to elevate life, and the respect 
for diverse lives. It is not meant to simply bring facts to light, but instead to actively 
change those who hear. Much like Nussbaum argued, understanding another’s story in this 
way can move the listener to an emotional response that motivates them to action. For 
Chopp, testimony of trauma can allow society to understand why change is necessary 
while connecting people more deeply. It is in this that she develops her method and 
definition of theopoetics, which is particularly useful in my work. In cooperation with 
liberation theology, Chopp argues that theopoetics challenges our assumptions by centring 
the experiences and concerns of the oppressed. In allowing poetry (and, as she explains, 
 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid., 61. 
288 Ibid., 62. 
289 Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: ‘What is Strong Objectivity?’” in Feminist 
Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York, Routledge, 1993), 55. 




other literary writings like novels) to shape the conversation, it is giving both reality and 
the effects of the experiences—memory, discourse, emotions, actions, etc.—the ability to 
challenge our previous understandings of a topic. Chopp’s explanation of theopoetics is 
therefore able to guide my theology through both an understanding of reality and the 
testimony of literature. 
 Therefore, I again look to those who seek to form a partnership between literature 
and theology. By actively changing the direction of the conversation, the movement, and 
the morals, these testimonies are meant to shape theology. When asked what the purpose 
of telling tragic stories is, I see the answer in Chopp’s description of the poetics of 
testimony. In order to develop a methodology that includes testimony, I must allow 
testimony to determine the form. As Chopp says, “A testimony requires being heard in its 
own voice, style, and content, neither as a variation of a common experience nor a 
representation of that which stands on the margins, opposed by the dominant discourse.”291 
Testimony is not the final word, but one that can “describe in real ways that require people 
to see these events that reason and theory do not count,”292 so that we may better hear and 
learn.  
 Chopp ends her ground-breaking essay with three important points that I wish to 
highlight here. First, she says, “theology has to be responsive to the moral summons of 
testimony.”293 Secondly, she believes that theology must be reframed through “poetics.”294 
Her use of this term is to highlight the poetic symbolism, codes, and images that theology 
already uses and its potential to rework them in order to respond to “the moral summons” 
of testimony.295 She wants to “blur the lines of theory and poetics so as to imagine and 
create new ways of envisioning human life.”296 As I referenced from Walton297, literature 
leads us to new places, allowing theology a new voice to “illuminate and instruct.”298 
 Finally, she discusses the poetics of testimony in terms of transcendence. Though, 
as she acknowledges, many feminist theologians are averse to the idea of God as ‘wholly 
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other’, she rejects the notion that transcendence necessitates a distant and uninvolved deity. 
She argues instead: 
 
To say it in traditional terms, transcendence expresses the hope that the memories 
of suffering will be told and not go unredeemed, the hope that personal and social 
existence can and will be transformed. God as the term of transcendence functions 
as hope, the promise of liberation, or in terms of David Tracy, the mystical-
prophetic God…Transcendence is not a conceptual problem but a moral summons 
to imagine hope.299 
 
And so Chopp ends her essay imploring us to utilize testimony in the purposeful quest for 
this hope, this reshaping, and this responsive theology. To allow the testimonies of the 
marginalized to determine the moral direction of our theological endeavours is to imitate 




My work in this chapter has been to review the aims and methodologies of others 
who have sought a dialogue between literature and theology as a means to reshape 
theological thinking. This will guide my next step in this thesis, particularly in allowing me 
to understand how to challenge dominant theories of the imago Dei. Cannon’s work, both 
theologically and methodologically, has demonstrated my own need to centre the voices of 
those to whom my work purports to communicate with. In desiring to see how the imago 
Dei can aid the oppressed and marginalized, I must, like Cannon, begin by listening to 
their stories. I return our thoughts to Lorraine Code’s exploration of standpoint 
epistemology300, and the idea that we must be able to listen to and acknowledge another’s 
point of view. Yet, as I saw, Cannon’s literature often supports her preestablished 
theology. As I learned from Wallace, I must prioritize allowing literature to challenge what 
I believe. Literature allows access to stories and experiences that are not my own, and 
therefore must be given priority in changing how I understand the world and how I respond 
to it. This development of viewpoint tied to Nussbaum’s valorisation of emotion enables 
the development of compassion. As Nussbaum states, “Compassion takes up the 
onlooker’s point of view, making the best judgment the onlooker can make about what is 
 
299 Ibid., 67. 




really happening to the person, even when that may differ from the judgment of the person 
herself.”301  
Yet, as I saw with van Heijst, I must be cautious not to bring my own desire and 
motive into the literature—I cannot approach the literature with a set of questions I require 
it to answer. In order for it to challenge me, I must allow the literature to have its own 
voice and agenda. I must be wary of the ways in which I may be prone to misuse or 
misread the literature. Though van Heijst argues against seeing the text as reality, I must 
also understand the ways in which the narrative can explain reality through fiction. As 
Chopp’s poetics give us the ability to put voice to deep trauma, I must understand that 
what the fiction teaches is grounded in real suffering. Thus, even as I take account of the 
fiction of the work, I am enlightened to the real testimonies it embodies. 
In forming my method for this thesis, I approach the following literature section 
with both questions I have developed from the previous theology section and a reading 
practice that continues to question my desired answers. This partnering of literature and 
theology should not be unbalanced, and I must remain cautious in my literary analysis. I 
turn now to my own work, the challenges literature has brought to my imago Dei 
understandings, beginning with the ways in which I will approach my readings. 
  
 




4. Destruction and Desire: Jean Rhys Novels and a Beginning Theory 
of the Imago Dei 
 
Introduction 
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, literature can raise theological questions and 
allow us to see others in a new light. Rather than attempting to find proofs of my 
preestablished theology, the literature I read must challenge and inform me, giving me a 
better understanding of marginalized people. 302 The principles I developed in the previous 
chapter have shaped my reading of Jean Rhys, as she delivers both a testimonial to 
marginalization as well as challenges to my approach. As I will demonstrate throughout 
these two chapters, Rhys’ depiction of life focuses on the ways people are excluded in 
society. She seeks to reveal the degraded and despairing aspects of human life lived as a 
perpetual struggle. In understanding her own life, as well as the fiction she powerfully 
creates, I can see vital aspects of humanity, frequently neglected in theological discourse, 
that help me to understand the image of God more fully.  
The fiction of Jean Rhys is distinctly helpful due to the complex characters she 
creates and themes of marginality we may explore through them.303 Her own sense of self, 
necessary to understand when examining her work, was complex and fluid. She found 
herself unable to achieve a sense of belonging to communities in the various places where 
she lived, and her writing expresses a profound sense of ‘outsiderness’. In the text Jean 
Rhys: Twenty-First Century Approaches (2015), Erica Johnson and Patricia Moran 
explain: 
 
Much has been written about how Rhys’s work defies periodisation and transcends 
categories…She is viewed as a modernist, postcolonial, Caribbean, British and 
Creole writer—yet to parse these identities is to fall short of the complexity of her 
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Rhys’ work is vital to my thesis for precisely this reason. Her rejection of hierarchy and of 
simplifying oppression set her well beyond the second wave feminism she did not identify 
with.305 Her work, similar to that of intersectional work being done today, is concerned 
primarily with how oppressions pile on top of each other. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
explains in “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,”306 
intersectionality is the understanding that separate issues of power often interact in ways 
that multiply oppression or marginality for people. In Crenshaw’s work, this is particularly 
linked to the oppression Black women suffer due to being both Black and women, and how 
those two cannot be separated out, but instead understood as interlocking issues. Though 
Rhys’ focus was often primarily on the oppressive power of money, as I said, she is also 
always simultaneously discussing gender, race, and nationality. Rhys writes a world where 
these are all weighed against one another, and thus pits people against each other in 
various and complex ways.307 Helen Carr states: 
 
Coming from the fissured and ambivalent world of the colonial margins, with their 
torn and violent history, to the grim, chill edges of metropolitan society, she was 
able to forge a powerful critique of European values and hierarchies, and to give 
new insights into the darkness, frailty, pain, desire and hope within the human 
psyche.308  
 
 It is her troubling of labels, her complex critique of society, and her consistent 
challenges to oppression that make her particularly important in this age. Though she has 
not enjoyed the same popularity of some of her contemporaries, she has proven to be far 
ahead of her time. It is her ability to present a testimonial, much like Chopp’s poetics, as 
well as establish questions to challenge and makes her the perfect author for this work.  
 Her complexity, therefore, encompasses a multitude of marginalisations. In her 
writing, and characters, there is a clear and important rejection of labels that define people 
either in terms of their allegiances or identity. Rhys continually refuses the categories of 
social justice activism, though her work is consistently read in those terms. She also rejects 
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labels of nationality, refusing to place herself within a context. Because she was raised in 
Dominica and later moved to England, she found herself in constant conflict with how she 
identified. As Rhys scholar Elaine Savory relates, an interview of Rhys shows this: 
 
To the writer David Plante she was unable or unwilling to answer when asked if 
she was a West Indian or a French writer and responded quite vehemently when 
asked about her English literary affiliation: ‘No! I’m not! I’m not! I’m not even 
English’.309  
 
Because of this, Rhys has to be read as undertaking an ongoing process of weaving 
together multiple identities. She is white, Creole, British, West Indian, woman, writer, 
educated, outsider. Her financial status is a constant shift, from the power and prestige of 
her family in Dominica, to the poverty she experienced at various times in her life in 
Europe. 
 As stated, disconnection from others because of class, race, and/or gender were 
important experiences in Rhys’ childhood. Being white and British in a territory that had 
resisted colonizing control, along with the isolation she faced in her own family, reinforced 
in Rhys the sense that she did not belong.310 Savory points out that it is in these early 
experiences that Rhys’ complex racial, economic and gender understandings began to take 
shape. In taking after her (relatively) liberal father311, Rhys developed an understanding of 
racial tensions best described by her belief that people formed understandings of 
themselves as “not the Other.”312  
 This enabled her to conduct a searing examination of how exclusion can shape 
identity, and this is displayed in the construction of her characters. In the previous chapter I 
discussed Anneliese van Heijst’s rejection of literature as simply a mirror of reality. While 
I maintained that it is necessary to allow the literature to have its own voice, I argued that it 
is also vital to understand how the author is constructing that voice. Rhys began with her 
life experiences, and then shaped them into fiction in order to raise particular challenges. 
The way she shaped her characters and their environments can be seen as highlighting 
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aspects of the world she knew and the viscous forces of exclusion she encountered.313  As 
Helen Carr explains, “Jean Rhys’ fiction has been read as the retelling through her heroines 
of her own melancholy tale…”314 In doing so, she is able to not only able to reflect on 
aspects of her own life, which she famously did not think it worthwhile to relate in 
detail315, but to point beyond them to the social mechanisms of oppression, 
marginalization, and rejection.  
This is where I must confess my own growth in understanding as I engaged with 
Rhys’ writing. When I began my research, I believed my ideas about the imago Dei would 
be confirmed through engaging critically with an author who writes primarily about 
suffering. I was looking for an imago Dei that was able to comprehend the experience of 
the innocent victims of injustice who were unable to find the courage to support their 
becoming or the communal resources that would affirm their identity. In entering into 
Rhys’ work with these pre-set notions, I struggled. My initial readings were, I confess, 
inadequate. Yet through the process of reading, and re-reading, spending time with her 
work and with her legacy, my thoughts were broken open.  
To begin, I had misconceptions about Rhys herself. Like many, I had made too 
simplistic an identification between Rhys and her characters who is often portrayed as the 
victims of circumstances. As Rhys scholar Helen Carr says, “One reason for beginning my 
account with Jean Rhys in Beckenham ‘protesting loudly’, as the court reports put it, is to 
underline the inadequacy of this image of her as a passive, hopeless and helpless victim, 
from whom her heroines and their bleak lives are cloned.”316 Rhys’ work certainly 
demonstrates a very dismal view of humanity. However, this view is not, as may first 
appear, a passively bleak view. Rhys certainly did not accept her own life or future as 
being one of passive reliance on her lovers, though she was certainly dependent at points. 
Neither was Rhys content to be defined by others, but instead insisted on speaking for 
herself in ways that continually seemed contradictory; expressing how those who long for 
inclusion also pass judgement on the society that excludes them. Thus, her position on 
many social issues are deeply ambivalent and many readings of her work debate whether 
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she was a feminist or not, a racist or not, a prostitute or not as these defined positions are 
not established in her writing. 
In fact, I experienced my own struggles with her work for a time for these reasons. 
Furthermore, reading her novels in succession, I despaired of her characters. They seemed, 
at times, completely helpless and victimized, and at other times to be complicit in their 
own destruction. I wanted to save them and berate them simultaneously. I wanted to 
dispute their sense that they were inherently doomed and tell them they simply did not 
have enough faith in their own talents. Though I was motivated to act317, I had not 
discovered the appropriate type of action needed. 
This was a naïve reading of Rhys, and of her characters and I assume she would 
have been displeased with many of my original interpretations of her work. However, the 
process of understanding Rhys is challenging because her work is deeply complex and 
varied. Her characters are not singularly anything, nor are they interchangeable. To truly 
understand what Rhys is doing, it takes time to see how she allows the forces that alienate 
her characters to intersect, how she develops narrators who work through their own 
complex views, and how, in the end, she allows herself to protest loudly for those at the 
margins. As Helen Carr explains: 
  
…her chief loyalty is not to her sex, but to the group with which she identifies, in 
her case the disempowered and dispossessed, which are neither so homogeneous 
nor so easily identified as a group held together by race, nationality or even 
class.318  
 
Rhys is not so much interested in specifically pointing out the oppression faced by 
particular groups, but rather, to draw her reader into the mind of the characters and 
allowing us to see the connections between the differing experiences of the disempowered. 
By multiplying her focus, she is not campaigning for one particular group, but instead 
seeking to side with the marginalized in every situation. 
Her novels are thus not simply narratives based on personal experience. Instead 
they serve as important commentaries on how the struggle to develop identity is often 
linked to systemic mistreatment of people—they are challenges, much like Cynthia 
Wallace examines for her work. In this respect, her fiction helps me to conceive a model of 
the imago Dei that is not reliant on problematic concepts of ability, goodness, assimilation 
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or even communal belonging. In the following two chapters, I will first examine Rhys’ 
own life to highlight key themes that were then elaborated upon and creatively mediated in 
her fiction. I will then move to explore her interwar novels to see how those themes are 
embodied and may be drawn upon in order to form a more complex and inclusive 
discussion of the imago Dei.  
 
Jean Rhys: An Isolated Life 
Ella Gwendoline Rees Williams was born in Dominica in 1890319, the third child of 
Reese and Minna Williams. However, only one of her two siblings had survived. An older 
sister had been born, Brenda Gwenith Maxwell Rees Williams, who died at nine months 
old. In her biography on Rhys, Carol Angier explains that according to custom, her mother, 
Minna, was encouraged to have another child immediately. This was thought to help with 
the pain of loss. As Angier states: 
 
Often, perhaps mostly, this works, and pulls the mother back into life. But 
sometimes it doesn’t. Then there is a phenomenon which doctors also recognise: 
what can happen to a child with a mourning mother. It can be left with a lifelong 
sense of loss and emptiness, of being wanted by no one and belonging nowhere; of 
being nothing, not really existing at all.320 
 
Rhys and her mother struggled to connect, due to the grief Minna was still suffering. Rhys 
recalls in her autobiography, Smile Please, that she is sure there must have been “an 
interval before she seemed to find me a nuisance and I grew to dread her.”321 However, 
upon the birth of her younger sister, Rhys felt she was cast aside. She experienced her 
mother as abusive; humiliating her and causing her to focus on her flaws from a young 
age.322 She felt an outsider in her own family, noting that when looking at a picture of her 
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family, “My brothers and sisters all had brown eyes and hair, why was I singled out to be 
the only fair one…?”323 
 This early division between Rhys and her mother was further complicated by the 
social status and attention her mother brought to the family. In her book, Jean Rhys, Elaine 
Savory states that Minna’s family was respected on the island, and Rhys was often referred 
to as “a Lockhart.”324 Her inherited social status, dependent on a relationship to her 
mother, only highlighted for Rhys how unlike her mother and sister she was becoming. 
The lack of a loving relationship with her mother opened a gap between Rhys and others; 
she felt herself ‘disconnected’ from earliest childhood and this becomes a major theme in 
her work. This sense of disconnection influenced her relationships throughout her life, 
even with those she most cared for. 
 The primary example of this is Rhys’ relationship with her father. In contrast to her 
mother, Rhys idealized him yet, as she admitted, “I probably romanticised my father, 
perhaps because I saw very little of him.”325 Despite this, Williams’ influence can be seen 
in many aspects of Rhys’s persona. Having moved to Dominica as a doctor, Rees Williams 
built a prominent reputation on the island. He was wealthy; in fact Savory lists him as one 
of the wealthiest people in Dominica.326 He was also influential in the island’s politics, and 
his social views seem to have influenced Rhys’s own. Not terribly consistent, both 
expressed opinions that can be seen as “racist and anti-racist, both hostile and sentimental, 
both patronizing and egalitarian.”327 Her father’s paternalist form of liberalism meant he 
was ‘kinder’ towards black people than some white occupants of Dominica, but it did not 
motivate him to side with the colonized Dominicans in their fight against the British 
empire.328  
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 Rhys’ childhood may have been spent idolizing her father from a distance, but he 
left the parenting work to Rhys’ mother. She explains, “My father never seemed to notice 
us at all, far too engaged in either abuse or praise of various English politicians, while my 
mother watched us the whole time.”329 Believing that he lived an exciting life and was 
kindly disposed towards her, she ascribes the positive aspects of her childhood to his 
influence. “It was he who stopped the hated plate of porridge my mother suddenly 
expected me to eat every morning, and arranged that I should have an egg beaten up in hot 
milk with nutmeg instead.”330 
 Rees Williams died when Rhys was 18. His death was ‘remote’ in that Rhys had 
already gone from the island and was distanced from her family by that time. Yet she 
remained deeply attached to him, and upon hearing, late in her life, that the Celtic cross 
that marked his grave had been knocked down, she wrote, “I hated whoever had done this 
and thought, ‘I can hate too.’”331 Despite these strong feelings her emotional attachment to 
her father was always distanced, and so his absence during traumatic times of her life is 
poignant. Again, threaded throughout her life is this constant feeling of disconnection with 
those she longs to be in relationship with. 
Just as her home life left Rhys feeling isolated, her social life was also 
unfortunately characterized by separation. Meta, her “nurse and the terror of my life,”332 
repeatedly and purposefully terrified Rhys. Meta taught Rhys things to be afraid of, 
including zombies and cockroaches. These interactions with Meta caused fear and distrust, 
as “[Meta] both made the young girl afraid and reminded her of her exclusion from the 
African world of the spirit.”333 She played tricks on Rhys, laughed at her distress, and 
physically abused her.334 Rhys explains, “Meta had shown me a world of fear and distrust, 
and I am still in that world.”335 
Rhys was also divided from her classmates. While she does not speak directly 
about her white peers, she recounts being rejected by the black girls she wanted to 
befriend. As Savory explains, “For Rhys racial difference factored into painful childhood 
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relationships at times.”336 Smile Please recounts several examples of Rhys’ interactions 
with black children, which developed in her a sense that they were happier than she.337 She 
poignantly recalls trying to initiate a conversation with a black girl at school, but the girl 
gave her an irritated look which Rhys interpreted as hatred.338 
Rhys painfully felt the separations between herself and those she wished to form 
relationships with. Although from a wealthy background she displayed a wilful 
misunderstanding of the conventions of race relations and class hierarchy. However, once 
again this should not be seen as a simple rejection of privilege. While Rhys spent most of 
her adult life protesting against the power of money to determine status, she also loved 
things money provided—fashion, luxury, etc. Savory tells us Rhys had “strong sympathies 
for the underprivileged. But she had strong contradictions there as well.”339 Rhys believed 
that things were not fair for both the workers and “the other side.”340  
Rhys is aware of these contradictions, and inserts the same complex outlook in her 
protagonists, giving us characters who are both able to experience “otherness” and also 
marginalize others as they continue to strive for stability. In her examination of Rhys’ 
work, Helen Carr believes that it is through this overlap of victim/victimizer that Rhys is 
able to reshape our understanding of social relationships. She says: 
  
For Rhys to make sense of existences like hers meant understanding the historical 
and social forces which had made them what they are….It is impossible to separate 
her readings of the psyches of those whose lives are misshapen and coerced by the 
hierarchical machinery of organized society from her analysis of the working of 
that machinery itself….She constantly, in Bhabha’s words, ‘relat[es] the traumatic 
ambivalences of a personal, psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political 
existence’.341 
 
It is this unusual ability to highlight the complex overlapping of various marginalisations 
that is particularly important in my work as I seek to discern the image of God in those 
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who can neither be classed as virtuous, courageous or innocent victims of hostile 
circumstances.  
The consequences of her disconnection from others then leads me to another 
important theme that can be seen in Rhys’ life and work. As she felt constantly othered, we 
begin to see her acceptance of this status. Not only does Rhys accept a feeling of distance, 
but she begins to accept abuse, both emotional and physical, as she devalues her 
personhood. This abuse shapes how she continues to form, or attempt to form, 
relationships.  
An important example of her acceptance of abuse comes from another significant 
event during Rhys’ Dominican life. When Rhys was fourteen, Mr. Howard, a friend of Dr. 
Williams, and his wife visited Dominica on their way to England. During a walk, as Rhys 
tried to behave “in the most grown-up way she could,” Mr. Howard put his hand on her 
breast.342 Rhys records a similar assault in her short story, “Goodbye Marcus, Goodbye 
Rose,” giving us perhaps a glimpse of her feelings about this assault. His hand having 
moved down to her waist, he was interrupted by a couple on a walk, yet Rhys was 
constrained to continue walking with him for months. Though, as Angier says, “He never 
touched her again,”343 Mr. Howard gained an abusive control over the young woman. He 
constantly repeated themes of owning her, her necessary submission to him, and the 
ubiquitous violence of gendered relationships. Angier explains, “That was love, he told 
her, that was making love: not kindness, but violence and cruelty.”344 This abusive 
relationship ended when Howard and his wife left for England, and Rhys claims to have 
“forgot it.”345 It is clear, however, that the effects of Mr. Howard’s ‘instruction’ lasted 
through Rhys’ entire life.  Her understanding of her place among people is characterized 
by separation, by violence, and by oppression. Mr. Howard’s assault and subsequent 
treatment of her, consolidated her sense of isolation. Her adult relationships with men were 
complicated, and it seems she came to identify love with being owned by someone. In 
Smile Please, as she discusses her relationships, she says: 
  
It seems to me now that the whole business of money and sex is mixed up with 
something very primitive and deep. When you take money from someone you love 
it becomes not money but a symbol. The bond is now there. The bond has been 
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established. I am sure the woman’s deep-down feeling is ‘I belong to this man, I 
want to belong to him completely.’346 
 
Howard impressed upon Rhys that love was ownership, and once again she developed an 
acute understanding of a divide between people. As she endures abuse, she also begins to 
act in ways defined by that abuse. Rhys both longs for relationships and also consistently 
acts against herself in that pursuit. This pattern is rehearsed throughout her adult life. 
 At the age of 17, Rhys and her Aunt Clarice boarded a ship to England, leaving 
Dominica behind. She was travelling in order to attend school in England, as was normal 
for many white Dominicans.347 She recalls her father telling her to write if she is “very 
unhappy,” but not too soon or he’d be disappointed in her.348 Going to her cabin, she saw 
that a brooch, which she had previously loved, had been crushed. She says, “I took it off 
and put it away without any particular feeling. Already all my childhood, the West Indies, 
my father and mother had been left behind: I was forgetting them. They were the past.”349 
As she attempts to disassociate from her former life, though, she finds her life in England 
to be equally filled with isolation and rejection. She may have believed she was able to put 
her past behind, but the themes of her past—difference and isolation from those around 
her, recognition of social hierarchies, sexual trauma, and financial concern—continue 
during her adult life. Rhys had been enrolled in acting school, but on the insistence of her 
parents had to leave after the second term.350 After hearing of her father’s death, Rhys 
decided to pursue a stage career and worked for a time as a chorus girl. She was routinely 
rejected for more prestigious acting roles. Rhys often cited her father’s financial 
difficulties as the sole reason she could not continue at drama school, yet her difficulties in 
getting cast also point to a problem with her West Indian accent.351 Savory explains, “If 
anything would have impressed upon Rhys her colonial and marginal status it would have 
been this painful failure to achieve her dream of acting because of her accent.”352 This 
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failure, coupled with her father’s death and even further isolation from her family, also 
contributed to Rhys’ financial struggles. She often found herself living in extreme poverty, 
unable to sustain herself through her stage work.  
 At the age of 20, Rhys began her first “love affair.”353 Lasting eighteen months, this 
initiated a series of relationships with men on whom Rhys became financially dependent. 
Rhys describes this in Smile Please, stating that her lover began sending her money 
through a law firm. When she received the first cheque, with a note that she would be 
getting a monthly allowance, she says, “It is at once humiliating and exciting.”354 She saw 
the cheque as both a “bond” and as distance, because it came from a lawyer.355 Once again, 
Rhys experiences love as being owned by another person--as she had been taught by Mr. 
Howard during his abuse--this time through money. She accepted that first cheque, tried to 
find a job, but because of her fear of rejection and isolation, continued to take money until 
she got used to it. “You think: I’ll never do that; and you find yourself doing it.”356 This 
move into a form of sex work places Rhys into another marginalized community and 
highlights the way in which these many forms of oppression combine and intersect.  
 During these years of sex work, Rhys continued to make some attempts at 
developing an acting career. In 1917, as she was taking dancing lessons, she lived in a 
cheap boarding house called Torrington Square. It was here that she met her first husband, 
Jean Lenglet. He fascinated her, and within weeks of meeting they were engaged. Her 
family disapproved, and Angier records that her sister asked her to end the engagement.357 
Rhys married Lenglet a year later, and she moved to Holland to be with him in 1919. She 
was thrilled to leave England and believed this would be the start of a better life. Lenglet, 
though, had many secrets—including the loss of his Dutch citizenship for eight or nine 
years and a previous wife he had not divorced.358 Their marriage was defined by financial 
struggle, Lenglet’s troubling and disreputable associations and actions, and Rhys’ naivety 
about him. The couple soon moved to Paris, where Lenglet succeeded in making some 
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money; almost certainly through illegal means. It was during this time that Rhys had her 
first child, William Owen. But her baby became sick, and because of their poverty, they 
left him at the Hospice des Enfants Assistés. Anxious and distressed Rhys became insistent 
that they christen the baby, even though she and Lenglet were atheists. Lenglet did not 
want to do this, and to distract her he bought champagne and they drank through the night. 
The next day, Rhys learned that her baby had died while they were drinking.359  
 Rhys kept numerous journals during these times, writing about these events and 
shaping them into stories. After travelling in Europe, with an extended stay in Vienna, the 
couple returned to Paris bringing with them their two-year-old daughter Maryvonne. It was 
then, in 1924, that she met the publisher Ford Maddox Ford. Rhys had been writing more 
seriously, and Ford took an interest in her work. This interest turned into an affair, but also 
the beginning of Rhys’ professional writing career. The relationship, which became 
notorious in the literary world, inspired her first novel, Quartet (1928).  
 Rhys and Lenglet divorced in 1932, and she married Leslie Tilden Smith the same 
year. Tilden Smith died tragically in 1945, six years after the publication of Rhys's final 
“interwar novel” and the last writing she would do for many years. Her adult life, the 
events surrounding her time as a chorus girl, her marriages, her poverty and sex work, all 
became the resources she used to craft her novels and stories. In these, power is held on the 
basis of gender, money, race and nationality, and she examines this oppressive interlocking 
system through her fiction. During this period of her writing career she did not achieve the 
kind of fame and financial rewards that would arrive very late in her life and she struggled 
to feel welcome within the literary world. Even as she moved to Paris, living among other 
expatriates, bohemians and writers, she saw herself the “outsider of outsiders,”360 unable to 
feel acceptance even in the company of exiles. As she says in Smile Please, “I would never 
really belong anywhere, and I knew it, and all my life would be the same, trying to belong, 
and failing.”361 
 As I reflect upon Rhys’ life, the two prominent themes of disconnection and abuse 
(both done to her and by her, to herself and to others) are the tragic poles around which her 
work and life unfold. Although, there is much of Rhys’ life left to be discussed, I break 
here to begin looking at how these two themes impacted on the first novels I will examine, 
Voyage in the Dark (1934) and Quartet (1928) and the challenges she delivers through 
 
359 Ibid., 112-113. 
360 Savory, Jean Rhys, xiv. 




them. By examining these novels in the light of these two themes, I believe they will raise 
important questions for my re-visioning of the imago Dei. I will review the books not 
chronologically, but in order of the author’s life stages to which they correspond. 
Voyage in the Dark 
Anna Morgan, Woman Divided 
  Voyage in the Dark tells the story of Anna Morgan, who was born in the West 
Indies and moved to England with her stepmother after her father’s death. As with most of 
Rhys’ characters, she pursues a life in which her sexuality is commoditized. Like Rhys, 
Anna’s move took place in her late teens. As she pursued a life as a chorus girl, her accent 
often kept her from finding success, friendship and real community. We see Anna isolated 
because of her cultural difference, and she struggles to find a sense of home in England. 
Eventually, she begins to live off the money given to her by her first lover, the older 
Walter Jeffries. Anna is Rhys’ youngest protagonist in her interwar novels, and her story 
highlights the transition most of the women characters make into forms of sex work to 
survive. This novel captures the first theme explored—that of disconnection and non-
belonging. Through Anna’s life, Rhys demonstrates the various ways Anna has lost 
connection to others and to herself, which I will work through in the following section. 
 Like Rhys, Anna is unable to connect to people in either of her homes. She 
remembers the West Indies in attempts to warm herself in a land she finds cold and 
unwelcoming, but simultaneously reflects that she did not ‘fit in’ in Dominica either. She 
says, like Rhys, “Sometimes It was as if I were back there and as if England were a dream. 
At other times England was the real thing and out there was the dream, but I could never fit 
them together.”362 Her time in England is also marked by loss of connection to her family. 
Having travelled there with her stepmother, Hester, after her father’s death she does not 
maintain regular contact with her, and in the middle of the novel, this is lost completely. 
Her stepmother had tried to have Anna’s uncle take her back to the West Indies, and he has 
written a rejection. Hester reads, “If you feel that you don’t wish her to live with you in 
England, of course her aunt and I will have her here with us. But in that case I insist—we 
both insist—that she should have her proper share of the money you got from the sale of 
her father’s estate.”363 Hester insists it is impossible to give her money, as “It’s an 
outrageous thing to accuse me of cheating you out of your father’s money. I got five 
 
362 Jean Rhys, Voyage In the Dark (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982), 8. 




hundred pounds for Morgan’s Rest, that was all.”364 Hester’s rejection, paired with the 
clear rejection from her uncle as well, begins a fight between the two women, which ends 
their relationship. 
Disconnection and Isolation 
Rhys uses several factors to highlight Anna’s disconnection to’ both England and 
the Caribbean. In the Caribbean, her family was apparently prestigious. She had servants 
and felt close to her father. In England, she is now noticeably poor, leaving her unable to 
assume her former class position. With her father’s death, she has lost connection to her 
family, and her stepmother is clearly not fond of her. Anna believes this is because Hester 
thinks her mother was black, and therefore Anna is not “white.”365 Though Anna considers 
herself white and West Indian, she realizes these descriptors also put her outside the groups 
she envies. Elaine Savory explains that Anna’s world is that of dualities, demonstrating 
“many subordinate oppositions.”366 The differences of the two communities are in 
opposition to each other, and so for Anna, she is at war with herself as well. In a letter, 
Rhys says of Anna, “The difficult thing is the only worthwhile thing. The girl is divided. 
two people really. or at any rate a one foot in the sea & on land girl.” (emphasis 
original)367 It is important to keep in mind that for Rhys, Anna represents this divided self, 
and the consequences that come from it. Even in her division, she belongs to neither 
community, and internalizes this as a rejection of who she is essentially. 
Anna’s desire to be black is further examined by Savory. As she explains, Anna 
understands blackness to be tied to not only happiness, but to sexual agency and the ability 
to engage autonomously with others. She says, “Anna makes sure Walter knows how much 
she has wanted to be black. Later in the novel, a man speaks to her in the street and she 
feels violent towards him but sees a policeman looking at her, and the violence turns 
towards him, verbally. She makes him ‘a damned baboon—a fair baboon too, worse than a 
dark one every time’.”368 This reversal of the racist use of monkey highlights her 
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problematic understandings of Black people’s power. For instance, in her attempt to cope 
with her first sexual experience with Walter, she imagines herself a young slave woman 
whose name she once saw on a family estate list; ‘Maillotte Boyd’.369 She is, in this, 
naming herself as a slave. Her inner connection to the slave list, particularly through 
naming Boyd at this point, highlights her problematic understanding of racial power 
relations. Savory explains that while Anna feels identifying with Black Caribbeans 
motivates her to stand up for herself, it is not in healthy ways. She sees her ability to act 
against Walter, particularly when she stubs a cigarette on her hand, as akin to the 
Dominicans rise against white colonization. This fetishization of blackness is particularly 
rooted in the violent struggle of peoples against each other. We also hear her say, recalling 
the slave relation she has assumed, “I like it like this.”370 However, her belief that she is 
assuming the role of a “passionate black slave woman”371 does not empower her as she 
believes it will. Rhys, as I noted previously, also had similar fantasies. Violence and love 
are linked for Anna, and Savory cautions that this slave motif is used to justify sexual 
predation for Anna.372 Men and women, in her understanding, act against each other just 
as, for her, black and white people do not exist peacefully. Instead they are essentially at 
odds and one can only assert themself at the expense of the other. 
This desire to be black is mirrored in an oppositional desire to be in a higher social 
class in England. Again, Anna recognizes that the social class she now belongs to is 
powerless, looked down upon, and she therefore desires inclusion in the class with power. 
In her work on Rhys, Sue Thomas discusses the symbols that represent the clash between 
the classes. As Anna feels confined, and suffocated, by the grey and cold of England, she 
also feels this in how wealthier people are constraining her. Thomas says “Walls figure in 
Anna’s sense of the English sneering at women of her class and in her desperate situation: 
‘their damned voices, like high, smooth, unclimbable walls all round you, closing in on 
you’.”373 Again, Anna sees the hierarchy as a dominating power, crushing the lower class 
and keeping them from freedom.  
 
369 Ibid.  
370 Rhys, Voyage in the Dark, 56. 
371 Savory, Jean Rhys, 96. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Sue Thomas, “Jean Rhys and Katherine Mansfield Writing the ‘sixth act,’” in Jean Rhys: Twenty-First-
Century Approaches, eds. Erica Johnson and Patricia Moran (Edinburgh University Press, 2015. University 




The differences in her worlds are mirrored in Anna’s divided self. The Caribbean is 
warm and colourful. England is cold and grey—“[it is] cold and…the towns we went to 
always looked so exactly alike.”374 Whereas in the Caribbean she suffered from fever, 
wore white in mourning, and wished she could be black. In England, Anna wears black in 
an attempt to signify sexual agency, is always cold and clammy, and wishes she was 
wealthy. Anna is never satisfied in herself. Yet she always believes that if only she could 
change an important aspect of herself, she might be happy. In the Caribbean, she believes 
she would be happy if she was black. In England, she believes better clothes would change 
her life— “I’ll do anything for good clothes. Anything—anything for clothes.”375 These 
contradictions are not merely part of Anna’s instability, but instead another demonstration 
of her lack of connection to herself and a lack of recognition of others. As she cannot find 
community, she also cannot find herself because her focus always seems to remain on the 
divisions that separate people. Anna is not trying to bridge gaps in the opposing cultures, 
but instead plays directly into their contesting moves for power.  She is unsuccessful, 
however, and remains a constant outsider. 
This brings me to the second theme I wish to highlight here: the complex 
consequences of not belonging. Anna, having lost connection to both her home(s) and 
herself, begins to both accept abuse and to abuse others. She is made fun of for her accent, 
her nationality, and her virginity— “the girls call her the Hottentot. Isn’t it a shame?”376 It 
is the perceived acceptance she receives from Walter Jeffries, the older man whom she first 
entered into a relationship with, that truly seduces her. She confesses several times that she 
does not particularly like Walter— “Oh God, he’s the sneering sort”377--but despairs he 
might also reject her. When he does finally break with her, she attempts to make a living 
through various forms of sex work, beginning with receiving allowances from other lovers 
and then moving into more explicit forms of prostitution.378 Eventually she becomes 
pregnant by one of the men she sleeps with.  
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Rhys does allude to various traumas, including rape and abuse, which have 
obviously contributed to Anna’s isolation and disconnection. However, Anna is not 
innocent herself and inflicts wounds upon those around her, with increasing violence as the 
novel progresses. In one instance, as she is with Carl, a lover she has had multiple 
encounters with, they are listening to music in her flat. She tells us: 
 
We started to dance and while we were dancing the dog in the picture over the bed 
stared down at us smugly… 
I said, ‘I can’t stand that damned dog any longer.’ 
I stopped dancing and took off my shoe and threw it at the picture. The glass 
smashed.379 
 
At the end of the novel Anna has undergone an abortion, which went badly wrong. 
She is very sick--“I was dying”380—and her friend Laurie tries to care for her. The novel 
ends with Anna thinking, “I lay … and thought about starting all over again. And about 
being new and fresh. And about mornings, and misty days, when anything might happen. 
And about starting all over again, all over again….”381 However, these lines do not convey 
a sense of hope but rather that Anna is utterly caught up in repetitive cycles of destruction 
she can no longer escape from. 
Even though Rhys does not give us a clear answer to whether the novel ends with 
Anna’s death, I believe the ambiguity is part of Rhys’ evocation of Anna’s death as a 
person. She has lost all connection to the world, and her increasing drift between spheres 
indicates that she has become a “ghost” long before her death. This “death” highlights a 
challenge Rhys’ writing makes to dominant understandings of the imago Dei.382 In 
understanding this death outcome, I look more in depth at Anna’s relationship with Ethel.  
A Type of Death 
Anna’s disconnection, and the consequences of her abuse and subsequent reaction 
to that abuse, has evolved into Anna’s complete disconnection from herself. She has, in 
essence, died to herself. Her dreams of happiness are implicated in this death--she believes 
she would be happier if she was someone other than herself, just as she wishes she could 
be black. This rejection of her own self, consolidated by the rejection she receives from 
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those around her, is then enacted in her rejection of others. Towards the end of the novel, 
she is renting a room from Ethel Matthews, who we see is also quite isolated. Her 
relationship with Ethel is a clear demonstration that Rhys does not allow her protagonists 
to be merely victims. Rhys paints a clear picture that Anna has become a destructive 
person, and this division, this disconnection from self, is a ‘death’ of Anna. 
 While Ethel desires connection and friendship, Anna cannot recognize any healthy 
forms of relationship offered to her. She seeks superficial admiration from men, even those 
she doesn’t like, and continues to seek to modify herself in order to get this false 
acceptance.  
During Anna’s time with Ethel, they fight over a situation with a client. As Ethel 
complains about Anna’s inability to perform manicures as she ought, the conversation 
turns to Anna’s exclusion of Ethel in social settings. Ethel cries: 
 
But it’s always the same thing. You didn’t even ask me…And oh God, what a life 
I’ve had. Trying to keep up and everybody else trying to push you down and 
everybody lying and pretending and you knowing it. And then they down you for 
doing the same things as they do.383 
 
In fact, this same speech could have been made by Anna. She has been trying and wishing 
to be included, but always senses that she does not belong. Yet when encountered by 
another human who is similarly isolated, she is unmoved. In fact, she pays them no more 
attention than an irritating insect, “A fly was buzzing round me. I couldn’t think of 
anything, except that it was December and too late for flies, or too soon, or something, and 
where did it come from?”384 She does not recognize the humanity of Ethel, demonstrating 
that for Rhys, Anna’s humanity is now also unrecognizable. 
 We see then that Anna’s isolation does not motivate her to be kind or inclusive of 
those she recognizes are also isolated, but instead leads her to despise them. She hates 
Ethel and she hates herself. In an imagined conversation with her then-lover, Carl, she 
imagines how he would describe her. She thinks he would say, “’I picked up a girl in 
London and her…. Last night I slept with a girl who…’ That was me. / Not a ‘girl’ 
perhaps. Some other word, perhaps. Never mind.”385  
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 Voyage in the Dark was disturbing for Rhys’ early readers, because of the explicit 
sexual and racial material it contained. She was made to change the ending by her 
publishers and substitute a more ambiguous outcome to the abortion. Rhys stayed with this 
altered ending even in its later reprinting.386 Primarily, Anna’s story is about abandonment, 
loss of connection, and an increasing inability to recognize herself as part of the world. Her 
narrative most clearly highlights the ways wounded identity becomes destructive, 
producing the type of “death” Rhys focuses on in her work. Wounded identity is a key 
theme in what we now call postcolonial literature. As critics have reviewed the novel the 
themes of economic, gendered, and racial violence have been discussed, and their 
combination noted as constituting one of the first examples of novels directly dealing in 
postcolonial themes. Ania Spyra states that, as an early and pioneering work in “new world 
literature”, comparison is a constant theme.387 She continues, “Reading Voyage as an 
example of comparison literature suggests that its critique of uniqueness is not so much a 
recent phenomenon…but has roots in the transnational or (post)-colonial situation of its 
author.”388 The comparisons in Voyage  demonstrate the problematic competitiveness 
between cultures placed in binary and hierarchical opposition to each other—challenging 
agendas that could be placed upon the work, in the same way van Heijst rejects 
preconceived answers to text. Spyra continues: 
  
Because of the imbalance of power, uniqueness—difference, opacity—becomes the 
domain of the disempowered. If there are no grounds for comparison, or when one 
side of the compared binary is considered the standard, comparison has to stall 
because the party which is not the standard is always already in the lost position. If 
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England is the standard of beauty, then the Caribbean cannot compare and cannot 
be beautiful according to the same standard.389 
 
In its exploration of such problematic relationships, Voyage in the Dark demonstrates 
hierarchy in relationships. Anna has experienced ‘love’ through oppression. Power 
imbalance, oppressive hierarchies, and loss have defined how she understands connection 
to others. Therefore, seen through Anna’s experiences, a relationship with a God who is 
powerfully ‘over us’ could not be comforting or indeed loving. Looking back to previous 
imago Dei theories, I must question how they are to be received by the oppressed when 
they are still modelling these features of oppression. 
As Anna continues in her disconnection and participates in destructive 
comparisons, she increasingly ‘dies’. This disconnection is, as Murdoch explains, 
“reciprocal…she is as alienated and culturally different and distant from her metropolitan 
counterparts as they are from her.”390 The novel’s end, either in the intended original or the 
published compromise, is not really about whether Anna survives her abortion. To Rhys, 
Anna has died inwardly already. She could not even be connected to her own pregnancy, 
as is evidenced by her sustained inability to admit her condition to herself or others. Her 
last disconnection is the final chapter in a life of an outsider in all circumstances and 
contexts. As Anna demonstrates this disconnection, I move now to Marya. In her story, a 




Marya, Woman in Competition 
 As stated, Quartet, published in 1929, is Rhys’ first novel – although it reflects a 
later period in her life. It draws creative inspiration from the complex relations between the 
real quartet of people Rhys was involved with at that time, including her writing mentor 
turned lover Ford Maddox Ford and Stella Bowen, a painter and Ford’s wife. While with 
her first husband, Jean Lenglet--and likely during his prison sentence391--she became 
involved with Ford. Their affair was documented by all four in published works. Because 
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Rhys, Ford, and Lenglet were novelists (and “sometimes plain liars”392), their accounts 
cannot be taken as purely factual.393 Savory explains: 
 
Quartet, which was Rhys’ highly fictional version of the affair and its 
consequences, caused a great literary scandal, especially in England, as Ford was so 
famous and many felt Rhys had behaved badly in exploiting the privacy of Bowen 
and Ford after being helped by them.394  
 
As with Voyage in the Dark, although the novel is a literary work references to Rhys’ life 
can be useful in highlighting the social concerns Rhys is exploring through fiction. Quartet 
similarly demonstrates a keen sense of competitive relationship, destruction of self, and the 
imbalance between social classes. 
 Stephan and Marya Zelli, married and poor, move around Europe as Stephan 
attempts to make money through various illicit schemes. His crimes come to light, and he 
is arrested, leaving Marya to support herself, a task she is woefully unprepared for. In this 
realization, her fear grew: “It was a vague and shadowy fear of something cruel and stupid 
that had caught her and would never let her go.”395 Having recently met a wealthy couple, 
Lois and HJ Heidler, she goes to them for help. “Now, look here, we want you to move 
into the spare room at the studio,” says Lois.396 This kind gesture is not without an 
underlying motive, though, as Heidler then forces Marya into an affair, that Lois is aware 
of. The affair is constantly shown in violent, divisive, and abusive ways.  
 Most obviously, this is manifested through the destructive relationship with HJ. 
Marya, initially afraid of and intimidated by HJ, is repeatedly abused, raped, and 
manipulated by him. When Marya falls in love with him, it is obvious that it is not healthy 
love, mutually beneficial or supportive, but instead the kind of abject love of an abused 
creature for its master.  
 Marya and Lois, meanwhile, do not fair better in terms of supportive relationship 
with each other. There are brief moments during the affair in which a connection is almost 
made between the two women. Marya admires Lois. Yet jealousy between them causes 
fights, and Lois makes clear that HJ holds the power in their marriage— “I’m talking about 
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the man, the male, the important person, the only person who matters.”397 Marya believes 
Lois hates her, and she comes to hate Lois as well. The women’s fighting causes Marya to 
move out, though she is still entangled in the affair.  
 After a year, Stephan is released from prison. HJ wants assurances that Marya will 
not return to her husband, “your going back to live with him would make an impossible 
situation.”398 However, the ‘arrangement’ with HJ is also becoming problematic. In the 
face of his increasing disinterest Marya tries to protest she loves HJ; “quivering and abject 
in his arms, like some unfortunate dog abasing itself before its master.”399 But he has 
clearly tired of her. In her desperation at this situation, she tells Stephan of the affair and 
declares she is leaving him. He rages, saying he will kill Heidler. In their ensuing fight, 
“He caught her by the shoulders and swung her sideways with all his force.”400 The novel 
ends with Stephan heading to a hotel with another woman. 
Unseen Identity 
Rhys emphasizes Marya’s disconnection throughout this novel by the literary device of 
highlighting sight, eyes, and looks. While in Voyage, Anna’s disconnection was largely 
framed through Anna’s desire to be someone else, here we see Marya wishing to be known 
(seen) by someone. Beginning with the first dinner Marya has with the Heidlers, we see 
Lois’ tendency to look past Marya.401 Marya regularly has unsatisfactory eye contact with 
Heidler, as he seems to either turn away from her or seek to possess her through looking.402 
Meanwhile, we become aware that Marya believes the ability to look at people, or to watch 
people, comes with elevated status. In a description of Lois, she emphasizes her ability to 
look at people. We are told: 
 
Lois was extremely intelligent. She held her head up. She looked at people with 
clear, honest eyes. She expressed well-read opinions about every subject under the 
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sun in a healthy voice and was so perfectly sure of all she said that it would have 
been a waste of time to contradict her.403 
 
Lois’ ability to look at people demonstrates her significance and status, though Rhys also 
demonstrates what harm it might do to have such people look at you. Marya is clearly hurt 
not only by not being looked at, but also by being watched. This difference in wording is 
important, as it emphasizes that the watcher is elevated above the watched; to really look at 
each other would be to recognize the humanness in the other. 
 As stated, Marya is watched by Heidler in her sleep404, once again highlighting the 
many ways we are told that Heidler’s relationship with Marya is oppressive and abusive. 
His presence is regularly referred to as heavy, crushing, and domineering.405 However, 
even as his presence is oppressive, it is the ways he watches her that seems to have the 
most effect. We learn, too, that Marya believes this ‘watching’ is common for men. “And 
they look at you with hard, greedy eyes. I hate them with their greedy eyes,” she thinks.406 
She regards Heidler’s eyes as “cool,” but begins to accept how they see her and thus define 
her. In the midst of the abusive relationship, Heidler’s opinion becomes fact for her. Again, 
we are told: 
 
What mattered was that, despising, almost disliking love, he was forcing her to be 
nothing but the little woman who lived in the Hotel du Bosphore for the express 
purpose of being made love to. A petite femme. It was, of course, part of his mania 
for classification. But he did it with such conviction that she, miserable weakling 
that she was, found herself trying to live up to his idea of her. / She lived up to it. 
And she had her reward. /…He had everything on his side—right down to the 
expression on the waiter’s face when he brought up her breakfast.407 
 
As Heidler physically “bore her down”408 he also breaks down her own view of herself. 
She has become, in her mind, what he believes her to be—useless except to be used. She is 
not to be considered anymore. What matters is merely what she can do for him. 
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 And so, we come to a significant passage in which Marya’s image of God, and of 
Heidler are revealed to the reader. Marya dreams about Heidler praying; his supposed 
‘divine’ connection having affected her own ability to pray herself. Rhys explains how in 
her dream, “Marya turned to watch Heidler go down on one knee and cross himself as he 
passed the altar. He glanced quickly sideways at her as he did it, and she thought: ‘I’ll 
never be able to pray again now that I’ve seen him do that. Never! However sad I am.’ 
And she felt very desolate.”409 Then she imagines he tells her about his relation to God. 
“God’s a pal of mine,” she hears him say. God has the same “cold eyes” and is in Heidler’s 
image. She is not even worthy of an introduction to this divine figure because “Lois is a 
good woman and you are a bad one.” Transformed into who he believed her to be Marya 
must acknowledge, “Nobody owes a fair deal to a prostitute.” 410 In her dream Marya is not 
loved by God/Heidler, nor should she be, and this extinguishes the last of her hope. In 
trying to wake from this terrible nightmare, she finds herself sick from drink and unable to 
force her eyes open. “She shut them and again the bed plunged downwards with her—
sickeningly—into blackness.”411 She then imagines herself trying to climb out, “so 
weighted down that it was impossible to hoist herself to the next rung…She was going to 
fall. She was falling. The breath left her body.”412 
 Stephan’s unsuccessful reunion with Marya is again focused largely on how others 
see her. In her rambling, she repeatedly references Lois’ opinion of her, that she “is too 
virtuous.”413 Stephan, upset, asks for details, but Marya “stared unseeingly with the eyes of 
a fanatic” and begs him to “be good to her.”414 She says: 
 
I wanted to beg you to be good to me, to be kind to me. Because I’m so unhappy 
that I think I’m going to die of it. My heart is broken. Something in me is broken. I 
feel…. I don’t know…. Help me!415 
 
Stephan, still enraged, determines to kill Heidler, though Marya begs him not to. As they 
fight, she looks at him.   
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She saw the expression in his eyes and was afraid. / ‘No,’ she said piteously, 
backing away from him. ‘I didn’t mean…’ / He caught her by the shoulders and 
swung her sideways with all his force. As she fell, she struck her forehead against 
the edge of the table, crumpled up and lay still.416 
 
So yet again Marya is conquered by the way a man looks at her. She is crushed once more, 
left without even a thought – destroyed. 
Invisibility 
 To understand how Rhys displays Marya’s death, I look to an earlier scene in 
which we see Marya’s desire to be recognized, not simply watched or looked at. When 
Heidler tells her that he is done with her, she looks across the café at a man. “It seemed 
enormously important that she should remember the name of the little man who, staring at 
her, was obviously also thinking: ‘Who is she, where have I met her?’”417 In the midst of 
her breakup with Heidler, Marya desires to be not just watched but known, recognized. 
This last insight Rhys gives us again distinguishes between the act of watching and seeing. 
It is not that Marya is afraid of being seen, it is instead that she longs to be known and 
recognised in that sight. She finally remembers the little man’s name, but it comes along 
with a strong feeling of nostalgia about days past when she still hoped in life. The 
connection she develops to this man is strained between the shame she feels at his seeing 
her now, being dumped, and the memory of who she then was. As this connection to her 
former self is now also ruined, Heidler sees the change in her eyes.418 
 Marya’s oppression is clearly tied to several aspects of her being in Quartet. Rhys 
points out her gender, constantly showing us that Marya believes it is always the man 
“who matters.”419 Marya identifies men as her primary abusers, and while we do not get 
information about her trauma before the novel begins, it is obvious she has suffered 
abuse.420 Marya’s social and economic status is also clearly part of this marginalization, as 
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Lois points out.421 Marya is unable to climb the social ladder, and so acceptance by the 
Heidlers in this way is another type of oppressive control. Marya admires Lois for being 
knowledgeable, hinting that she is insecure about her own intelligence. Finally, Marya’s 
move into becoming “petite femme” or prostitution, seals her fate as an unvalued member 
of society. As I will explain, though, it is not Marya’s ‘image’ (or personhood) that dies in 
this novel, even though it is badly wounded. 
Destruction  
 Though received as a fictionalized account of Rhys’ own relationships, Quartet 
succeeds in portraying her four characters as variably problematic. Rhys is certainly not 
painting herself as innocent victim. As Savory states, it is an indication of her great talent 
she was able to “keep herself from being either simple heroine or simple villain.”422 The 
novel is a prime example of Rhys’ expertise in writing, as none of the narrations are 
trustworthy, and the “reader learns quickly to measure a word or a phrase in a context 
carefully.”423 Quartet firmly establishes Rhys’ goal to keep us from assuming simplicity in 
the ways society oppresses and moves people into self-destructiveness. In this, the novel is 
particularly important in reframing the questions we normally ask in determining who is, 
and is not, ‘good’. As I discussed earlier, Rhys is challenging how we understand power. 
In Voyage, she identified how others’ power over us can destroy us. Here, Rhys also wants 
us to reframe what we understand as our own power. For Rhys, power cannot be good if it 
crushes others. Heidler’s power over both his wife and Marya is a demonstration of his 
oppressive nature. Likewise, Lois’ power over Marya positions her as guiltily complicit in 
abuse, even as she remains powerless with HJ. For Rhys destructive power and the 
hierarchies it creates cannot be good, and therefore, she challenges us to acknowledge the 
problems that ensue when we represent God through the terms of hierarchical power 
relationship. In her discussion of Quartet, Helen Nebeker argues that women, in Rhys’ 
fiction, live in “a distorted world where man’s only view of woman is sexual and woman’s 
only hope, submission.”424 Nebeker’s argument that women become sex workers not 
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because of “uncontrollable desires”425 but as a mode of survival is again evidence in the 
destructive competitiveness between oppressor and oppressed. The encounter between 
women and men is one of economic struggle. She says that in the struggle between 
Stephan and Marya, we see that Stephan’s violent response is tied to Marya’s economic 
dependence on him. To quote: 
 
In this final revelation of man’s despair, of woman as man’s economic, if not moral 
and spiritual, albatross, Rhys transcends her time, suggesting that much of man’s 
real dislike of woman—perhaps even his sexual exploitation of her—is rooted in 
his unconscious sense of perpetual economic obligation. Since the obligation exists, 
perhaps he exploits it to the fullest. Conversely, as woman rails against man’s 
sexual exploitation, berating him for assuaging his guilt with money, she 
nevertheless feeds and lives upon him like some parasitic vine.426 
 
As Rhys powerfully displays, the ways in which the powerful maintain their power leads 
the oppressed themselves to operate in light of this, often in ways that involve them also in 
compromise and guilt. Just as in this unequal fight for power we cannot allow the powerful 
to image God, nor can we always simply declare the oppressed innocent. As Rhys makes 
clear the abused and traumatized can also damage others. Nebeker’s interpretation of 
Quartet certainly has problematic aspects to it. Nonetheless, it is helpful to my discussion 
here. While Marya and Stephan’s conflict is a far deeper one than simply frustration about 
economic inequality, that destructive competition is still present. Marya and Stephan, 
Marya and Lois, Marya and HJ, Lois and HJ, and Stephan and HJ all seek to secure their 
own status through the destruction of the others. 
Marya’s relationships with the three other characters are all, in various ways, 
demonstrations of different ways in which hierarchical society can be crushing and 
destructive. Her relationship with her husband, Stephan, highlights a number of national 
and racial prejudices, as his Polish name and nationality affect Marya’s ability to move 
within society in Paris. What’s more, Stephan is an example of an oppressed person 
making decisions society deems unacceptable (though in this instance, they are truly 
destructive and violent) and then re-enacting oppressive relations in his responses to other 
people (particularly Marya). Her relationship with Lois, first viewed by Marya as one of 
help and compassion, highlights internalized misogyny and the destructive competition 
between women that results from this. Lois, the wife, is clearly in a position of power over 
Marya, and even in fleeting moments of weakness, Marya is constantly torn down by her 
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contact with Lois. This relationship, in its overlapping oppressions, give insight to how 
class and status can overpower gendered compassion, in keeping with Rhys’ suspicion of a 
one-dimensional feminism. 
Marya’s part in this competitive relationship, unlike Anna’s in Voyage, is focussed 
on desire for recognition of her true self. As Anna pursued change in herself through 
constant appropriation of other people and cultures, Marya desires someone to know her as 
she is. This focus on connection as recognition is demonstrated through Rhys’ use of sight 
and understanding.  Therefore, this novel demonstrates Rhys’ challenge to perceptions 
concerning who is worthy of recognition. Recognition, highlighted earlier in my work 
through Stephenson’s four points of the imago Dei, is a key aspect to being able to 
participate in the world as God does. This type of recognition includes recognition of the 
self and of others, leading to a mutually beneficial and loving relationship. As I discussed 
through the theology of Karl Barth, Katie Cannon, and the philosophy of Martha 
Nussbaum, developing recognition of others is essential to understanding the imago Dei. 
However, now in light of Rhys’ novels, I am able to see that recognition’s importance 
particularly for those who do not recognize themselves. 
 Therefore, Quartet links Rhys works most directly to the discussion of the imago 
Dei, both in the novel itself and in the understanding of the image as sight. As Stephenson 
says, to image God we must begin by looking one another in the eye, and then 
participating in that knowledge of the other. Marya desires recognition, even as she does 
not believe herself worthy. The other characters, who do not give her this recognition, are 
in her belief more worthy. It is here that I see the imago Dei more truly reflected in Marya 
than the others.  
 As Voyage demonstrates our participation in the image of God requires us to be 
vulnerable and also acknowledge our own woundedness, Quartet shows us that this 
participation must not be superficial. Marya, in her desire to be seen and known by the 
others, does not, herself, see and know them. Resentment between the four is, as Nebeker 
helps to demonstrate, due to the destructive relationships through which they are 
positioned. However, the destruction they enact is not equal. HJ’s ability to crush the 
women (and Stephan’s power as well) is far greater due to his privileged role. Marya, 
suffering from gendered, economic, and class disadvantage is the most injured.  
Challenges Raised 
 These two novels present the many of the challenges I see Rhys raising to 




isolation of Anna, leading me to question how our understanding of the image could be 
localized in attitudes of dignity or courage. Is Anna not able to represent the image because 
she did not see herself as worthy or capable? Similarly, Rhys does not show us that Anna, 
or others, are able to lift themselves out of their isolation through their own efforts. In 
Quartet, Rhys challenges the notion that Heidler images ‘his pal’ God. I also understand 
her to be questioning the characteristics we valorise in the divine, specifically that of 
power over others such as Heidler boasts of. I also am led to look at Marya’s longing to be 
recognized for herself, even as she believes she can never image God.427 Her sense of 
agency and selfhood is often compromised, and she certainly damages others in the 
process of trying to be accepted into the world. I therefore must continue to question how 
community, or participation in relationships, has been required in alternative imago Dei 
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In my discussion of her previous two novels, I outlined how Rhys demonstrates 
competitive and destructive dualisms in social and personal lives, which produces a form 
of ‘death’ in her characters. For Rhys, this kind of death, as I have stated, is a loss of both 
connection to the self and to the world/others.428 By linking these states of separation to the 
destruction of the human person, Rhys challenges us to look specifically at the way in 
which power over others can be exercised as a destroying force.  Loss of connection, and 
the abusive patterns it perpetuates, require me in this thesis, to re-examine the 
disconnection presupposed between humanity and God in some traditional theological 
schema, including that of the imago Dei, and acknowledge the possibly abusive patterns of 
relations that could come from that. In reading Rhys, I am also motivated to discover the 
presence of God-not in ‘power-over’, but in participation with. This is a theme I will 
continue to explore in the following chapters as well. 
By emphasizing the problems hierarchical divisions cause, Rhys is also able to 
move beyond needing to make clear separations between the oppressed and oppressors. As 
I demonstrated in the previous chapter, her characters are both victims and victimizers. In 
this chapter, I will examine two more of Rhys’ interwar novels, After Leaving Mr 
Mackenzie (1931) and Good Morning, Midnight (1939), in order to further complicate how 
‘victimhood’ can be defined. Rather than allowing us to analyse oppression as if all who 
are oppressed are victims, or all who have privilege are victimizers, Rhys gives us 
characters who cross between these categories because of the layered way marginalization 
truly works. These novels also expressly highlight the major role economic status plays in 
oppression, increasing the ways people are marginalized. When her characters attempt to 
transform themselves, as many imago Dei theories would require, money becomes key to 
their success or failure.  
As well as continuing to challenge understandings of moral goodness or moral 
agency as means of participation in the imago Dei these later two novels challenge us to 
recognize the imago Dei in their leading characters not in spite of the women’s difficulties 
or shortcomings, but because of them. As I will demonstrate, particularly in relation to the 
 




final novel, Good Morning, Midnight, Rhys locates the humanity of her characters at the 
very point where we are most aware of their inability to transform themselves. In their 
worst moments, either because of oppression or their own actions, these women are still 
worthy of dignity. Her goal is not to offer models of women who achieve changes in their 
lives or circumstances, but instead to change how we respond to them. 
After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie 
Julia, the Lost Sister 
 ALMM is a narrative of two sisters, Julia and Norah.429 Told primarily from Julia’s 
point of view, the story explores Julia’s return to London after years of living abroad in 
continental Europe. Julia, a woman older than the characters Rhys has given us so far, is 
beginning to have concerns about her life and her future that we have not encountered in 
Anna or Marya. She has become dependent on her lovers for money but is starting to doubt 
her ability to attract them in future. 
To begin, Julia’s story is framed by rejection. The novel opens with her dismissal 
by her patron Mackenzie.  Julia receives this in something of a daze—“she felt bewildered, 
as a prisoner might feel who has resigned herself to solitary confinement for an indefinite 
period in a not uncomfortable cell and who is told one morning, ‘Now, then, you’re going 
to be let off today. Here’s a little money for you. Clear out.’”430 She argues with 
Mackenzie in a restaurant, attracting the attention of another man, George Horsfield. While 
Mackenzie is only slightly fazed by this encounter, Horsfield is drawn to Julia. Thinking 
she “looked pretty lonely,”431 he sits with her and they spend the night drinking and 
talking. Later, in his room, she explains her situation, and he gives her some money. 
Horsfield, feeling “powerful and dominant”432 then encourages her return home to her 
family.  
Julia’s decision to return to London is provoked by the encounter with Horsfield, 
but it is also clearly taken out of desperation. Even while making the decision we see that 
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she “felt so tired. How to do all that must be done while she was feeling so tired?”433 
Comforting herself with the idea of buying new clothes, she sets out to prepare for her trip 
but, in her anxiety, she spends almost all the money on these purchases. Upon arriving in 
London, she is immediately in need of money again. Her economic insecurity puts her in a 
position of reliance upon her family members, her sister Norah and Uncle Griffiths, who 
both immediately turn down her requests for help. These early rejections allow us to see 
the kind of fractured relationship Julia has with the world, but also with herself. She says 
to Uncle Griffiths, “Yes…it was idiotic of me to come. It was childish, really. It’s childish 
to imagine that anybody cares what happens to anybody else.”434 She has become so 
accustomed to her way of living, she is no longer able to believe anything different may be 
possible for herself. 
Julia’s return to London has introduced us to her sister, Norah, who becomes an 
important figure in the novel. The narrative form of ALLM allows us to see glimpses of 
Norah’s life, separate from Julia’s. We learn that having spent much of her adulthood 
caring for their ailing mother, Norah has a similar sense of loneliness and abandonment to 
her sister. She confesses that she feels annihilated by her family and the world, and that she 
no longer feels alive— “My life’s like death. It’s like being buried alive. It isn’t fair, it 
isn’t fair.”435 Norah’s energies have been exclusively focused on caring for her non-
responsive mother, and there seems a divide in Norah between who she wishes to be and 
who she is. The inability to live an autonomous life is compounded by her the need to 
conceal her relationship with Miss Wyatt; a theme which Rhys uses to subtly introduce 
queer relationships. Yet even with this hidden intimacy, Norah feels wasted. She 
complains, “They just stood around watching her youth die, and her beauty die, and her 
soft heart grow hard and bitter.”436 
Julia succeeds in acquiring a little money from a past lover she contacts and begins 
to think in terms of her future again. Yet, in this awkward encounter, Julia feels again 
betrayed. “She had hoped that he would say something or look something that would make 
her feel less lonely.”437 She receives financial support, but she leaves lacking the thing she 
really desires. In her depressed state, she gets word that her mother is dying and goes to the 
home to see her one last time. As she’s visiting, her mother dies, and the sister’s only 
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connection to each other is gone. They fight, each accusing the other of not caring enough, 
and Miss Wyatt tells Julia to leave. Julia leaves, saying, “I shall never bother any of you 
any more after this. Really.”438 She reunites with Horsfield, and their affair continues for a 
short time.  
However, the death of her mother and the loss of her family, have left Julia in a 
very low state. She thinks about aging, that “suddenly something happens and you stop 
being yourself; you become what others force you to be. You lose your wisdom and your 
soul.”439 One night, as Horsfield is following her up the stairs to her room, she gets 
confused in the darkness. His touch alarms her, and she yells out, “Oh God, who touched 
me?”440 This breakdown causes the end of their relationship, and ten days after her arrival 
in London, she goes back to Paris. Having arrived in Paris, she once again encounters Mr 
Mackenzie. “Lend me a hundred francs, will you?”441 she asks, and he obliges. The novel 
ends as they part ways, leaving us with the belief that Julia will continue as she has done or 
further decline. 
Disconnected Sisters 
Rhys uses the character of two very different sisters to deepen the challenge made 
in Quartet—and to ask, ‘why do we only question the moral and spiritual status of those 
who do not follow social norms?’ She questions further whether those who do abide by 
conventional moral codes are really more able to live fulfilled lives or are they not also 
enslaved by economic and social constraints they cannot change or avoid. While Julia’s 
story is similar to that of many of Rhys’ other characters, Norah’s is one of outwardly 
following societal expectations and family obligation. The differences in the sisters’ paths, 
however, does not change the ultimate outcome for either of them. Both Norah and Julia 
are disconnected, and their wounds ignored and left unhealed.  
As I discussed previously, competitive relationships can be destructive, and are 
often unequally so. Voyage in the Dark gives us insight into how the competitive 
relationships cause wounds, but with ALMM we are able to see the wounds as they fester. 
Julia’s and Norah’s wounds are old. Their interaction as played out in the novel prove that 
unhealed wounds reopen, causing even deeper damage. Norah sees Julia’s new clothes and 
imagines her living a glamorous life in Europe. She believes that Julia has forsaken her 
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family responsibilities and escaped the restrictions of society. In her jealous response, “she 
felt a fierce desire to hurt her or see her hurt and humiliated.”442 This is not due to hatred 
for Julia, but instead hatred for her own life and a misguided comparison between this and 
her sister’s fortunes. Julia, in turn, is jealous that Norah had the love of their mother443 and 
a seemingly stable life and believes her family has rejected her. Neither sister really knows 
the other, but they both believe themselves to be the despised one. 
Thus, the sisters’ situations and relationship highlight the theme I have been 
pursuing in my research into Rhys’ novels. Rhys uses the differences and animosity in the 
sisters to emphasize the difficulties of the oppressed in forming communal and supportive 
bonds. Rhys characters are not “less valuable” or “less human” because they have become 
sex workers or have not lived up to society’s expectations. They also have not been mere 
victims, or people without agency, in their situations. Instead, what I--and I believe, Rhys--
observe is that various forms of lack of connection to the world are destructive and one of 
their most destructive elements is to separate us from those who are similarly 
marginalized.  
 
Survival and Dependence 
Julia’s story through the novel reveals the different ways that she attempts to 
sustain herself but simultaneously demonstrates their ineffectiveness. Despite the 
continuing rejections she faces Julia makes great efforts to maintain appearances. She fears 
“looking like that woman on the floor above” who has given up.444 That woman, realizing 
she has nothing left to offer, has stopped trying. Yet this leaves her “a shadow, kept alive 
by a flame of hatred for somebody who had long ago forgotten about her.”445 Nevertheless, 
Julia keeps ‘trying’ even as she fails.  
 Mr. Mackenzie, her previous benefactor, is given some narrative room, allowing us 
to know his perception of Julia. We learn that he never intended to keep his promises to 
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her,446 and that he knew she had been “principally living on the money given to her by 
various men.”447 He is concerned about how others will perceive him in relation to Julia, 
and even as she tells him how he has hurt her, he only cares whether anyone else is 
listening. To Mr. Mackenzie, Julia is of no value in her personhood. This break in 
relationship is an example of what Moran believes adds to the chronic shame of Rhys’ 
protagonists. She says: 
  
Our sense of self, both particular and universal, is deeply embedded in our 
struggles with the alienating affect. Answers to the questions, ‘Who am I?’ and 
‘Where do I belong?’ are forged in the crucible of shame.’ These questions are 
central to the Rhys protagonist, who struggles with feeling unloved and unwanted 
at the personal level, and marginalised and despised at the social and cultural 
level.448 
 
 As I stated previously, after her break with Mr. Mackenzie Julia meets George 
Horsfield who was witness to Julia’s painful conversation with Mackenzie. Horsfield, 
though currently sexually interested in Julia, proves no better than Mackenzie. He 
regularly feels “detached” from her.449 He begins to give her money, but not because of 
concern for her, but rather because it makes him feel “powerful.”450 In fact he feels  more 
attracted to her when she is more obviously upset,451 and even as their relationship ends, he 
believes she’ll be desperate enough to contact him again.452  
 Two other men from Julia’s past are introduced in the novel. Her Uncle Griffiths 
and Neil James, a former lover. The attitudes of both toward Julia mirror what we see from 
Mackenzie and Horsfield. They find her desperate, pathetic, and only worth helping 
because of the power it gives them over her. Julia is, to all of them, less than human. She 
tells us, as she’s beginning to ask for money from Neil James, “Because he has money he’s 
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a kind of God. Because I have none I’m a kind of worm. A worm because I’ve failed and I 
have no money. A worm because I’m not even sure if I hate you.”453 Julia is not unaware 
of how these men view her, but in fact, agrees with their judgments. She has no 
compensatory support from a female realm that values and sustains her. As Elaine Savory 
also comments on Julia’s separation from the others in the novel, saying, “Since she is 
alienated from her physical mother and far from her mother’s culture, Julia…is double-
divorced from a space where she might be known.”454 Her relationships in all areas have 
been destroyed, leaving Julia unknown and unable to participate meaningfully with 
anyone. 
The final severing of ties to the world in the breakdown of family relationships has 
broken Julia completely. Savory states, “Her paralysis and silence act as a physical 
embodiment of this social and emotional isolation.”455 Even as she thinks she may be able 
to win another man, she feels she is unable to interact with them. “Something in her was 
cringing and broken, but she would not acknowledge it.”456 She wishes she could talk to 
someone, tell them about herself, but  time and again is unable to do so.457 She is unable, 
even, to care for the plight of things she used to be moved by. Rhys says, “Now she felt 
indifferent and cold, like a stone.”458 Julia has lost her ability to participate in the world at 
all. 
 Meanwhile, Norah has tried to live according to social expectations by caring for 
her mother and has sacrificed her own life to the domestic demands made on women. Like 
her dress, Norah has “lost [her] freshness.”459 She is also economically disenfranchised 
through the social role she has assumed. Norah’s place in society is indelibly marked upon 
her. “Middle class, no money” was seen in every aspect of her.460 As Rhys relates, this 
means she was “brought up to certain tastes, then left without the money to gratify them; 
trained to certain opinions which forbid her even the relief of rebellion against her lot; yet 
holding desperately to both her tastes and her opinions.”461 Norah cannot achieve a 
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fulfilled life without risking herself by overthrowing these impossible restrictions. She is 
not willing to take this risk, though, and so even her one friendship462 with Miss Wyatt is 
not able to be revealed in truth. Norah, in an attempt to maintain the little financial stability 
she does have, must sacrifice her own self and her loves for that money. Her sacrifice is 
very like Julia’s, though on the surface might seem to have made ‘better’ life choices she is 
no less oppressed economically and no more able than her sister to assert her own agency 
or achieve meaningful connections with others. 
 A Theory of Life 
 In opening her discussion of ALMM, Elaine Savory discusses at length the previous 
scholarship on Rhys. Included in this is the idea of the “Rhys woman,” and the idea that 
the protagonists from the four interwar novels can be seen as one woman at different 
stages, probably representing Rhys herself.463 She sees this as particularly erasing the 
Caribbean and racial aspects of Rhys, and concludes that: 
  
The Rhys woman is a subversive not just in intention and reaction to social 
conditions but in her very existence as a puzzling, riddling, self-questioning loose 
cannon who continually destabilises conventional values for women, sexuality and 
male behaviour towards women and easy definitions of national, class and ethnic 
identity.464 
 
This complicating of issues, particularly evident in ALMM, problematizes the idea of the 
unitary “Rhys woman.” Moreover, I believe that the juxtaposition of Julia and Norah 
demonstrate that Rhys is creating a tapestry of ways people are marginalized and 
oppressed. That the women characters have commonalities, and the fact that they can be 
read in life stages (as I have done) does not mean they should be autobiographically 
localized as one woman. It can mean, though, that Rhys is prefiguring the possibility of 
solidarity between the oppressed. She may be read as implying that those who are damaged 
and marginalized might connect in their woundedness.  
If this possibility is present it must also be clearly stated that this coming together 
does not happen in this novel. After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie, like Voyage, shows us two 
women who have stopped participating in the world. For Rhys, and in my analysis here, 
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these women have died by the end of the novel, not physically, but rather have become 
“ghosts.”465 They are both unable to risk relationships, even with each other, and they both 
grow more dead as the narrative progresses. As we see Julia at the end of the novel, she is 
even unable to perform the basic actions needed to secure more money for herself.  She 
leaves Mr. Mackenzie with only a small amount and seems simply too weary to try and 
gain more from him. Instead of acting as Marya does, desiring to be recognized, which 
indicates a desire for the ‘I-Thou’, Julia acts as Anna does—disconnected to the point of 
willing death. Neither she nor Norah will allow themselves to be affected by the world 
anymore, and therefore are not truly “alive” in the sense Rhys is symbolizing. The 
importance in recognizing the similar fates of the women is seen in that Rhys frames both 
outcomes clearly, while demonstrating how differently the sisters have lived. Norah has 
seemingly done everything right. If we were to take Heidler’s understanding of the ‘good 
woman’ Norah should be considered exemplary. She may not have much money, but she is 
not a prostitute. She has lived, outwardly, according to conventional standards. Yet she is 
still described as dead. Julia, on the other hand, has been continuously damaged by others. 
She has suffered obvious trauma and marginalization. Without economic independence, 
she has taken to living the only way she can by surviving on sex work. However, Rhys 
does not absolve her of responsibility. Rhys shows us how Julia still hurts both her sister 
and her mother. The sisters’ futures are that of the ghosts that haunt all of Rhys’ novels. 
Their constant wounding of each other inflicts further damage and they find no support 
through connecting to their common oppression. There is no recognition, no “looking the 
other in the eye.”  
Connection and the Image 
 As stated, Rhys clearly highlights the break in these sisters’ relationship, and I see 
this as her way of signalling their need for reconnection. Norah and Julia’s relationship is 
one of competitive disconnection. Norah desires to be seen as reputable and holds this over 
Julia. Julia, thinking herself the outcast of the family, looks for this affirmation in men. 
Julia believes Norah, along with the rest of their family, must hate her and see her as less 
than human. Savory says that we begin to see Julia as a zombi, a “Caribbean form of the 
living dead.” 466 Neither sister, though, changes. Even a recognition of the need to change, 
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particularly shown in Norah’s reflection upon how her choices have left her isolated467, 
does not move them to make new decisions. Along with Rhys, the sisters continually 
desire that someone else will impart dignity upon them, creating change for them. 
However, as no one does or can and their lack of money symbolizes their captivity. the 
sisters return to the destruction they faced in the beginning of the novel.  
Julia and Norah are characters who are deeply wounded by their pasts. In Patricia 
Moran’s analysis of Rhys, she states, “ Rhys’s courageous exposure of the mechanisms by 
which chronic shaming underwrites the social transactions that have multiplied and 
relentlessly disenfranchised her protagonists is one of her most brilliant and important 
contributions to modernist and postcolonial discourses.”468 For Julia and Norah, these 
wounds from trauma and oppression, leading to the chronic shame both sisters carry, 
continue to keep them from the ability to move within a society built on economic status. 
This story demonstrates clearly the inability to reject oppression, even inwardly as Cannon 
offers, without significant outside support. Having noted this, I now move to Rhys’ final 
interwar novel, in which this requirement for mutuality, recognition and human contact is 
most clearly depicted. 
  
Good Morning, Midnight 
Disconnected Memories 
 Good Morning, Midnight is the last of Rhys’ four interwar novels. It focuses on 
Sasha, the oldest of Rhys’ characters, who lives in Paris. While the plot is much simpler 
than the other novels, we frequently switch back and forth from current time to the 
memories Sasha has of her past life.469 Like Voyage in the Dark, GMM is told in the first 
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person, from Sasha’s point of view. Through this, we are able to see Paris from Sasha’s 
perspective, and to discover how she understands both the world and herself. It is 
important to note that because the novel has a fairly simple plot, we are drawn to focus on 
Sasha’s complex state of mind and see how her despair has disconnected her from the 
world. 
 As the novel begins, Sasha is leaving London to return to Paris, thinking about her 
original trip to Paris with her then-husband, Enno. Arriving in Paris, she rents a room, 
“More dark rooms, more red curtains….”,470 which is next door to a man who, throughout 
the novel, wears a dressing-gown. Sasha seeks to order her days based on interacting only 
with people she believes will like her. “The thing is to a have a programme,” she tells us, 
“not to leave anything to chance—no gaps. No trailing around aimlessly…”471 But the 
routine she sets out to follow is one which brings up many memories from her past. She 
remembers jobs she’s had, including one in a shop. A fluent French-speaker, Sasha was the 
receptionist. However, she was nervous around the owner and is unable to communicate 
with him. Due to his inability to speak French, she is unable to complete a task he has 
given her, and she loses her job. Yet, Sasha knows the incident was not her fault. She 
recognizes she has been wrongfully treated, but she cannot speak up for herself. This 
memory leads her to recall other jobs in which she appears to have failed; unable to evoke 
confidence in herself she has been ‘let go’.  
Memories of Loss 
 These haunting memories disrupt Sasha’s planned routine. Dwelling on a series of 
disastrous encounters she thinks of lashing out at the people she believes have wronged 
her, and the day she has planned begins to unravel as past memories thwart all her attempts 
at new beginnings.  
 This disastrous day has also brought back extremely painful memories of her 
pregnancy and the death of her baby in Paris. She had struggled to care for her child, 
having no money and being unable to feed her baby. Having taken him to the hospital and 
having been bandaged herself by a midwife to remove the marks of her pregnancy, she is 
informed that he has died. She remembers gazing at him with the trees of her motherhood 
already removed from her body. 
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And there he is, lying with a ticket tied round his wrist because he died in a 
hospital. And there I am looking down at him, without one line, without one 
wrinkle, without one crease….472 
 
Sasha may have no physical marks of her baby, but this memory tells us she carries these 
wounds of his loss. On her next day in Paris, in an effort to change her fortunes, she has 
her hair dyed “a nice blond cendré.”473 She plans to buy a new hat as well, and as she 
continues her day, things begin to look up. 
 Her memories become happier, but less frequent. She is more grounded in the 
present with her new confidence. It is in this mood that she encounters an interesting group 
of Russian emigrees. She also meets a new man, René, who clearly is hoping to get money 
from her—we learn that he is a gigolo as the story continues. She finds this reversal of 
roles to be empowering, and they spend the day together. However, again, in the next 
morning, her spirits are low. Her plans to meet with her new Russian friends are the only 
thing that gets her out of bed, but during their outing she is drawn back to her memories. 
She thinks of times she had no food, her thoughts of suicide and she struggles to remember 
what reality is. “Pull yourself together, dearie. This is late October 1937, and that old coat 
had its last outing a long time ago.”474 In each of these instances, Sasha tries to enact a 
change that will fix her life, or at least give her more confidence. She is seeking outside 
affirmation of her personhood, but primarily does this through superficial means. Sasha’s 
understanding of change never goes deeper than immediate physical or material change, 
and Rhys uses this to demonstrate the futility of these attempts. 
Sinking and Drowning 
 Rhys uses constant unsuccessful efforts at transformations Rhys uses it to show 
Sasha’s inability to change is another way of being ‘dead’. In GMM, Sasha often likens her 
state as something like dying or death.  In order to comprehend this, I quote at length. 
 
On the contrary, it’s when I am quite sane like this, when I have had a couple of 
extra drinks and am quite sane, that I realize how lucky I am. Saved, rescued, 
fished-up, half-drowned, out of the deep, dark river, dry clothes, hair shampooed 
and set. Nobody would know I had ever been in it. Except, of course, that there 
always remains something. Yes, there always remains something….Never mind, 
here I am, sane and dry, with my place to hide in. What more do I want? …I’m a 
bit of an automaton, but sane, surely—dry, cold and sane. Now I have forgotten 
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about dark streets, dark rivers, the pain the struggle and the drowning….Mind you, 
I’m not talking about the struggle when you are strong and a good swimmer and 
there are willing and eager friends on the bank waiting to pull you out at the first 
sign of distress. I mean the real thing. You jump in with no willing and eager 
friends around, and when you sink you sink to the accompaniment of loud 
laughter.475 
 
Sasha articulates a key theme in Rhys’ novels here. The importance of various forms of 
privilege, or connections to the world, which I have been highlighting in the works, are 
presented as being “strong and a good swimmer and there are willing and eager friends.” 
Sasha realizes that she lacks these things. Rhys is using this analogy to highlight the 
systemic difficulties her characters face in their economic and social positionings, their 
gender and nationality, and to press upon us that “the loud laughter” means Sasha (and 
others) are not merely drowning because no one notices. In fact, their struggle is the 
entertainment society provides for the successful. When the multiple oppressed begin to 
drown, they not only cannot find someone to help them, they are surrounded by people 
actively hurting them. As Moran explains: 
 
The Rhysian protagonist is painfully aware of contemptuous gazes, ranging from 
the sneers on the faces of landladies, waiters, servants and taxi drivers to the open 
contempt written on the faces of family members. The protagonists’ obsessive 
concern with clothing registers a common strategy of fending off contempt, as if 
clothing functioned as a form of camouflage: Julia speaks of her fur coat as a 
‘protective colouring’ and Sasha similarly images clothing as ‘protective 
armour’.476 
 
 As I have been arguing, Sasha, like Anna Morgan, believes she can improve her 
life by superficially changing who she is. As she remembers her past, she tells us “It was 
then that I started calling myself Sasha. I thought it might change my luck if I changed my 
name.”477 She lives behind a mask: “Besides, it isn’t my face, this tortured and tormented 
mask. I can take it off whenever I like and hang it up on a nail.”478 She believes if she can 
only change her appearance, and thus how people look at her, her whole life will change 
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for the better.479 As Carr explains, this desire to change is rooted in her own self-hatred: 
“Like the Creole, she has internalized the condemnation and scorn of those around her. 
Rhys’ psychic patterning of those excluded and humiliated is something far more complex 
than the pathos of oppression. Hatred breeds hatred, brutality breeds brutality.”480 Her self-
hatred turns to hatred for others, and so Sasha struggles to survive in this death-like state. 
 In the face of so much rejection Sasha attempts to catalogue places and people 
where she might find acceptance. Much like Marya’s experiences of 
“knowing/recognition” in Quartet, Sasha analyses the ways people look at her, interact 
with her, and respond to her. Through this practice she makes adjustments in her life and 
only goes to places where she is liked, or at least where people feel neutral about her. She 
says: 
  
My life, which seems so simple and monotonous, is really a complicated affair of 
cafés where they like me and cafés where they don’t, streets that are friendly, 
streets that aren’t, rooms where I might be happy, rooms where I shall never be, 
looking-glasses I look nice in, looking-glasses I don’t, dresses that will be lucky, 
dresses that won’t, and so on.481 
 
There are many examples of this process in the novel, but one in particular is paradigmatic: 
Sasha’s trip to a café, Théodore’s. She decides to eat there, though she isn’t sure yet 
whether it is “friendly” or not. She wonders if the patron will recognize her and debates the 
consequences of this. As she thinks, she says, “Today I must be very careful, today I have 
left my armour at home.”482 She observes the people around her, also very aware that they 
might be observing her. She soothes herself with saying they are too interested in 
themselves to notice her, but her panic grows. “I told you not to come in here, I told you 
not to.”483 Then, as she’s finishing her meal, two girls enter. Théodore talks to them, and 
Sasha tells us that the girls turn to look at her.  
 
 
479 “If I had been wearing [the dress] I should never have stammered or been stupid.” (28) “Who says you 
can’t escape your fate?  I’ll escape from mine, into room number 219.” (37) “Watching her [try on hats], am I 
watching myself as I shall become?” (68) “I feel saner and happier after this [hat shopping].” (70) 
“Tomorrow I’ll be pretty again, tomorrow I’ll be happy again, tomorrow, tomorrow….” (57) “You’re 
judging by my coat.” (75) 
480 Carr, Jean Rhys, 71. 
481 Ibid., 46. 
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 “’Oh, my God!’ the tall one says. 
Théodore goes on talking. Then he too turns and looks at me. ‘Ah, those were the 
days,’ he says. 
 ‘Et qu’est-ce qu’elle fout ici, maintenant?’ the tall girl says, loudly.”484 
 
Sasha believes the whole café is looking at her now; her worst fear realized. She tries to 
look at the tall girl, who then averts her eyes. Sasha’s panic grows, bringing her near to 
tears.  
It is at that point Sasha distracts herself by focusing on changing her hair colour. The ideal, 
she tells us, is blond cendré. It’s a difficult colour, though. She explains, “First it must be 
bleached, that is to say, its own colour must be taken out of it—and then it must be dyed, 
that is to say, another colour must be imposed on it.”485  
 Are those in the café really behaving as Sasha perceives them? Even she is not 
sure, as she leaves and questions the meaning of Théodore’s smile. However, the event 
allows us to see how her two protective devices work to keep her functional. She needs to 
believe that people like her, or at least are neutral to her, and that she belongs where she is. 
Feeling like an imposter in Théodore’s, she immediately dreams of changing who she is.486  
 
Beyond Death in Life 
Throughout the novel, Sasha reflects on death and life, and her beliefs about them. She 
references murder, suicide, and the afterlife frequently.487 Yet, her references are clearly 
 
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid., 52. This scene is also particularly poignant, as Sasha wishes she could also remove her own self and 
have another identity imposed upon her. 
 This desire to change her looks is not merely vanity, though. It also has economic implications. In Andrea 
Zemgulys’ work on economic issues in GMM, she points out that Sasha, and the other women in the novels, 
are trading on their looks. She says, “women, specifically poor women, manage the market as a system of 
exchange that structures the world and values them for their exchangeabilty as things.”486 Sasha’s work, and 
the casual sex work of Rhys’ other protagonists, does require them to focus on their looks. However, it is the 
understanding of themselves as things to be traded and finding security in disconnecting from themselves in 
this way, that both helps the women survive and continues in their woundings. 
487 Describing a dream: “But blood is streaming from a wound in his forehead. ‘Murder,’ he shouts, ‘murder, 
murder.’” (13) “Paris is looking very nice tonight…. You are looking very nice tonight, my beautiful, my 
darling, and oh what a bitch you can be! But you didn’t kill me after all, did you?” (16) “But no, you must 
have the slow death, the bloodless killing that leaves no stain on your conscience….” (23) “He has 
recognized me…. Very unlikely. Besides, what if he has, what’s it matters? They can’t kill you, can they? 





not only to a physical death. Sasha does consider suicide in a desperate state in Paris and, 
as Savory says, this represented not as tragic but “something to consider as a next step, a 
proper move.”488. Physical death assumes this ‘thinkable’ status for Sasha because, as she 
tells us throughout the novel, she considers herself already dead. Her “real end” came long 
ago. But it was not a quick death. It was a series of events in a process of being 
disconnected.  
 
‘What happened to you, what happened?’ He says. ‘Something bad must have 
happened to make you like this.’ 
 ‘One thing? It wasn’t one thing. It took years. It was a slow process.’489 
 
 Her sense that she has died, that her existence is disconnected from her body and 
from other people, is what directs Sasha’s actions for the majority of the book. She 
acknowledges that, even if she isn’t fully aware of the meaning. Attempting to look like 
someone she is not, or to avoid places she might be recognized, are the continuation of not 
being “marked” by her life. The elusive “tomorrow” cannot come, because tomorrow is the 
hope that she will, in fact, become someone wholly different.  
 It is here that the end of the book, and its deep ambiguity, are important. Sasha 
brings René, the gigolo, to her room, but as they argue, she asks him to go. Instead, he 
rapes her. The scene, in its difficult detail, must be quoted here. 
 
 ‘You think you’re very strong, don’t you?’ he says. 
 ‘Yes, I’m very strong.’ 
 I’m strong as the dead, my dear, and that’s how strong I am. 
 ‘If you’re so strong, why do you keep your eyes shut?’  
 Because dead people must have their eyes shut. 
 I lie very still, I don’t move. Not open my eyes…. 
 ‘Je te ferai mal,’ he says. ‘It’s your fault.’ 
 When I open my eyes I feel the tears trickling down from the outside corners. 
 ‘That’s better, that’s better. Now say “I tell you to go and you’ll go”.’ 
 
hammer from the folds of my dark cloak and crack your little skull like an eggshell.” (52) “’Why didn’t you 
drown yourself’, the old devil said, ‘in the Seine?’” (41) “It was then that I had the bright idea of drinking 
myself to death.” (43) “As soon as you have reached this heaven of indifference, you are pulled out of it. 
From your heaven you have to go back to hell. When you are dead to the world, the world often rescues you, 
if only to make a figure of fun out of you.” (91) “Well that was the end of me, the real end…. The lid of the 
coffin shut down with a bang. Now I no longer wish to be loved, beautiful, happy or successful. I want one 
thing and one thing only—to be left alone.” (42-43) “But when I think ‘tomorrow’ there is a gap in my head, 
a blank—as if I were falling through emptiness. Tomorrow never comes.” (159) 
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 I can’t speak. 
 ‘That’s better, that’s better.’ 
I feel his hard knee between my knees. My mouth hurts, my breasts hurt, because it 
hurts, when you have been dead, to come alive.490 
 
Sasha tells us she is coming alive, but we must understand what she means by this. After 
the gigolo leaves, having also taken her money, she cries. She says, “Who is this crying? 
The same one who laughed on the landing, kissed him and was happy. This is me, this is 
myself, who is crying. The other—how do I know who the other is? She isn’t me.”491 
Sasha has finally recognized herself. This is the first instance of meaningful change for one 
of Rhys’ characters. Though seemingly a small step, Sasha not only has recovered a sense 
of survival, she has also reconnected to herself. The ‘other’, who begins to tell her to do 
things, is the protective voice in her head that has kept her from connecting all these years. 
The ‘other’ is the one that tells Sasha to believe her neighbour has heard everything and so 
she must be quiet. The ‘other’ is the one who believes the gigolo has taken all her money, 
though in fact he has left her a little. “I appreciate this, sweet gigolo, from the depths of my 
heart. I’m not used to these courtesies.”492 After this horrible experience, we would assume 
Sasha would retreat farther into her disconnection. Yet, here we see a glimmer of hope. 
Sasha’s situation is not much changed, but she sees a very small kindness and connects to 
it. She meaningfully changes herself.  In this moment of hopefulness, Sasha unlocks the 
door, wishing René would come back. 
 He does not come back, but Sasha is visited by her dressing-gowned neighbour, the 
commis, who she has interacted with throughout the novel. Their interactions have not 
been monumental events. She avoids him, and he seems to want to talk to her, but they 
never have a real conversation. He is always wearing either a blue or white dressing gown. 
She is afraid of him, but primarily because she seems to think he understands her. When 
the commis enters, we are left with this final scene. 
 
He doesn’t say anything. Thank God, he doesn’t say anything. I look straight into 
his eyes and despise another poor devil of a human being for the last time. For the 
last time…. 
Then I put my arms round him and pull him down on to the bed, saying: ‘Yes—
yes—yes….’493 
 
490 Ibid., 181-182. Here I am reminded specifically of Chopp’s testimonial poetics from Anna Akhmatova, as 
described on page 86.. 
491 Ibid., 184. 
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Savory discusses this last line and its reference to James Joyce’s Ulysses, in which Molly 
Bloom repeats ‘yes’ as she expresses and embraces life and love.494 In her opinion this 
saying, ‘yes—yes—yes’ demonstrates that Sasha “gives herself up most chillingly to a 
death-in-life, to a zombi state.”495 This idea of a “death-in-life” is certainly something I see 
regularly in Rhys’ novels, but I interpret the passage quite differently. As I demonstrated 
with Rhys’ other novels, the character’s death-in-life comes with both giving up on 
themselves and on others. Here, Sasha surprisingly appears to possess renewed hope. She 
sees her death as having happened long ago. This, then, must be different to death, while in 
Joyce’s novel, the ‘yes’ spoken is tied to Molly’s affirmation of life and love496, Rhys 
shows us that Sasha’s affirmation is of herself. This scene demonstrates her restored 
acceptance of herself and, perhaps, through the commis, also the others that she has 
previously despised. Therefore, I agree with Tamar Heller’s assessment of the conclusion 
to GMM, this ending is hopeful; a “potent antidote to despair.”497 
Connection and the Image 
Savory describes GMM as Rhys’ “masterpiece, mordantly funny and at times 
highly satirical…but it has generally been far less noticed and definitely far less loved”498 
than Wide Sargasso Sea, her final novel. As she remembers her life, we can clearly see 
how Sasha has been wounded. As she goes about her days, we see Sasha’s attempts at 
protect and disguise those wounds. It is the ending of the novel, though, that sees Sasha 
begin to heal and allow her wounds to transform and redeem her. While the novel has 
another controversial conclusion it is, as I have argued, one that, finally, offers a small 
glimmer of hope. Sasha’s life is no better than that of Rhys’ other protagonists, but there 
are glimpses of a different attitude, and the way Rhys portrays this hope is important for 
my research. 
 Sasha’s life has numerous named traumas, but more importantly, it begins with a 
woman who has stopped attempting to participate in the world and is rather shielding 
 
494 James Joyce, Ulysses (Toronto, Canada: Every Man’s Library, 1997), 1078. 
495 Savory, Jean Rhys,131. 
496 Maud Ellmann, “James Joyce,” The Cambridge Companion to English Novelists, ed. Adrian Poole 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 338. 
497 Tamar Heller, “Affliction in Jean Rhys and Simone Weil,” in The Female Face of Shame, eds. Patricia 
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herself from it. While these actions are methods of protection, they are also demonstrations 
of Sasha’s paralyzed state. They also show how Sasha moves in the world after her 
“death.” By not leaving her in this state, Rhys uses this novel to gesture towards the 
difficult movement back into life. Sasha’s wounds are not fully healed, but finally not 
ignored when she is “reborn.” They are acknowledged and given air. She allows herself to 
be recognized as wounded, and in turn recognizes another human in their woundedness. It 
is this moment that does not negate but rather completes the many challenging insights 
concerning the imago Dei that I have begun to discern in Rhys’ novels. 
As I have stated some critics read the ending of GMM pessimistically, insisting that 
Sasha is dead and hopeless in her surrender to the commis.499 Others discern a more 
optimistic conclusion, insisting that Sasha is at last able to love. In her article, Heller even 
goes as far as naming Sasha’s final act as a direct imitation of Christ. She says, “Imitating 
Christ’s assent to a sacrificial death, decreation purges the will of its inherent lust for 
power by replacing it with purely disinterested love.”500 As I examine the novel, I agree 
with those who read it with hope. The commis may conceivably have killed Sasha or, more 
plausibly, simply made love to her. Whatever the case it is Sasha’s attitude that is 
significant. Her declaration that she will not hate, paired with her earlier admission that she 
is being reborn, describe a person who has, as Heller says, experienced a second creation. 
This, as I will argue, is the movement into a love of self and others that causes me to 
reflect further on God’s vulnerable participation within the world. 
Sasha’s “rebirth,” rather than death, is the final key to my reading. She has been 
traumatized as much, or more, than Rhys’ other women. As Helen Carr discusses, Sasha’s 
forms of protection regularly fail her: “She shows a fragmented, volatile, destructive 
psyche born of a torn, destructive, violent history.”501 However, in the end, Sasha realizes 
that she wants to be alive. This simple desire, awoken in her when she allows herself to be 
wounded by the rape rather than to ignore it numbly, makes her want to be connected to 
people—even the ones who have hurt her. This may not be the way we want her to “come 
alive.” We might even recoil from this response to a violent assault upon her. Yet I cannot 
refuse the point Rhys wants to convey. Our standards for “success” and “failure” are badly 
biased toward those who make money, gain power, and can control their own lives 
completely. Rhys here shows us how she envisions a truly alive human—a woman willing 
 
499 Savory, for example, says, “This is a deeply disturbing conclusion, but very powerful: a surrender to the 
end of love, a female wasteland.” (Cambridge, 79) 
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to continue to participate in the world even in the face of trauma and oppression. It is this 
theme of participation rather than power that is now come to full fruition in her fiction. 
To Find Identity 
 Rhys challenges my understanding of identity in pointing out the many ways 
identity is formed in relation to processes through which the self is placed in opposition to 
others. These oppositions mimic and sustain relations of hierarchy and power. If we 
continue to uphold these in our theological reflection, we will always remove the imago 
Dei from those who have no power and who fall short of our ideals of fulfilled personhood. 
Rhys challenges me to shift my understanding of the divine image away from the 
perfections of power that I (and society) too often equate with God likeness. Like Heidler, 
by perpetuating them we implicitly image God as a powerful oppressor. By challenging the 
belief that the imago Dei is located in power, Rhys pushes me to reorient my 
understanding of the image to consider how Godself participates in our weakness and 
woundedness.  
This is why the theories of the imago Dei I explored at the beginning of the thesis 
struggle to answer the challenge Rhys has pressed upon me. Barth’s and Tillich’s theories 
relied heavily on a sense of ability in oneself, which Rhys’ women cannot achieve. 
Cannon’s belief that one must understand they do not deserve to be oppressed relies on a 
self-acceptance that Rhys did not achieve in her life, nor did she allow her characters to 
enjoy. Rhys, in her isolation and continued marginalization, often blamed herself for her 
misfortunes or concluded that she was inherently less deserving of love than other people. 
She recounts in Smile Please that her mother believed “black babies were prettier than 
white ones,”502 and, as we have seen, she spent much of her life wishing she were black. 
She recounts in her autobiography as well: “I am a stranger and I always will be, and after 
all I didn’t really care.”503 This kind of self-blame that Rhys demonstrates challenges the 
theories of the imago Dei Cannon and the other feminist theologians I noted have 
developed, and so I must allow Rhys’ challenges to shape my understanding as well. 
 Her novels have much to offer beyond her own self-reflection. In dealing with her 
divided self, she acknowledges the widespread problem of hierarchical oppression and the 
destructive consequences of identities developed in opposition to each other and to the 
powerful others. Further, Rhys explores multiple themes of oppression, particularly how 
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women “struggle to survive in the modern world, against the sadistic power of men, 
poverty, and society.”504 The women, in various ways, are “outsiders among outsiders.”505 
Rhys carefully constructs her stories to demonstrate how each of the women are wounded, 
but also how they wound others. Rhys moves from disconnection to destruction. 
Yet she is not so much interested in specifically pointing out the oppression faced 
by particular groups, but rather, by drawing her reader into the mind of the characters, 
allows us to see the similarities in the experiences of the disempowered. She is wary of 
identifying which groups are most marginalized and she could also be disturbingly racist 
and classist herself. By multiplying her focus, she is not campaigning for one particular 
group, but instead attempts to side with those who are misrecognized, abused and excluded 
in every situation.  
 
Conclusion 
I have read the work of Rhys as a literary challenge to theological thinking as 
outlined in chapter three. It sheds light on the occluded experiences of marginalized 
women, it reveals the complexity of suffering and helps me to begin to imagine ways it can 
be overcome. It evokes an emotional response in me and enables me to grasp that divine 
compassion must also be evoked by the suffering it describes. Finally, it challenges me to 
confront disturbing perspectives that destabilize my own preconceptions and it points to 
the death in life that is the continuing outcome of oppression and trauma. 
In relation to the specific concerns of this thesis, my readings of Rhys’ interwar 
novels lead me to argue that the imago Dei must be able to comprehend the following 
challenges if it is to speak meaningfully to oppressed and wounded people and point 
towards transformations in the way we encounter God and others. To begin, it must not be 
a misdirected attempt at achieving perfection. To simply desire the perceived perfections 
of God to be imposed upon humanity both excludes a vast amount of humanity, but also 
presents problematic understandings of God’s transcendence as I shall go on to explore 
further in the next chapter.  
Secondly, as it would be impossible for everyone to achieve these characteristics, a 
requirement of achievement (even when labelled as ‘courage’ or ‘overcoming’) must be 
rejected. It is a continuation of the very system that places people in positions of 
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oppression and marginalization to attempt to become the oppressor. Even in situations such 
as Cannon imagined, in which a community is seen as lifting each other into silent dignity, 
those without community are left behind. Rhys’ depiction of interlayered oppressions 
confronts the notion that everyone has a community—her characters are socially ostracized 
in so many categories that there is no one left to pull them out of their isolation. Economic 
paralysis, patriarchal power, hatred of self, and the many other ways they are pushed to the 
margins ensure that they are unable to receive communal affirmations of their God 
likeness. In fact, as Rhys has shown, the women believe that they do not deserve such 
affirmation. The women do not feel a connection to God and lack the power to transform 
this situation. 
In order to build a theory of the imago Dei that can effectively include those who 
resemble the women in Rhys’ novels, I must focus instead on the very fact of their 
woundedness. When we recognise the trauma they have suffered as essential to who they 
now are we must also seek to understand how this trauma connects them to God. Instead of 
attempting to erase or ignore their wounds, I must look to them specifically to see how God 
is present within them. 
This leads me directly to the vulnerability God demonstrated in the incarnation. If 
Christ is in fact the true image of God, this event should be primary to understanding how 
the image is displayed, for it is the way God revealed Godself. By connecting to humanity, 
God took on the wounds (quite literally) and vulnerabilities of being human—and 
specifically a human who was in various ways marginalized. Christ took on an 
‘intersectional’ oppressed life, suffering in economic, social, and national ways, even unto 
death. It is in this self-emptying that God demonstrates love toward us—connecting with 
humanity not in power, but in wounds. 506  We must then recognize the woundedness of 
God, and of ourselves, in order to see that it is not our work or ability or even our beliefs 
that makes us worthy. It is God’s recognition of our trauma, and the glimmer of hope God 
gives by being present within and through trauma. In reading the novels this way, I am 
challenged to recognise Rhys’ women characters as imaging God just as they are. God is 
not imaged as oppressive and powerful, like Heidler, but instead weak and vulnerable, like 
Marya. God is imaged in Sasha, who in her woundedness finally affirms her connection.  
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6. Reframing Definitions: Trauma and Immanence 
Introduction 
As I concluded in the previous chapter, Rhys’ work requires me to understand the 
imago Dei in light of the weak, the disconnected and those unable to escape continuing 
cycles of trauma in their lives. Through understanding Rhys’ concerns of marginalization, 
I also demonstrated that Rhys calls for connection. In their wounds, the characters are 
united, though most of them do not recognize this. It is the connection of wounds that I 
now seek to examine.  
Encountering Rhys’ deeply wounded characters, I can no longer seek a theology of 
divine likeness that erases or ignores wounds. Instead I must attempt to understand how the 
imago Dei itself incorporates woundedness. People are not only in God’s image if they are 
healed of their wounds. Indeed, their wounds may become an integral part of who they are. 
Therefore, in beginning to trace a ‘wounded’ image of God, I must consider wounds in 
relation to Gods own self and ask whether this woundedness is key to the imago Dei. 
These challenges cause me to look back at the works I began this thesis by 
examining. Having surveyed understandings of the imago Dei presented in the work of 
significant theologians from Karl Barth to Katie Cannon, I was dissatisfied primarily 
because I considered they were in danger of overlooking or eradicating the brokenness 
which characterizes many people’s lives and identities. Even in theories that sought to 
address the situations and concerns of oppressed groups, representations of the imago Dei 
still seem to implicitly communicate that persons should overcome their suffering - if only 
inwardly.  
Yet, as I have begun to discern through my readings of Rhys’ novels, this 
understanding of the imago Dei is inadequate. Furthermore, I am challenged to complicate 
the idea of innocent victims, wounded by the acts of others, and insist that theological 
representations of humanity must engage with the morally ambiguous victims as well as 
complex and ambivalent forces of oppression. Rhys’s work requires me to acknowledge 
that a sense of not belonging, or a lack of community, paired with abuse can lead to a 
person’s actions being destructive to both themselves and others. I think particularly of 
Anna in Voyage in the Dark. Her increasing disconnection led to her own destruction, but 
she also inflicted great damage upon other people.507 Many of Rhys’ characters similarly 
 




appear disassociated from the world and themselves. They are incapable of discovering the 
silent dignity Cannon celebrates. They also cause hurt by acting out of the trauma they 
have suffered. Yet, Rhys challenges me to discover the image of God in these figures as 
well.  
 In essence, my reading has led me to reflect that theories of the imago Dei are 
consistently seeking to replicate the qualities traditionally attributed to God in human form. 
We desire that the divine attributes of power and freedom be extended to humanity. Yet if 
the image is identified primarily within these attributes that represent authority, attributes 
that are not available to everyone, the image must become the preserve of privileged 
people. Rhys challenges me to look instead at weakness of those who lack agency and 
contemplate, through them, the possibility of weakness in God. Through this chapter, I will 
discuss how brokenness and wounds are not only a significant aspect of our lives but are 
embraced within God’s self also. I will draw upon the work of theologians who are 
addressing this theme and particularly those who focus on theological responses to 
suffering or trauma such as Shelley Rambo and Mayra Rivera. 
Brokenness Defined 
It is from this challenge that I look specifically to theologies engaging with 
brokenness in various forms. I use this word in response to the thinking of the Caribbean 
philosopher Édouard Glissant. His important work, Poetics of Relation (1990), defines 
relation in an entangled manner. We are not merely related to each other superficially, but 
essentially, though these relations have been broken. He states, “Today the individual, 
without having to go anywhere, can be directly touched by things elsewhere.”508 This 
connection, the ability to directly impact others, is what he says allows us to “’know’ that 
the Other is within us and affects how we evolve….”509 However, acknowledging this and 
establishing these relations must be a conscious effort. Glissant emphasizes that the world 
is moving toward relationality, but that this is not yet achieved or always realised. Glissant 
is inspired by Caribbean thought, which he believes “may be held up as one of the places 
in the world where Relation presents itself most visibly.”510 Moreover, Caribbean poetics 
function as a significant resource for Glissant, particularly the work of Derek Walcott, who 
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describes the Caribbean as a “gathering of broken pieces.”511 Imaging the Caribbean as a 
site of broken pieces coming together to affect each other and be in relation, does not mean 
that the broken parts disappear. The brokenness, in fact, is important to the relation.  
Therefore, in discussing brokenness, I highlight both the various ways people are broken 
and the poetic understanding Glissant has conveyed that a vision of relation does not deny 
the breaks that have taken place. As Rhys’ work demonstrates, these cracks remain and 
affect how we engage with the world. I think particularly of Sasha, and her many strategies 
to survive without enduring more hurt. Ultimately, she was unable to protect herself by this 
withdrawal from life and in recognition of this she began to heal, “to come alive.”512 Her 
brokenness in fact becomes the way she connects with the commis. Therefore, it is vital 
that I continue to see how these fractures can be both enduring and redeemed. 
Rambo: Looking at Scars 
 In responding to this understanding of brokenness, and thinking back to Rhys, I 
want to be sure my analysis acknowledges trauma without seeking its erasure. Therefore, I 
must look at theologians who study trauma without superficially ‘healing’ it. Too often 
people are advised to see difficulties or oppression as a means of coming to value 
alternative aspects of life they might be grateful for or hopeful about.  This prevents us 
giving serious thought to how event(s) may change people, perhaps for the worse. There 
are lasting consequences of trauma and they must be properly understood. 
The enduring consequences of brokenness are a major concern in the challenging 
writing of Shelly Rambo, who focuses much of her work on suffering. Her commitment to 
both constructive and systematic theology is particularly helpful for me, as this leads her to 
engage with the traditional doctrine of the imago Dei in contemporary and practical ways. 
Her work explores how Christian theology might be formed both out of and in relation to 
trauma. In particular, her second book, Resurrecting Wounds: Living in the Aftermath of 
Trauma (2017), explores the ways we might understand and seek healing while not erasing 
the significance of the scars that trauma leaves. The book is presented in four parts, each 
exploring a different way Christian theology has dealt with trauma, and she threads these 
understandings together to generate a theology of suffering that allows wounds to retain 
enduring significance. Her work, employing both the insights of theopoetics and yet rooted 
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in context and practice, gives an understanding of resurrection that centres upon Christ’s 
death and the wounds that endure in resurrection - rather than on the glorified post-
resurrection body so often represented in Christian theology. 
 It is the focus on scars and the remaining consequences of trauma that are 
particularly helpful for my work. Like Glissant, Rambo insists that the wounds of events 
remain. They do not disappear. In relation to this conviction she evaluates John Calvin’s 
commentary on the disciple Thomas and his direct encounter with the wounds of Christ. 
Rambo is concerned about the theologian’s desire to move beyond, and then erase, the 
trauma this scene embodies. As she explains, Calvin’s commentaries were initially 
sermons. His emphasis is primarily upon convincing his listeners of the effectiveness of 
receiving truth through hearing without the need for physical proofs. She says, “He wants 
to turn attention away from the sensuality of touch and instead emphasize that the process 
of faith is nurtured by way of hearing the word and responding to it.”513 Thus, as he 
analyses Thomas’ words after the death of Jesus, Calvin sees his need to see and touch 
Christ’s wounds before believing as “displaying both obstinacy and stupidity.”514 Calvin 
acknowledges God accommodates Thomas, as God accommodates all human limitations, 
but this is as a concession to human failure. In her critique of Calvin, Rambo says that his 
erasure of wounds demonstrates a mistrust of doubt: doubt is lazy, sinful, and unfaithful. 
Thomas is displayed as an example of human inadequacy.  
Instead, Rambo believes Thomas’ encounter with Christ's wounds emphasizes 
God's good cooperation with humanity. She regards the displaying of wounds as not only a 
response to Thomas’s lack of faith, but also a sign of God’s redemptive identification with 
human suffering.  She explains, "The marks of the wounds are God’s accommodation to 
human weakness, and they are important insofar as they ensure our salvation.”515 Calvin 
only sees this accommodation as the result of sin. For him, we are so damaged that God 
has to allow us to see these wounds to help us believe; it would be better if we could 
believe without God's assistance.  
 Rambo questions Calvin’s perspective on this matter and offers a much more 
positive interpretation of woundedness that directly connects with the imago Dei, “Why, 
then, would wounds not be the ultimate sign of limitation and humanity—marks of the 
human—that would affirm that the full range of humanity is, in the end, united with 
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God?”516 This statement is essential. Rather than seeing the weakness of humanity as 
something shameful, Rambo sees God uniting with it and bringing it into relationship with 
Godself. Her understanding of wounds reminds me again of Glissant’s approach to 
brokenness. The cracks are not only evidence of trauma, but of relationship. Christ’s 
wounds mark his body eternally, demonstrating God’s suffering. God has embraced 
humanity, and the embrace includes and empowers the marked bodies of real human lives. 
Yet also, God is affected by God’s participation with humanity—not just affected but 
wounded. Therefore, not only are we transformed by encounter with God, but God is 
transformed as well. 
In Rambo’s estimation, the love of God not only allows us to touch Christ's 
wounds, but invites such encounters. Christ’s physical body is essential to the reconciling 
work, and therefore, the wounds are important to the resurrection. As Jessica Coblentz 
states in her review of Rambo’s text, “Healing is not a clean break. Christ’s marked body 
discloses the enduring presence of suffering’s wounds within resurrected life. In fact, 
wounds serve as ongoing sites of resurrection, though not in the instrumental fashion of 
redemptive suffering.”517 
Rambo’s critique of Calvin emphasizes his failure to “give meaning to an important 
juncture in which things are shifting.”518 She continues to explain this, saying, “The danger 
in erasing these wounds is that the erasure occludes a testimony to what is most difficult 
about traumatic histories, whether personal or collective: that the wounds remain.”519 This 
notion is essential to consider. As I have emphasized, in revisioning the imago Dei our 
previous definitions of “weakness” or “flaw” must be revisited, and Rambo’s work allows 
us to do so through a direct look at wounds. What we might have wished could be erased, 
instead, allows us to achieve a deeper comprehension of God’s presence in the world.  
In understanding the healing or resurrection that accompanies these wounds, 
Rambo allows us to fully grasp that wounding (or trauma) does not distance us from God. 
My first significant insight into the imago Dei gained from Rambo’s work, then, is this 
understanding that wounds not only remain but must be acknowledged and understood. 
Allowing wounds to tell their story, and to recognizing the importance of that story, is 
central to understanding of the healing that accompanies those wounds. It must be 
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particular and personal. Again, I look back to the challenges literature brings to theology. 
Rhys’ penetrating depictions of the complexity of the wounds her characters suffer allow 
me to truly see them in their woundedness. In observing the wound, Rambo explains, we 
can then allow the wound to be acknowledged while also working toward true healing 
rather than erasure.  
  Secondly, I wish to highlight the claim that God is transformed in relation to human 
wounding and woundedness. In insisting that God embraces our wounds, Rambo also 
discusses the suffering God experiences in incarnation, drawing us from the experience of 
Thomas further toward the drama of God’s relation with the world. In this, her perspective 
accords with that of panentheist theologians, like Mayra Rivera (whose work I consider 
further below) that the reconciliation between God and the world is a recreation. This 
recreation, she says, “is a reorientation to the world.”520 Like Rivera, Rambo insists that 
God is concerned with and affected by our lived experiences, and that because of God’s 
interaction with the world, the world can be transformed to the likeness of God. Again, 
drawing insights from Glissant, the fractures in relations paradoxically serve to connect 
God and the world more fully. Rambo believes the transformation from wounds is 
something that involves both us and God. To demonstrate this, I return to Rambo’s 
discussion of the story of Thomas, and the physicality of Jesus’ wounds. She says: 
 
[W]hen Jesus appears to the disciples, he presents them with wounds….The 
memory comes forward in order to surface wounds, but it also brings the possibility 
that wounds, once surfaced, may yield something new….Suddenly, what they think 
they see is altered by the presencing of wounds….Through dismantling sight, Jesus 
opens the disciples to a kind of witness that involves affective work, signaled 
through his invocation of breath and touch. He turns them to the wounds and to the 
surface of skin. He invites them closer to touch.521 
 
Jesus exposes the wounds and allows the physicality of breath and touch to begin the 
healing. Rambo reminds us that Jesus also promises the paraclete in this moment, bringing 
the Spirit who will “guide them into truth.”522 Therefore, the wounds themselves become 
the way of healing. They are now “a productive site in which difficult memories are held 
(and not erased); they can also be the site of potential transformation…”523 
 
520 Ibid., 41. 
521 Ibid., 87. 
522 Ibid., 89. 




 Looking at Thomas’ story, Rambo reminds us that God took on these wounds. As 
she says, “Christianity is distinctive in its claim that God suffers.”524 God embraced the 
world in a way that interlaces divinity with humanity so that the suffering of the world also 
marks God. In being marked in this way, God can then enact healing; the resurrection 
Christ brings through his wounds. In a similar redemptive process, allowing the memories 
of woundings to affect us can be part of the process of healing. She says, "The wounds can 
be a productive site in which difficult memories are held (and not erased); they can also be 
the site of potential transformation, in which the crossing of memories might bring about 
healing.”525 This move generates an understanding of atonement that declares God does 
not require suffering to achieve redemption, but instead sees God as affected by us, freely 
choosing to take on suffering in order to empower us and even in order to enable us to 
attend to our own wounds. In light of this, the atonement is God achieving reconciliation 
with the world through the incarnation of Christ, in suffering and woundedness.  
Continuing her focus on how woundedness might enable the development of a 
liberative theology, Rambo then turns to highlight the suffering of God in light of Black 
theology, particularly through the work of James Cone. As I discussed earlier in this thesis, 
Cone points to a Black Jesus to demonstrate the oppressive and traumatic experiences 
Jesus endured and how these are mirrored in the experience of black people. 
Understanding this, Rambo uses this section of her book to further explore how suffering 
and redemption are intertwined. She, however, explains that we must first surface the 
wounds—we must gaze upon the cross, even as we find it horrific. Horror is mixed with 
redemption, but Rambo points out that we cannot ignore the horror and only look for the 
redemption. Citing theologian Willie Jennings, she says that white theology has too long 
focused solely on redemption as a means of avoiding complicity in suffering and injustice. 
She says this willed blindness is false, and states: 
 
Christian theology is produced by erasing wounds. It sanitizes and purifies. 
Theology birthed from this wound is dependent on ongoing practices of erasing 
these origins. It insists on pure beginnings that hover above the soil. And if and 
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We cannot ignore the suffering being done. Further, we must also see the complex roles we 
play in prolonging the suffering. As Rhys demonstrates, we are often also complicit in 
suffering, even if we are victims. We must confront the wounds in order to understand 
them, and in looking particularly at racism, Rambo notes that we must see how different 
responses are required when acknowledging wounds. 
 Here Rambo cites author Wendell Berry, who “narrates racism within the United 
States by employing the image of a hidden wound.”527 Berry believes that racism is a 
“collective wound” within the United States, but this does not mean it is equally shared or 
that we can respond in the same ways. Instead, we must understand our particular roles in 
the wounding, acknowledge how the wound is caused, and then accept our roles and 
responsibilities in relation to healing.  
 At this point Rambo directly discusses Christianity’s role in the wound of racism. 
While it claims to be a healing faith, “’White man’s Christianity’ renders the Christian 
story in a particular way, offering a justification of white superiority.”528 Therefore, the 
“sacred bandages” of Christianity are trying to conceal the wounds rather than heal 
them.529 Here, she returns to James Cone's theology of the cross, saying that it “offers both 
judgment and healing,” again stressing the varied ways suffering laces through 
humanity.530 While we must all look to the cross, as we must acknowledge wounds, our 
responses must be different. White America must “turn to the cross to see the suffering that 
they have enacted there.”531 Therefore, it is my responsibility to acknowledge what I, and 
my inherited legacy, have done to wound others. I cannot forget how I am implicated in 
racism and must work to repent of this. Looking at the cross must change me radically so 
that I actively work toward a healed world. Rambo also addresses the intersectional 
oppression of black women, employing Melissa Harris-Perry’s image of a crooked room. 
The crooked room, she explains, is the predicament of black women in the United States. 
Their attempt to stand straight is hindered by this room, and they can become so used to 
the crooked room that they believe the room to be “oriented correctly.”532 Harris-Perry 
believes the problem is in recognition—Black women are not recognized meaningfully and 
 
527 Ibid., 71. 
528 Ibid., 74. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid., 75. 
531 Ibid. 




then “wounds cannot surface, truths cannot be told.”533 As I discussed previously, Cannon 
believes that the silent grace of Black women is to believe they do not deserve the 
treatment they receive. Even if they cannot overcome their situation, they can believe 
themselves worthy of better. What I questioned then, and Rambo highlights here, is the 
possibility that some will not achieve this silent grace. Misrecognition may define the ways 
the oppressed sees themselves as well as others, and like Rhys’ women, they may not resist 
their oppression but accept and perhaps perpetuate it. 
 Furthermore, a theory of the redemption of suffering can lead to a valorisation of 
suffering, which Rambo warns us against. She explains that when we look at a redemption 
that requires sacrifice, we begin to see Christ as a “soldier-saviour.”534 This common 
theme in certain atonement theories has led to a problematic connection between 
Christianity and the “American war story,”535 which she then examines in the final section 
of her book on veterans’ healing. She reminds us of Thomas’ story, affirming again that 
redemption is embodied here as “a vision of communal care” rather than a sacrificial 
suffering.536 Jesus’ suffering came as a consequence of his life, and God’s embrace of the 
full range of humanity. Rather than a victory narrative, we need the sense of physical 
presence and the breath of the Spirit released into the room. Theology, Rambo says, “can 
reposition suffering so that it may be engaged rather than idealized.”537 Therefore, Rambo 
cautions us that the atonement is not merely to be seen through the cross. Jesus’ suffering 
there is not where redemption happens. Instead, she says, the redemption is the recreation 
of that suffering. Through the work of Delores Williams, she explains that the cross 
demonstrates the destruction of the life Jesus offers us. The cross is the wounding. Yet, in 
the resurrection, Jesus offers recreation to that life. This, Williams argues, is a 
revaluation— “the return of Jesus, the defiled one, reassigns value to those denied 
value.”538 The wounds are not covered or erased, but examined in order to present value to 
those “the world deems of little value.”539  
 In concluding her work, Rambo reemphasizes three points she believes brings 
theology into conversation with wounding. First, she says that “wounds cannot be easily 
 
533 Ibid., 86. 
534 Ibid., 113. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Ibid. 
537 Ibid., 141. 
538 Ibid., 102. 




seen or accessed.”540 We must be willing to truly look, to touch, to listen. It takes 
invitation, as Jesus invited Thomas to touch his wounds. Secondly, she “emphasize[s] that 
a spirit is breathed into this place.”541 Jesus breathed new life into the room, and recreation 
transformed the disciples. Finally, a “new community is formed and given shape.”542 New 
valuations are able to move us forward, transforming the world. I look back to my analysis 
in Chapter 2 of Lisa Stephenson’s understanding of the imago Dei.543 We “[look] the other 
in the eye” in order to assist the other, to be assisted by the other, and to recognize the 
impossibility of being “an ‘I’ without a ‘Thou’.”544 It is in this way, as in Glissant’s 
understanding of  relation, that we affect each other in our brokenness. I think specifically 
here of Rhys’ portrayal of Sasha’s ‘coming alive.’ It was in a moment of violence and hurt 
that her desire to be connected to others returned.545 Brokenness is not to be ignored or 
avoided, but instead may become the means that allows us to be in true relation with each 
other. 
Brokenness and God 
 Having developed an understanding of how woundedness can become integral to 
relationship, I now seek to further explore how we might explore God’s interaction with, 
or redemption of, human brokenness in the light of this. Here I keep in mind the challenges 
drawn from Katie Cannon and womanist theology to avoid requiring overcoming in those 
who suffer, whilst practicing silent grace. I also keep in mind my challenge from Rhys that 
even such silent grace may not be attainable for many. As Glissant teaches, I must focus on 
the brokenness, looking for God’s work within these cracks. In doing this, I turn to 
systematic theologian Serene Jones and her work on trauma and grace. Jones places trauma 
within the context of imago Dei by declaring that human beings embody God’s will 
despite the marks of sin and separation they bear. As she explains: 
 
I would recall the doctrines of justification and sanctification and the truth they 
insist upon: that in the very moment we are marked as sinful by the world, God 
marks us as loved, as recipients of divine forgiveness. Marked in this way, we are 
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freed to act not as perfect creatures, but as fallen people who are nonetheless called 
to persistently seek ways to embody God’s will for the flourishing of all creation.546  
 
Jones argues that in trauma we can look to God’s presence for grace that transforms. Jones 
sees a transformation of trauma not as overcoming or erasing of woundedness, but instead 
requiring “new imaginings”547 that themselves emerge out of the context of trauma itself. 
 Trauma and Grace (2009) explores the way in which the Christian Church can 
declare God already present in traumatic events and the way Christians can both lament 
and hope in the wake of trauma. Two particular sections in her book explain this 
juxtaposition and serve as useful comparisons to Rambo’s dialogue with Calvin. Jones also 
turns to his work and employs his Commentary on the Psalms as containing a methodical 
three step process to living with and restoring trauma.  
This is seemingly quite a different view of Calvin than Rambo offers in her critique 
of his commentary. Yet, in following more closely the three steps Jones describes, I 
maintain we might develop a rather a more positive appreciation of Calvin’s position than 
Rambo offers. To begin, Jones identifies the three steps in psalmody: “psalms of 
deliverance, psalms of lamentation, and psalms of thanksgiving.”548 The first, psalms of 
deliverance, represent an articulation of the reality of wounding people suffer. Here, Calvin 
sees the psalmist asking God for help in specific circumstances, crying aloud against the 
trauma of ‘evil’. Like Thomas asking to touch the wounds, this is the request for God’s 
intervention. Yet, instead of seeing Calvin dismiss this request as demonstrating the 
sinfulness of humanity, Jones focuses on Calvin’s belief in God’s intervention. Jones does 
not deny that Calvin sees weakness or sin in humanity, but instead understands Calvin to 
care more about God’s response. She says, “With this stabilization comes the possibility of 
imagining that one is, in the most ultimate sense, safe. It becomes possible to imagine that 
the deepest truth about oneself is that God loves you.”549  
The second step, the psalms of lament, are understood as Calvin’s reminder that the 
pain people experience should be released, as “groans of the violated”550, so that they can 
begin to mourn. Once this is done, the third stage follows in “psalms of thanksgiving,” 
which are able to occur because the wounds are healed. Rambo believed this requirement 
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for healed wounds was an erasure, but Jones does not agree. She states, “What is crucial, 
therefore, is not to have the pain disappear or the forces of violence cease to bear down 
upon us, but to reduce the hold…[it] has upon…the one who suffers.”551 Jones explains: 
 
What is also remarkable is how Calvin accomplished this reintegration into the 
mundane: not by pretending that the traumas never happened or will somehow 
magically disappear because they have been remembered and mourned, but rather 
by allowing the reality of violence testified to in the first two types of psalms to 
continue to echo through the praising prayers of this third type of psalm.552 
 
While I think Jones’ commentary on this process is a persuasive reading of 
Calvin’s work, I must agree with Rambo that it can be difficult to avoid attempts to erase 
or forget the wounds when the emphasis still falls so strongly on healing. Instead, a 
balance between the two views is necessary, particularly as I look to understand how 
trauma changes both God and humanity, while not allowing woundedness to destroy us. 
Jones’ way of articulating how brokenness must be allowed to remain, as Glissant 
encourages, is a vital step in her being able to affirm praise and rejoicing later. 
Continuing to look at trauma, Jones then moves from the psalms to examine the 
Gospel of Mark, in its original inconclusive state.553 By leaving the women in a state of 
shock, refusing the tidy ending of the other gospels, she believes this ending gives space to 
the trauma of the Cross. It allows those suffering to see that this trauma isn’t merely 
‘gotten over’, but that it lingers in post resurrection experience. Yet, in this, God is still 
present. There is a hope of transformation in the resurrection of Christ. She says, 
“Expecting the world to be broken and expecting grace to come—it is the air and gravity 
of sin-grace imagination. That’s what makes Christians such inveterate hopers. In our 
minds, something is always about to happen. And then it does.”554 The broken remains and 
the rejoicing will come but allowing both to fully exist is integral to the Christian faith. 
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This is, for Jones, a living out of Calvin’s three steps. It is acknowledging the trauma, 
crying to God, and then hoping for redemption  
 Jones’ theology of trauma brings me back to the glimmer of hope I see in Good 
Morning, Midnight. While the trauma of that fateful end is not resolved, and we are left 
with only variously problematic interpretations of what has happened. The hope that I see 
in that novel is like the hope Jones sees in the ending of the Gospel of Mark. It is the 
unexplained belief that God will transform the brokenness. Again, I quote her: 
 
The cross trains us in these dispositions of body and imagination. It narrates for us, 
again and again, two paradoxical stories about who we are: God’s inevitably 
broken children, and God’s constantly renewed beloved; these two stories run 
down parallel tracks of flesh and soul. They are not, however, driven toward 
evolving resolution. We are not becoming better or worse: we just are these two 
things, in the juxtaposed tension of our everyday life.555 
 
As Rhys does not allow us to see her female characters ‘become better’, Jones does not 
require improvement. This tension allows for those broken pieces to come together to form 
the Relation Glissant talks about. As he explains, this relation is “not merely an 
encounter…but a new and original dimension allowing each person to be there and 
elsewhere, rooted and open, lost in the mountains and free beneath the sea, in harmony and 
in errantry.”556 Therefore this tension brings us into a new state of being where a form of 
reconciliation without the eradication of wounded identities can take place.  
 
The Immanence of God 
 The theological interrogation of brokenness I have undertaken with reference to the 
work of Rambo and Jones now prompts me to inquire further into the ways in which God 
meets us in and engages with our trauma. Traditionally Christians have stressed God’s 
immanence as a way of comprehending how God fully enters into the ‘travails’ of creation 
at every level, while maintaining this in tension with the belief that God is also 
transcendent. However, reflections on the immanent presence of God can be overshadowed 
by a felt need to stress and defend transcendence. As Barth declared, God is an ineffable 
Other557, and some have seen this radical otherness in conflict with God’s immanent 
presence in creation. As I continue to develop my thesis on the imago Dei, I must now 
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engage with contemporary theological struggles to reimagine immanence and 
transcendence. As I strive to comprehend God’s image in wounded humanity, I must locate 
this in a wider understanding of the relation God has with the world. To form this, I begin 
with a critical examination of Catherine Keller’s panentheist understanding of God as 
immanent within the processes of becoming that pattern the universe and the life of all 
creatures. 
Keller’s Immanence and My Questions 
 To begin, Barth’s insistence on God’s separateness is disputed in Keller’s works on 
the doctrine of God. Practicing a hermeneutics of suspicion, she sees a patriarchal 
hierarchy operative in his theology particularly in his conception of otherness. Her work 
regularly focuses on how gendered power is encoded within hierarchical social models and 
theologies. She is particularly concerned that these types of understandings of God directly 
impact upon social relationships in the world.  It is within this context that her 
disagreement with Barth is played out. Reacting against “the individualism of the 
Enlightenment,” she says, “his reinscription of the imago dei as relational rather than an 
ontological endowment”558 demonstrates his understanding that human beings do not 
represent God’s image in their essential being. This allows Barth to maintain that God 
must be conceived as wholly other, and for Keller, this means that God retains “absolute” 
difference.559 Barth’s insistence on the difference and the total sovereignty of God sustains 
the patriarchal and domineering social order Keller seeks to overcome. She says, “Barth 
seems to have transferred to the Lord’s account our most modern claims to certainty and 
property.”560 For Barth, this is done in order to differentiate creature and Creator. 
However, in this, she argues that he has made a Creator who deals in domination; the form 
of domination that has “driven women to the shelters.”561  Furthermore, Keller argues this 
kind of omnipotence and separation from creation is part of Barth’s understanding of a 
hierarchical cosmic order. This order is such an important part of Barth’s theological 
worldview that it “takes precedence over any other understanding of relationship.”562  
Although opposing violence against women, Barth equally opposes women 
asserting their autonomy in opposition to the divinely ordered system in which they might 
 
558 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (London: Routledge, 2003), 48. 
559 Ibid., 87. 
560 Ibid., 90. 
561 Ibid. 




find their fulfilment.563  Keller argues that this vision supports a patriarchal system by 
implying  women’s submission to male headship is integral to their response to God.564 As 
demonstrated previously, critics of Barth argue that this perspective leaves women forever 
vulnerable to male oppression.565 Keller objects to Barth’s doctrine of God on these 
grounds and further questions whether understandings of divinity that maintain a 
hierarchical order and separateness between creator and creation can ever lead to anything 
other than domination. For her, any discussion of God as entirely outside of us requires 
God to be oppressively above us.  Therefore, she sees Barth’s understanding of God’s 
freedom and power as oppressive, linking it with a warrior ethos that develops a need to 
possess because of the anxiety of nonbeing.566 Instead, Keller represents the world and 
God as connected essentially. She likens it to connections within the body, saying that 
differences between the hand, wrist, and arm do not allow us to separate them without 
damaging them.567 These are ideas she elaborates further in her book On the Mystery 
(2008) in which she explains: 
 
Because we are radically interdependent, we are unbearably vulnerable to each 
other. We are each other’s power. But power does not mean dominance. Power is 
manifest concretely in the flow of influence, the flow of me into your experience, 
of you into mine, by which we consciously and unconsciously affect each other.568  
 
In this frame God’s power, or influence, is expressed in participation rather than 
control. Keller’s book From a Broken Web (1988) explores the intertwined relationship she 
sees between God and creation. In discussing relationship with God, she argues that 
traditional models that see God as self-sufficient are “a bizarre double standard.”569 This 
view of God “is the absolute instance of the traditional sin” of being “curved in upon 
himself.”570 God, she argues, must be interdependent with creation or else incapable of 
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truly loving the world.571 Likewise, she believes that we must be interdependent - or 
immanent- to each other in order to truly image God.572  
In discussing imaging God, again, we must continue to remember the relation 
model as outlined by Glissant. As Keller states, the divine/human relation leads to the 
“crown of thorns, not domination”.573 Relation means seeing the wounds of the other, and 
as I demonstrated through Jones and Rambo, allowing those wounds to remain as we see in 
the example of Jesus.  Keller here offers an important insight into the imago Dei through 
developing this perspective. She sees God’s participation in the world as ‘risk’, that is God 
risks being weakened by us. Likewise, then, the imago Dei requires risk in human beings 
also. Here, she explains: 
 
…in the name of our humanity in the image of God, we are empowered not to lord 
it over others, nor to settle into a serene and dispassionate piety, but to risk an 
adventure? To go off on an uncertain journey? To take untoward chances?574 
 
 We must be willing to risk in love, to venture and be wounded, but always to be 
connected. In this, we are in the image of a likewise connected and loving God.  
 Keller’s book, Intercarnations (2017), explores this theme of entanglement more 
thoroughly. Again, stating that an understanding of God in which God is ‘over’ or ‘other 
than’ creation necessitates dominion, she expands the concept of the Incarnation of Christ 
into “Intercarnations.” Incarnation is too limited an idea, she explains, and there are 
ancient Christian traditions (of theosis or theopoesis) that see incarnation as a process that 
extends outwards into all creation and the purpose of which is to fully embody the divine.  
Intercarnation “witnesses to the multiplication and entanglement of any and all becoming 
flesh.”575 This expansion allows Keller to understand God as continually embodied 
through the whole of creation, rather than entirely focusing on the singular incarnation of 
Christ. For her, this means that the importance of Creation is elevated, signifying the 
importance of, particularly, oppressed and marginalized groups. In explaining that God is 
in relation with the world, she presses that this means “bodies matter”576 –and this 
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statement must be a claim made within the particularities of the world in which God is 
embodied. She goes on, “And so, for example, at a particular moment in history—not as 
exception but precisely as exemplification of a deep history—intercarnation means: black 
bodies matter.”577 In my continuing focus upon woundedness and with the conviction that 
the realities of each person’s experience must be seen and understood in order to truly be 
in relation, I see that Keller is also stressing God’s particular interaction with the wounds 
of the world as it is at its ugliest. Furthermore, to see God imaged in those who struggle to 
state “Black Lives Matter” is to see God risking and participating in the world. 
In order to develop her liberative theological approach further, Keller turns to 
theopoetics, which she describes as “a currently vibrant node of radical theology.”578 She 
traces the development of theopoetics from “ancient theopoiesis to a modernist and then a 
current theopoetics.”579 Through this journey, she emphasizes the entangled nature of God 
and Creation in inextricable relationship. The Incarnation, she believes, “gets radically 
redistributed as the becoming divine of us all,”580 and thus theopoetics deals with how we 
are involved in “Cosmic God-making.”581 This God-making does not mean we are 
“making God up,”582 but affirms humanity participates in the divine making of the world. 
Keller’s thinking here is aligned to process theology, particularly as developed out of the 
philosophy of Alfred Whitehead, in emphasizing the divine becoming of all creatures. She 
states, “The image of God is the image of the creature magnified”583 and the world can 
thus be imaged as ‘God's body’.584 In her book Cloud of the Impossible, she sees God as 
intertwined with nature, co-creating with humanity, and embodied by the diversity of 
creation rather than the singularity of Christ. She says: 
 
So the alpha and the omega, in this co-incident, fold not into providential 
predetermination but nonseparable difference. “I am the Alpha and the Omega”—
but not necessarily the Origin and the End. And it is that difference which comes 
before us at any moment—familiar or strange, soft or monstrous, the Other, the 
Others, the Hyperobject. It mirrors back to ourselves enigmatically. It calls to us in 
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the interplay of question and answer. And it selectively contracts a cosmos in 
which I am already enfolded.585 
 
Because of this view of God-in-Creation, Keller believes we must be more open to 
the mystery and uncertainty of theology. Theology is not static, since creation is ever 
growing and evolving, and therefore rather than pursuing a logocentric theology, she 
prefers theopoetics, a creative and “eventive”586 exploration of the divine. We are 
entangled with the Earth, each other, and the divine, and therefore must be concerned with 
the events of creation in this “cosmic solidarity.”587  
Keller’s theopoetics is inspiring and, particularly in light of experiences of trauma, 
issues a clear call to active concern for the world. Her work, particularly her emphasis on 
God’s essential connection to the world, enables me to see the world as essentially 
connected to God in turn. As such, it presses upon us the demand to truly encounter others. 
I will now pursue further the attempt to form a reimaging of the imago Dei that stresses 
God’s risky particular and relational participation in the world. The postcolonial theologian 
Mayra Rivera focuses on issues of gender, race, and postcolonial liberation theology. Like 
Rhys, her work engages with the intersectional oppressions that constrain identity and also 
offers further insights into how human traumas might become sources of theological 
insight. Particularly significant for my work is her particular focus upon embodiment as 
the place of encounter between humanity, the world and God which has clear implications 
for understanding the imago Dei. I am also drawn to her because her focus on Latina and 
Caribbean perspectives resonates with the work of Rhys. 
Rivera: Interaction as Transformation 
 Rivera’s book The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God 
begins with a critical interrogation of the concept of God’s “otherness.” She first discusses 
Karl Barth’s insistence on the ineffability of God. She says that “for Barth [the] reality of 
God shattered all human cognitive schemes and rendered human understanding of God as 
ignorance.”588 Though she has some sympathy with Barth’s perspective, it leads her to a 
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different conclusion. She agrees that God is “irreducibly Other”589. However, for her this 
does not constitute this kind of incomprehensible distance that it implies for Barth. While 
Barth's theology is systematically formed by a belief that people cannot know God in 
Godself other than through God’s self-revelation, Rivera instead insists that we can 
identify God's interactions with us in our embodied, everyday reality and thus recognised 
they can transform us. Rivera’s theology more closely aligns with Keller’s in this regard 
and so these interactions and participations in the world are seen as revelatory of God ‘in 
process’ within the world. 
 Though God is transcendent, or in her preferred term, “beyond,”590 she does not see 
this in terms of incompatible difference. In looking directly to postcolonial theology, she 
sees an essential connection in this beyondness. She explains: 
  
In postcolonial criticism, the beyond (and therefore transcendence, I will argue) 
becomes inextricable from the witness of oppressed communities…. In this 
postcolonial vision, transformation emerges from the encounters with the otherness 
beyond.591 
 
Transcendence is thus not a distance that cannot be bridged, as Barth argued. It is, instead, 
experienced in active encounters with others. God’s encounters with us are the events that 
allow us to transform, and it is this transformation that Rivera sees as the key to 
transcendence. Her view, like Keller’s, emphasizes the connection God has to the world in 
essence. Shelly Rambo says of Rivera’s understanding of God’s interaction with the world, 
“The gospel…interacts with and transforms in relationship to spirit, body, and bread.”592 
 Rivera’s understanding of God’s presence also draws her to liberation theology, 
which continues the shaping of her view on trauma. As Rivera explains, liberation 
theology affirms an “immanent human value,”593 and this must cause us to revisit the 
tension between God’s transcendence and the idea of immanence. Rather than posing these 
as oppositional terms she says that “transcendence flows through reality as the sap through 
the branches of a tree.”594 It does not contradict but rather consolidates our inherent 
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relationship with an Other that is God, but also with all of creation. We are not merely, as 
she says, “’non-identical repetitions’ [quoting Radical Orthodoxy theologian John 
Milbank] of our relations to the intimate but ineffable God.”595 We are not just a likeness 
of God, then, but bound to all other creatures in God’s living body. 
 In emphasising that such integral relations also imply ethical responsibilities, 
Rivera turns to the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Enrique Dussel to emphasize the 
importance of relational transformation.  Out of their reflections upon the violence of 
totalizing systems these thinkers developed forms of philosophical ethics which locate 
transcendence in the world changing encounter with another who is different to myself. 
She says, “In the face of the Other, they argue, we are encountered by transcendence.”596. 
She quotes Levinas’ warning, “Stop seeing real Jews, and it’s easy for people to believe 
lies. Jews are lazy. Jews are ugly. Jews are evil. Day after day.”597 However, failure to 
recognize the challenge of transcendence in the other does not only lead to prejudice and 
violence. The face of the other is what calls us out of our own imminence and into 
selfhood She continues to use his work to argue that it is this openness to the Other through 
others that enables self-transformation. When we are open, we are allowing the other to 
affect us and constitute our own becoming. A theme which I have traced repeatedly 
through my readings of Rhys. 
Rivera’s exegesis of Jesus’ story of the sheep and the goats in Matthew 25 is 
particularly relevant here. Jesus demanded generosity to those who are hungry and poor, 
and affirmed that showing kindness to them was showing kindness to him. In Rivera’s 
terms in such acts of solidarity we are practicing our openness to God and encountering 
transcendence in our midst. In concluding this chapter, she says: 
 
Taking infinity as our primary metaphor of transcendence, however, we attempt to 
offer a model that emphasizes the in-finite openness and singularity of the other 
person, within the particularity and complexity of her/his context….This notion of 
relational transcendence should not extract transcendence from the finitude of the 
person (imagining it as something outside or disguised behind "mere presences"). 
Instead, it will seek to affirm the "presence" of the "infinite in the finite, the more 
in the less."598 
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Rivera is demonstrating the imago Dei is recognized and practically affirmed in 
transformative behaviour towards the others that is quite literally affirmed as recognizing 
God through them. This functional movement of transcendence as transformation and 
transformation as openness to the other can be moved into a focused construction of an 
active ethic of the imago Dei which I find deeply compelling.  
 In concluding her book Rivera reflects on the “glory of God.”599 God’s 
transcendence means that God’s glory is both “hidden and revealed”600 in creation and is 
always to be discerned in the midst of life and through our encounters with others and 
some of these may be deeply wounding. We are all marked by encounters, as Rambo 
showed Jesus is marked by his encounter with us. Rivera’s focus is that our scars, or our 
marks of encounter, transform us. She says, “As self and Other emerge from the 
interhuman encounter, as they come forth as new creatures, scars become transfigured in 
the divine embrace.”601 Therefore, it is in reflecting God that we encounter the other as 
God would—in love. We also see that the other is reflecting God in the encounter and 
marked by our actions. Rivera says, “We aspire to give and receive that which may open 
for us new paths for continuous liberation: a love that renounces its consuming impulses 
while opening itself to be touched by the Other.”602 
 This theme is explored further in her more recent book, Poetics of the Flesh (2015). 
In describing her use of poetics here, Rivera utilizes Glissant’s Poetics of Relation. In his 
work, as she explains, “poetics refers not only to styles of writing, but also modes of 
knowing, being, and acting in the world.”603 Glissant sees “gathering the broken pieces” as 
the poetic work of making new beauty.604 The transformation Glissant describes, Rivera 
uses to show that it is not an erasure of wounds but an understanding of the intertwined 
nature of life and death.605 She describes the ways in which our flesh is marked by our 
experiences, our relationships, for both good and ill. However, she refuses to see these 
markings (even the scarring ones) as depreciating for they are the embodied signs of our 
relationship with others and with God. She explains: 
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We inhabit the same world. This means that the body I experience is tied to the 
experiences that others have of my body. I can feel empathy for others. I can 
incarnate the gestures and words of others. I can be wounded by them.606 
 
Yet, even as we are affected by and effect the world, there is still for her a focus on love. 
She continues 
 
In Christian texts, God is the initiator and model for such an embrace of flesh. 
Infusing earth with love, God creates. Becoming flesh, in birth and suffering, God 
re-creates. Christians are called to remember these stories, to see themselves in the 
transformations that they depict, to imitate God and be born again.607 
 
As Glissant takes broken pieces to make a new creation, Rivera insists that our 
transformation in relation to God allows us to poetically reconceive our lived experiences. 
This poetics gives us the ability to “keep us open to others, to sense the entanglements of 
our carnal relations.”608 
 Rivera’s ability to allow for brokenness is crucial. In Rivera’s work I begin to find 
some answers to the challenges reading Rhys raised for me. Rhys’ characters were 
wounded by the world, as well as being the ones to wound, and these complicated marks 
on their flesh should not be ignored or erased. However, I am reminded that my reading of 
Rhys compels me to find the image of God without emphasizing ability. Rivera allows for 
brokenness, yet in her calls for transformational unity, I am still struck with the 
requirements placed upon people. 
 Here, I briefly refer to disability theologian Sharon Betcher, and her work “Flesh of 
My Flesh.” While I cannot devote adequate time to a full exploration of her work, I do 
believe her critique of Rivera’s position is necessary here. As she concludes her article, 
Betcher notes postcolonialist thinking as a possible resource for disabled peoples. 
However, she argues that its emphasis on borderland and hybrid identities that multiply 
and entangle can lead to a refusal to “name the other”609 which is a failure to see them in 
their specificity and thus is also an erasure of identity. She argues that both Rivera and 
Keller adopt the approach of entangling and confusing identities, in increasing forms of 
multiplicity, out of a desire to increase inclusion by emphasizing that complexity leads to 
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the inevitability of “unknowing”610—the blurring of defined boundaries between people. 
This appears liberative in that it contests against all forms of othering. However, Betcher is 
concerned about the erasure of specific identities it also entails—particularly those which 
have become sources of solidarity and strength. She says, “Apophatic unknowing could 
further suppress that which culture holds abject.”611 In fact, this critique is similar to that I 
made previously when comparing the perspectives of Jones and Rambo. While the desire 
for healing and redemption is obvious and important, the need to continue to name the 
trauma (or, for Betcher, the reality of the individual in their specific context of disability) is 
vital. Rambo seeks to correct what she sees as Calvin’s erasure of the wounds by focusing 
on the scars that remain and transform. I believe this balance between hope for healing, as 
with Jones, and sight of the scars, as with Rambo, is the same requirement Betcher calls for 
in relation to identity as she engages with Rivera’s work. 
 Particularly in light of process theology’s insistence on God’s existence being in us, 
I share Betcher’s concern about holding a fear of human limitation. As I saw in Rhys, 
insistence on ability and overcoming places some people outside the possibility of imaging 
the divine. Betcher’s challenge is incredibly important—that I continue avoiding 
“valorization of ability.”612 Therefore, I must look for the hope of restoration without focus 
on a kind of active societal or individual transformation. This may mean returning again to 
questions of transcendence and God’s transformative work in creation. 
Remaining Questions 
 In this chapter I set out to respond to the challenges I had encountered in the work 
of Rhys to discover ways of imagining the imago Dei as present in wounded and damaged 
people. I was seeking to discern not only how they embodied the divine but also how their 
very woundedness was incorporated into the transforming presence of God in creation. As 
I have engaged with the work of theologians who have wrestled with trauma I have 
realized that my original questions have led me to a new understanding of theological 
work. As Rambo says: 
 
The power of these resurrection appearances lie in their ability to offer a vision of 
wounds that turn us to the world in a particular way. Without an appeal to the 
seductive pull of promised endings, they can turn us to life in the midst of its 








sustaining theology that probes the capacities and readiness of communities to hold 
pain and to stay with difficult truths.613  
 
Like Rhys, Rambo refuses to ignore the complexities and brokenness of life. As I saw with 
Sasha in Good Morning, Midnight, her brokenness allowed her to connect with other 
broken people, and in the end, she was transformed and changed her view of others. 
Likewise, Rivera calls for us to be transformed in our brokenness. Yet, as I demonstrated 
in analysing Keller, God participates in this transformation. I am reminded of Sasha’s 
analogy of a drowning person. As she states, having “willing and eager friends on the 
bank” allows you help in being pulled out.614 As God’s connection to the world 
demonstrates, we in fact have this friend. As Jones stresses, God’s transformation of the 
world is the hope in future redemption. Finally, Rivera points towards an ethics of 
obligation based on the recognition of God’s image in the face of the other that I believe 
has crucial practical implications. It demands that we put our own safety at risk and try and 
help those whose life experiences have placed them in such danger. However, while such 
an ethical stance is hugely important it may divert attention away from another significant 
preoccupation of this thesis which is how does the image of God also encourage us to 
perceive God’s transformational reaching out to those in danger of going under in this way 
– specifically those who appear to be beyond all human reach.  
Thus, my explorations of the imago Dei are not merely a search for the image of 
God in people, but also a search for Godself also. Here I must return to the question of 
transcendence.  Can God be broken and wounded, as I have discovered ways of 
comprehending here, and also the refuge and safe haven for humanity offering forms of 
hope for those who are so wounded and damaged as to find no help elsewhere? 
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In previous chapters I have explored various understandings of the imago Dei in an 
attempt to see how God connects with broken humans, particularly the isolated and 
marginalized in trauma and suffering. I have been challenged by the literature of Rhys to 
discern how the broken aspects of humanity are included within the imago Dei. This then 
led me to ask if I am really looking to characters like Marya and Sasha as embodying the 
image of God, what that then reveals of Godself. In the previous chapter I thus explored 
theologies that stressed God’s participation in every aspect of created life. The work of 
Rambo and Rivera, in particular, encouraged me to affirm that this includes God assuming 
the enduring wounds of trauma. However, at the end of the chapter I voiced my unease as 
to whether the images of divine imminence and participation in suffering were enough to 
sustain hope for those who were so completely overwhelmed by circumstances that their 
selfhood was destroyed. As the doctrine of the imago Dei causes us to reassess not only 
our humanity but also our understanding of Godself, I now continue my efforts to address 
the challenge of affirming the woundedness of God alongside new visions of enabling 
transcendence. 
 
Foundations of Transcendence 
As a young person I held a primarily traditional protestant understanding of God as 
“distinct from the world metaphysically, intellectually, ethically, emotionally, and 
existentially.”615 In believing this, I saw God as, essentially, better than me in all these 
terms. That is: God is smarter, more ethical (or, perhaps, holds to a better set of ethics), 
perfect in affect etc. Through theological study I was able to move past this simple 
comparative distinction. However, the notion of ‘better’ persisted and continued to impact 
upon my spiritual understanding. Particularly, as I think about the women in Rhys’ novels, 
I still struggle with my previous preconceptions which hinder me from grasping the image 
of God in those whose lives are full of failures, mistakes and unfulfilled potential. In order 
to fully see the imago Dei in all of humanity, I must continue to focus on how God is 
imaged through trauma and wounds, rather than through ‘perfections’.  
 




Clearly there are a lot of weighty precedents for my former understanding of God. 
Thomas Aquinas, for example, taught that God “contains within himself all the 
excellencies of perfection.”616 Humanity could only understand God in comparison to 
ourselves—either as the perfection of good qualities (power, knowledge, etc.) or the 
opposite of us (immaterial rather than material, eternal rather than mortal, etc.).617 
Similarly, Barth and other neo-orthodox theologians stress God’s perfections, particularly 
God’s perfection in freedom and in love.618  
However, there are many insights still to be distilled from these ideas. As 
Augustine taught, God’s omnipotence does not allow that God can do anything, as God 
cannot “die, sin, deny himself, etc.”619 Augustine saw God’s transcendence and 
immanence as inextricably linked—God is “above space as the exalted One, immanent in 
space as the Actuality that fills everything…”620 This Augustinian view of transcendence 
and immanence deeply influenced the ways in which Paul Tillich developed his theory of 
the imago Dei, which I briefly discussed in Chapter 1.621 Yet, as I continue to reflect on 
Tillich’s work , I still am struck by a focus on comparison – albeit one not made in terms 
of gradation which is a notion he firmly rejects. Tillich states: 
 
As the power of being, God transcends every being and also the totality of beings—
the world. Being-itself is beyond finitude and infinity; otherwise it would be 
conditioned by something other than itself, and the real power of being would lie 
beyond both it and that which conditioned it. Being-itself infinitely transcends every 
finite being. There is no proportion of gradation between the finite and the infinite.622 
 
This understanding of God as being-itself, in a way like Keller’s understanding, 
sees God as connected to the world in an essential sense. However, it still maintains the 
‘better than’ aspects in which God is the perfection of the power we do, or could, have 
through divine means. Though Tillich sees God as imbuing us with this power, the notion 
is still one that concerns me. Particularly in light of the theologies of trauma I examined in 
the previous chapter, I do not think God seeks to reveal Godself so that the image can only 
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be seen in those powerful enough to sustain existential courage. As Rivera observed in her 
reflections on Matthew 25, Jesus told us that we see him in the hungry and poor.623  
 
The Need to Redefine 
For an alternative perspective on how God empowers that embodies a different 
perspective on human potentiality I briefly turn to the contemporary theologian Jürgen 
Moltmann. Moltmann has commented extensively on key doctrinal themes and in these has 
developed a characteristically eschatological approach to Christian theology. His future-
oriented methodology is demonstrated in his development of a theology of resurrection, 
which he calls the “theology of hope.”624 This theology argued that in the face of 
catastrophe and despair, it is empowering to hope for a real and lived redemption of the 
suffering world. Moltmann explains that God will bring about this redemption in the world 
through an “anticipatory consciousness.”625 As I discussed in chapter 2, Black theology 
emphasized the interaction God has with the world, seeing it as important to bring about 
positive change. As God actively works toward the end of oppression, so should those who 
follow God. Therefore, theologian Howard Thurman saw interaction with God as bringing 
about essential change in humans. As I saw in James Cone’s theology, God is represented 
as actively siding with the oppressed, working toward an end to injustice.626 Moltmann’s 
theology is similar to the work of these theologians in many respects.  In order to 
demonstrate this hopefulness, in his book The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, Moltmann 
discusses the link between how we understand God and what we desire to see in ourselves. 
He says: 
 
The world is God’s work, but man is God’s image. That means that every human 
being finds in himself the mirror in which he can perceive God. The knowledge of 
God in his image is surer than the knowledge of God from his works. So the 
foundation of true self-knowledge is to be found in God.627 
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He argues that we should understand ourselves through the knowledge we achieve 
in God’s actions. However, the mistake we often make is in looking for God in certain 
qualities we desire to see in ourselves. Rather than focusing on the work of God in order to 
see truths about God, we attempt to distil from those works of God qualities humans can 
acquire—power, might, knowledge, etc. These certainly are characteristics of God, but 
have we seen those aspects in God inappropriately? Moltmann’s stance is that yes, we have 
wrongly transposed our own desires onto our beliefs about God. 
This work to understand how God’s characteristics are properly understood and 
revealed to us is particularly significant when considering God’s imaging in traumatized 
and oppressed people. As I discussed in the previous chapter, many of the theories and 
debates concerning ability raise serious problems. For example, in order to better 
understand God’s power, Moltmann focuses on how it is in balance with God as love. He 
argues that God’s love means that God cannot be sufficient in Godself, and that this 
requires participation beyond Godself (with us). He explains: 
 
Freedom as it truly is, is by no means a matter of power and domination over a 
piece of property. So total power is by no means identical with absolute freedom. 
Freedom arrives at its divine truth through love. Love is a self-evident, 
unquestionable ‘overflowing of goodness’ which is therefore never open to choice 
at any time. We have to understand true freedom as being the self-communication 
of the good.628 
 
Moltmann here offers us the significant challenge to radically redefine power and 
freedom. As I redefine God’s power, I stop looking to those who are powerful over others 
as properly bearing God’s image. As I expressed in Chapter 6, Rhys’ challenges require 
me to understand how my talk of God affects those who are oppressed and those who are 
traumatized. If I do not appropriately understand what power means in relation to God, I 
cannot really connect God to those who are powerless. This is why Moltmann’s argument 
for a reconstruction of key characteristics of God, particularly his insistence on redefining 
God’s freedom, love, and power, helps me to reorient my explorations in a more promising 
direction. Following this, I look now to Kathryn Tanner’s radical revisioning of the terms 
of transcendence to reconstruct my own understanding in the light of the critical challenges 








A Radical Definition of Transcendence 
Tanner’s current work is focused largely upon social justice, economic flourishing, 
and the political contributions of theology. It centres on God’s relationship to the world 
and what economic systems imply for human relations. She is concerned about the manner 
in which many theological models can add support to hierarchical and oppressive ways of 
living. As I discussed in the previous chapter, Tanner is thus also seeking a relational 
model of the Triune God that is empowering and life giving. 
The first aspect of Tanner’s distinctive approach to transcendence I will examine is 
her insistence on the need for radical redefinitions of theological categories. Like 
Moltmann, she asserts that theologies that do not define their terms in relation to God 
appropriately will always prove inadequate, as they implicitly fall back upon and rely too 
heavily on flawed human examples to shape their perspectives on the divine. For instance, 
outlining what she sees as the rules “for speaking of God as transcendent,”629 she states 
that traditional definitions of transcendence (such as those I briefly described above), and 
particularly statements that imply “a simple contrast of divine and non-divine” are “not 
radical enough.”630 In a significant  chapter in the edited collection Common Goods, she 
argues that too often God’s transcendence is used to promote exclusion or justify certain 
beliefs.631 She states: 
 
Appeals to a transcendent God become in this way a means of criticizing rather 
than reinforcing human opinions about right belief and action….Seduced by the 
confident presumption that those standards at least exist, one is tempted, despite 
God’s transcendence, to identify one’s own account of truth and goodness with the 
standards for them that God represents. Specifically religious forms of fanaticism 
and dogmatism are the result. One dares to speak for or as divinity. 632   
 
In her novels, Rhys’ characters are continually looking to be different than they are, 
to be in a different class or society, etc. This rejection of themselves predisposes them to 
see others as hostile (even if this perception is not false), and to believe that the ability to 
wield power over them evidences the other person(s)’s superiority. With this mindset, it 
becomes incredibly difficult for the women in Rhys’ novels (or any oppressed person) to 
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have hope—“a happy-go-lucky optimism about one’s own future prospects is rendered 
unintelligible by belief in a hostile, perpetually threatening world…” as Tanner explains.633 
She goes on to show (from the opposite perspective to Rhys) that those who see 
themselves in the image of God because of the power they hold to exclude those they do 
not approve of or relate to, are able to justify their exclusion and subsequent actions on the 
basis of a self-identification with the divine. Therefore, it is necessary to “radicalize that 
divine transcendence and thereby prevent identifications of human views with divine 
ones.”634  
Radical transcendence, then, must be very differently understood. It is too simple, 
and presents the same dangers, to merely switch the site of identification to a different 
aspect of God’s character or to reframe a divine quality slightly differently. Nor, as 
previously argued can we rely on a contrastive approach. As she states: 
 
A God who genuinely transcends the world must not be characterized, therefore, by a 
direct contrast with it. A contrastive definition will show its failure to follow through 
consistently on divine transcendence by inevitably bringing God down to the level of 
the non-divine to which it is opposed, in the manner outlined earlier. 635  
 
Whilst this move might appear to be taking us back to the position outlined by 
Barth, Tanner shifts the insistence that God is Other into a more expansive definition—
God is not “other” in terms of our familiar human dualisms. Instead, God is outside our 
characterizations of difference, our need to compete for stations, or binary (and 
hierarchical) oppositions such as chaos versus order.  
For Tanner, the options Keller sees as leading her logically to process theology and 
panentheism in order to escape repressive forms of power assume as simplistic a definition 
of transcendence as Barth’s—essentially that transcendence means God is other in an 
oppositional (and then oppressive) sense, rather than ‘wholly distinct’ in Tanner’s vision of 
transcendence.636 She argues that the seeming paradox both Barth and Keller address is 
practically solved through more clearly defining terms in theology which will  mean that 
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“what Christians want to say…are actually consistent with one another.”637 I will expand 
on this conviction further through this chapter. 
Moreover, in order to explain her move away from ‘traditional’ definitions of 
otherness or of transcendence, Tanner expands upon her rejection of the comparative 
model I referred to previously. To do so, she elaborates upon the principles of God’s 
actions and human freedom as necessarily working together. In a similar manner to 
Moltmann’s assertion that God’s love actually requires humanity, as God cannot love truly 
without an outside being to love, Tanner extends this understanding to God’s love 
operative in the world.  In a critical assessment of Tanner’s contribution to thinking on this 
matter, Carl S. Hughes states that her rejection of transcendence as a competitive 
relationship “means to exclude all understandings of God as a ‘supreme being’ who 
occupies one extreme of a continuum of being and who can thus be predicated with the 
same attributes to which creatures aspire.”638 God is not merely different from creation in 
God’s relationship to it, but instead is beyond such differentiation. As he states: 
 
The individuating qualities of creatures derive from their differences with one 
another: a king is a king because he is not a peasant; a prisoner is a prisoner 
because she is not free. Tanner argues that because God radically transcends the 
creaturely plane, God is not subject to such oppositionary differentiation. To the 
contrary, God’s transcendence is precisely what enables God’s immanence, and 
God’s sovereignty is precisely what enables creaturely freedom.639 
 
What is most necessary to take from this approach is Tanner’s continual rejection 
of ‘otherness’ as oppositional. Her redefinition of otherness is more accurately portrayed as 
a move to say that God is not unlike us but rather is defined in terms different to the ones 
by which we are predicated. To say then, that God is active in the world does not mean we 
are not ourselves active. Rather God’s action far from limiting our free agency enables it, 
because God’s active presence, which is distinctly unlike our abilities, empowers us to 
freely act. As Tanner states, “God’s own agency is transcendent, not just in being outside 
the world, but in being of a different character from happenings within the world.”640 It is 
then inappropriate for us to project our forms of work (production, transformative action, 
fulfilling roles, etc.) onto God’s  (empowerment, divine creation or love, etc.) or vice 
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versa. The ways these cooperate must also be separated from our human understandings. 
Instead, as I will further show, God’s power allows our agency. If the difference between 
God and humans is precisely what brings about God’s active work in the world, then there 
is no reduction in human potentiality or creativity due to God’s activity. All that humanity 
does is enabled and empowered by God, yet this does not reduce the significance of our 
actions. Thus, once again, we must allow our definitions to be shifted in order to break 
from limiting understandings of both God and ourselves. 
In order to understand how God’s actions connect and empower ours, I return to the 
relation model given by Glissant641 that requires participation, particularly in the 
‘cracks’—those traumas or sufferings that scar us, which Glissant believes then connect us 
to each other in true relation. As I demonstrated there, Glissant’s theory of relation requires 
identification of wounds and cooperative actions to heal (or redeem) those wounds. As 
Moltmann also argues, the act of creation began the self-humiliation of God. He says, “For 
God, creation means self-limitation, the withdrawal of himself, that is to say self-
humiliation. Creative love is always suffering love as well.”642 This view of love means 
that God, in participating with humanity fully, is both affecting us and affected by us.  
God is then defined by a love that requires, not merely allows, for God to be 
affected by the world in both suffering and joy. God’s suffering then must be seen not as a 
weakness, for that suffering is the passion of God, integral to the powerful love God 
possesses. It is this suffering love that allows freedom. Moltmann again explains, “The 
suffering of God with the world, the suffering of God from the world, and the suffering of 
God for the world are the highest forms of his creative love…”643  This means God has 
empowered creation to act, even in actions that wound God. 
Therefore, while Tanner sees God as distinct, or indeed over and above creation, 
there is no need to then believe God is opposed to creation. Here she takes a different 
position from those offered by process theology that I addressed in the previous chapter. 
Tanner agrees with the panentheist position that it is important to acknowledge God as 
implicated within but not limited to the created order. However, for her God is not simply 
‘more than’ creation. She offers the reflection that “The Christian theologian needs to 
radicalize claims about both God’s transcendence and involvement with the world if the 
two are to work for rather than against one another.”644 This radical reframing of 
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transcendence and immanence moves our relationship with God into a perichoresis that 
mirrors many definitions of the Trinity currently employed in contemporary theology.645 
We are not God, but we are essentially linked to God and empowered by God. This 
relation lessens neither us nor God. As Tanner explains: 
 
God is different from the world in virtue of the fullness of God’s trinitarian life, but 
it is this very fullness that enables God to overflow in goodness to us. The Father 
already brings about what is different—the Son and the Spirit—in complete unity 
with the Father. The triune God is therefore being nothing other than Godself in 
unity with a world different from God, as that unity and differentiation find their 
culmination in the human being, Jesus….646 
 
 
The Source of All 
As I can now see, through these redefinitions of terms, Tanner’s work gives me a 
foundation upon which to build an understanding God in radically new ways, also shifting 
understandings of what the image of God could be. While I keep in mind the 
understanding of presence and participation in the face of trauma that I explored in the 
previous chapter, I am now able to more coherently combine it with a new understanding 
of transcendence. As I saw through Rambo, God’s participation in the world includes 
experiencing and taking on the wounds of trauma.647 In her theological thinking, God’s 
assumption of woundedness (both in taking on our wounds and in the literal wounds of 
Christ) allows then a transformation of those wounds. By understanding this theory in light 
of Tanner’s illumination of transcendence, I can see that the transformation is not work 
done by us, as we are the traumatized, but empowerment done by God. It is God who 
endows us with the imago Dei, particularly through our suffering. In looking towards how 
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each. 
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this speaks to the context of Rhys’ women, I see that while Sasha’s narrative gives some 
amount of hope, her story does not transform the stories of the other women. She has not 
empowered herself, nor does she empower the others. Instead, I can allow the unhappy 
endings, the ‘failures’ of the other three main characters, to remain as they are and still 
emphasize the imago Dei in them. God is still present with Anna and Marya, even if I 
cannot see it through active change in them. Instead, as Rambo suggests, God enters into 
their suffering, “breath[ing] new life into the room,”648 while not requiring anything of the 
women. 
Because Tanner has rejected a contrastive understanding of God’s otherness, it is 
necessary now to understand what she sees as essential in a theory of transcendence. She 
takes the work of the Neo-Platonic philosopher Plotinus as enabling a beginning step to a 
non-contrastive transcendence. As she states, within Hellenistic cosmologies “God 
transcends the world as a whole in a manner that cannot properly be talked about in terms 
of a simple opposition within the same universe of discourse.”649 Contrastive language can 
only be used of things in the world, but because God is not in the world, God also “must 
transcend that sort of characterization, too.”650 Plotinus expands on this notion, working 
through different types of terms in order to deal with this difficult conundrum. As Tanner 
explains he “seems to vacillate…between univocal predication and contrastive 
definition.”651 In discussing the One (God), Plotinus’ theory is that:  
 
the One is not to be identified with any determinate particulars or with the multiple 
totality of which it is the source or principle. The one is a simple, undifferentiated 
unity; as such, it simply is not what everything else specifically is in virtue of a 
determinate character…. Direct contrasts oppose in this way the simplicity of the 
One to the composite character of what proceeds from it…652 
 
In essence, Plotinus argues that while God’s transcendence means that God is 
different to creation, this implies a hierarchy of source rather than value. God is “simply 
the first in a line of sequentially productive agencies.”653 Tanner is not completely satisfied 
with this, however, as she notes Plotinus uses contrastive language, which has the danger 
of appearing to leave God uninterested in the world. Nevertheless, it is a helpful starting 
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point. As she says, “If divinity is to be the source of all, and not just the world’s organizing 
principle, it cannot be properly characterized in terms of the differences that hold among 
entities originating in dependence upon it.”654 
If God cannot simply be talked about in terms of difference, even though God is 
outside the world, then there must be a new way to understand God’s transcendence. 
Tanner then identifies that where Plotinus was unable to fully explain this, “Christian 
theology takes up the task….”655 She again stresses that the primary rule is to avoid talking 
of God in “simple contrast” but to understand God’s actions alongside God’s character. In 
this she says, “God will become the genuine source of everything that is, in all its diversity, 
multiplicity and particularity, without the need for any indirection.”656 God’s actions 
cannot be removed, since the first action we can discuss is that of creating. If, as Plotinus 
says, the beginning of understanding God is in seeing God as the source of everything, 
then God’s actions are in fact God.  
Tanner argues that Christian theology has wrestled with this understanding for 
centuries, but she sees it as the essential principle for knowing God at all. In fact, 
understanding anything about God must begin with understanding that God is creatively 
connected to everything. She says, “God’s nature is clearly not being directly opposed to 
that of things of this world since God is talked about as being simply identical with what is 
asserted predicatively of those creatures. If a man is righteous, God is righteousness.”657 
God, in creating the world and particularly in creating humanity in God’s likeness, has 
created a world that is a reflection of God. Tanner then shows that if humanity has a 
characteristic of God like righteousness, then we know that God is righteousness.658 
However, she clarifies “God is not, however, what created reality is, because in the 
creature’s cases such terms are only asserted predicatively and not substantively.”659 While 
humans can display characteristics, God is essentially those characteristics. While humans 
do actions, God is God’s actions (creation, love, etc.). In summation, “God may be other 
than creatures without differing from them in respect to quality.”660 
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She continues to explain this, focusing on positive aspects of both humanity and 
God. In particular, she says that as many theologians, Barth in particular, have shown, God 
is love. Yet, again as many say, “one cannot say that love is God.”661 The source of all 
these things, creation and these particular actions, is God, but yet they are still now not 
God. I wish to link this more specifically to the work I am doing here, and the notion of 
participation. 
As I demonstrated through my reading of Rhys, an important aspect of a revisioned 
image of God is participation in the world. And in looking at the theologians in my 
previous chapter, these participations must often be risky. As Rivera seeks to show, God 
risked greatly in the Incarnation. Jesus suffered his own traumas, but the triune God suffers 
still when traumas are inflicted upon those God loves—as I said, behaviour toward other 
people is our behaviour toward God.662 Again, we are marked by our encounters, and 
similarly God is marked by encountering us. Further, as Rambo demonstrated, Jesus also 
invited us to not only see his wounds, but to be open with our own. All of this participation 
is the outpouring of these two important aspects of God which Tanner has shown are 
essential to God’s being. First, creation is the outpouring of God’s desire to be both 
creative and connected to something outside Godself. As 20th century theologian Emil 
Brunner states, the act of creation was both the first act of love and of revelation.663 
Brunner emphasizes this, saying, “His love to us, to men [sic], is the outflow of His being, 
of the fact that He is Himself loving, and that He loves.”664 Therefore, God must 
participate. This leads me to the second important aspect of Tanner’s theory of 
transcendence for my project. 
Because God’s being requires outward actions (love, creation), God’s 
transcendence cannot essentially separate God from creation. Instead, God’s actions 
connect God to creation. Here is where the redefinition of transcendence must be fully 
realized. 
As I discussed in chapter seven, the traditional theories of transcendence are, for 
Keller, problematically supportive of hierarchies. Keller believes traditional definitions of 
omnipotence must be limiting or oppressive. However, while Keller sees abuse of power 
and an oppressive limiting of human agency and creativity, Tanner sees transcendence and 
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omnipotence as the characteristics that brings about agency and creativity in human beings. 
Humans are not limited because God is omnipotent, but God’s omnipotence produces 
human ability. Tanner’s position demonstrates that in its perfection—which she explains is 
the Incarnation and intervention of Christ—God’s interaction with the world means that 
humans are benefited by God’s power. Thus, in her book Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 
Tanner states: 
 
This non-competitive relation between creatures and God is possible, it seems, only 
if God is the fecund provider of all that the creature is in itself; the creature in its 
giftedness, in its goodness, does not compete with God’s gift-fullness and goodness 
because God is the giver of all that the creature is for the good. This relationship of 
total giver to total gift is possible, in turn, only if God and creatures are, so to speak, 
on different levels of being, and different planes of causality – something that God’s 
transcendence implies.665 
 
Hughes explains, “…it would seem that the more God transcends the world, the 
less God can be involved with its inner workings. However… because God transcends 
creaturely scales of differentiation entirely, God is able to be immanent at every point 
within the world.”666 As I earlier said, human characteristics can be reflections of God’s 
being. Humans can love, because God is love and has gifted humans with love. I turn 
quickly again to Brunner, who discusses the importance of God gifting humans with love. 
He states: 
 
With this Word [Jesus] God turns to man, imparts Himself to him, and in so doing 
gives him his life. But He gives it him in such a way that man must receive it. He 
does not fling it at him--for that would mean that he was a ‘finished article’—but 
He offers it to him through His call…667 
 
In God’s actions (which Brunner is connecting with the Incarnation as the action of 
love and revelation, as I will discuss further), humans are not left alone, but are gifted by 
God in a participatory manner. God gives gifts to humans through relationship with 
humans. Tanner redefines God’s power as well, saying, “God’s absolute or unconditioned 
power, in short, is not one of jealously guarded exclusive possession but one of universal, 
all-comprehensive giving; everything in the world with any causal efficacy or agency has 
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that power by virtue of God’s own power to give it.”668 God’s power is not oppressive, but 
sustaining of creation’s power. Heidler does not image God’s power, but instead, by 
refusing to despise the commis and acknowledging some relationship with him, Good 
Morning, Midnight’s Sasha is a much closer example.669  
Similarly, it is important for Tanner to focus also on Christ in understanding God. 
For Tanner, like Barth, Christ is the perfection of God’s gift to Creation. In Jesus, 
Humanity and the Trinity, she states, “In Jesus, unity with God takes a perfect form; here 
humanity has become God’s own.”670 Through the Incarnation, God demonstrates the 
duality of transcendence and immanence in one act. 
This is, again, not a paradox for Tanner. Because God is differentiated from 
Creation, God is fully able to enact this change. God is not, as we are, enclosed in Godself 
and can therefore also be “with what is not God.”671 Here, I turn to Amy Plantinga Pauw’s 
assessment of Tanner’s work. She explains that, “Gift is the central concept around which 
Tanner’s articulation of the divine life and the incarnation revolves. Gift is also the centre 
of her understanding of human existence. All that we are – in our creation as in our 
salvation – is God’s gift to us.”672 Because giftingness is key to Tanner’s understanding of 
the Incarnation, and of God’s actions since creation, it is important to define this gift 
correctly. Tanner is not arguing for a gifting that mirrors the “debtor/creditor” relationship 
but instead as creating “a community of mutual fulfillment.”673  
Seeing God’s actions as gifts, and as mutually fulfilling, allows Tanner to also 
address the ways Christ’s Incarnation reconcile humanity and God. Her belief is stated in 
Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, “The point of incarnation is therefore, as it was for the 
early Greek Fathers, the perfection of humanity; this is a human-centered Christology just 
because it is an incarnation-centered one.”674 Jesus perfects the connection God has with 
humanity, in which the spiritual and the physical are no longer at odds but unified. Again, 
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in connection to the perichoresis of the Trinity, she sees this action as encompassing God’s 
Triune nature. She continues: 
 
Reinforcing the unity of being between Father and Son by a unity of love and 
joyful affirmation, the Holy Spirit is the exuberant, ecstatic carrier of the love of 
Father and Son to us. Borne by the Holy spirit, the love of the Father for the Son is 
returned to the Father by the Son within the Trinity; so the triune God’s 
manifestation in the world is completed in Christ through the work of the Spirit 
who enables us to return the love of God shown in Christ through a life lived in 
gratitude and service to God’s cause.675 
 
The Triune action of love reinforces the idea that the Incarnation is giftedness out 
of the transcendent nature of God—God is able to enact this kind of loving action because 
of the otherness that allows God to extend beyond Godself. In her assessment of Tanner’s 
position, Christine Helmer states that this does not change God but “enables God to 
assume the other.”676 Likewise, Christ assumes sinners, transforming them while not 
diminishing in himself. Sinners acquire characteristics of Christ, enabling them to 
reconcile with God and with humanity and furthermore benefit others. As the hypostatic 
union of Christ is not seen to diminish his divinity nor his humanity, Tanner argues that 
God’s omnipotence and transcendence should not take away from creation’s value or 
agency. We do not become Christ, but instead are empowered by him.  
 
Building an Imago Dei of Risk 
While I have continued to emphasize the participatory nature of God, I believe that 
it is here that I also can understand the participatory nature of the imago Dei. As humanity 
has now been given, freely, characteristics of God, the display of imaging God is risky 
participation. As Tanner says, “Such an idea of noncompetitiveness can be generalized…to 
produce a vision of a human community of mutual fulfillment…”677 It is not merely loving 
those similar to us, as God’s transcendence moves God to love outside Godself. We can 
also not only love safely, as God’s participation through creation and Christ has 
demonstrated the great risks God took. In fact, by looking at most of Rhys’ female 
characters, it is evident that even as they remain in their unhealed situations, not being 
lifted into hopefulness, they are still risking. Even as complicated and broken as they may 
be, the image is present particularly within their wounds. 
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Here, it is important to note theologian Sarah Coakley’s critical assessment of 
Tanner’s gift-centred theology. In this non-competitive aid, Tanner emphasizes that the 
Trinity does not lose nor diminish through empowering each other, and that in the 
Incarnation (and, Coakley points out, Christ’s death) there is nothing lost nor sacrificed. In 
this model, neither should we lose or sacrifice as we empower others. Coakley sees this as 
a naïve argument in the face of late capitalist problems.678 While, I believe it is problematic 
to compare God’s transcendence and immanence to the broken order of the world, I would 
argue alongside Coakley that God did sacrifice and bear loss in incarnational kenosis. 
Here, I think it is important to distinguish between sacrifice/loss and ‘being diminished’. I 
instead raise a slightly different critique, which I return to Helmer to discuss. She asks, 
“Does the principle of gift-giving flatten the dynamism in God’s own being between, for 
example, the attributes of mercy and justice?”679 Is Christ’s death not a sacrifice, even 
momentarily? Is it not a loss, even a temporary one, that God suffered? How do we see 
God affected by the world if we cannot see God suffer along with us? I look once again to 
my previous chapter and emphasize Rambo’s call to both acknowledge and redeem our 
wounds. While Christ did not lose divinity, nor did the Triune God diminish because of the 
Incarnation, it is not true that God did not suffer. The trauma Christ suffered invites us into 
relation with his wounds, as demonstrated to Thomas, and shows us that in fact the 
Incarnation did leave God changed. This does not mean God is not powerful, nor does it 
necessarily negate omnipotence as if it were a quality that could be emptied by degrees 
when in fact it is the sustaining source of creation. However, if creation is truly 
empowered, the ability to act upon God must also exist. We see this through both Rambo 
and Jones, who argue that an aspect of God’s empowerment is in the kenotic act of 
redeeming.680 It is vital, then, to not mistake suffering and woundedness with 
diminishment. If God can be wounded without being diminished, then our wounds 
likewise need not diminish us. Again, it is a need to properly understand the terms used, 
but also to see God’s character as it truly is. As Moltmann argued, God’s power and 
freedom are not to be seen as oppressive or negating ours. 
 
678 “If this strikes one as an essentially bourgeois solution to the dilemmas of global capitalism, I fear that 
this may be the result of the determined erasure of the motif of ‘exchange’, and thus of the effective 
obliteration of distinguishing ‘differences’ of relation both in God (qua persons of the Trinity) and in us (qua 
even-ing out difference of resources out of ‘our’ plenitude).” Coakley, 233. 
679 Helmer, “Systematic Theological Theory,” 217. 




This is not wholly out of line with Tanner’s work. She also sees hopefulness and 
stresses active participation in her work The Politics of God. Through a vigorous 
explanation of how traditional systematic theology must constantly progress through 
critiquing itself, she continues to explain her understanding of God’s transcendence and the 
importance of Christ. Again, her understanding of the indivisible connection God has with 
creation is displayed: 
 
As the world God creates and guides and redeems in Jesus Christ, the world is 
forever God’s place no matter how distant it seems from the standards of truth and 
goodness that God represents. God is at work there for the ends God intends. Indeed, 
God is at work for those ends in established forms of social relations, no matter how 
great the effort of human beings to stymie them. Therefore, according to the account 
of the relation between divine and human working that I have been favoring, one 
cannot rule out the possibility of human working within such a social sphere to bring 
human life closer to such ends.681 
 
In Tanner’s estimation, the brokenness of the world, brought about by creation’s 
pulling away from the will of God, can be empowered as it is. Further, as I saw with 
Serene Jones682 the cross shows us God’s presence in the brokenness. She believes that 
community (specifically the Christian Church) must declare God’s presence, while 
acknowledging that people will remain broken. Again, I quote, “…we are: God’s 
inevitably broken children, and God’s constantly renewed beloved….We are not becoming 
better or worse: we just are these two things, in the juxtaposed tension of our everyday 
life.”683 That which reveals weakness or brokenness does not need to be forgotten or 
glossed over, but instead, God can redeem it. This is no naïve belief that wounds will 
disappear. This is also no obliteration of difference in our present world. Instead, it is a 
hope that in our brokenness, God is present and active. In the trauma, God sees us fully 
and loves us. This hope is for a redemption not of erasure, but of future authentic 
restoration. 
Once the need to erase wounds is left behind, it is possible to begin understanding 
imaging God within woundedness. Rather than seeking perfections of intellect, actions, or 
domination, the imago Dei can be understood by seeing God in the derided and denigrated 
aspects of humanity. I think of the work of practical theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid, 
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who discusses the need to understand the lived theology of the oppressed. In her book 
Indecent Theology (2000), she elaborates on the theology of sex workers and others outcast 
from society. She argues that by thinking primarily of how God (or theology in general) is 
lived out in these situations, you can more clearly see the longing of God. She describes: 
 
The excessiveness of our hungry lives: our hunger for food, hunger for the touch of 
other bodies, for love and for God; a multitude of hungers never satisfied which 
grow and expand and put us into risky situations and challenge, like a carnival of the 
poor, the textbooks of the normalisers of life.684 
 
Althaus-Reid does not see this excessiveness as something we need to extinguish, 
but instead as an expression of the connection we were meant to have.685 God’s longing for 
creation, demonstrated by God’s acts of creation, incarnation, revelation, and particularly 
suffering, should be imaged in our lives. Longing for relationship, joy, etc., all mirrors the 
longing of God. And the suffering that comes from those risks—rejection, hate, trauma, 
violence—are also mirrors of the risks of God. The image is seen most clearly in these 
instances, rather than contexts of ease, power, or elitism. 
  
Silent Grief: A New Understanding 
Belief in this future restoration again focuses on the life and work of Christ. As 
Christ assumed humanity in the Incarnation, we can see a future restoration of humanity as 
we see Christ restored to the presence of God. Christine Helmer, seeing the restored 
relationship we can have with God, focuses on the active presence of God in the world. 
She locates her concern primarily on God’s “battle with horrendous evil”686 and 
theologians concerns about God’s work against evil even in a “self-giving love that costs a 
life.”687 It does indeed seem too naively positive to assume redemption when those things 
have not been actualized yet. Though much of Christian theology discusses an ‘already and 
not yet’ of God’s restorative plan, Helmer believes we must remain firm that the 
actualization of redemption is “still outstanding in the sense of its extensional progress in 
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that her connection between desire and God allows us to reject notions that desire is somehow suspect, and 
that we ought to be more comfortable risking in order to attain certain desires. 





both individual biography and the church’s history (which is related to world history) as a 
whole.”688 Because of this, we ought to also acknowledge an important aspect of the 
Incarnation and death of Christ: “the silent grief of which is inscribed into the eternal 
heart.”689 
This term ‘silent grief’ links me once again to Cannon’s work and her development 
of “silent grace.”690 As I discussed in chapter two, Cannon sees the silent grace of Black 
people, particularly Black women, as the announcement that they do not deserve the 
mistreatment they receive, but are fully embodying the imago Dei.691 In light of this, 
Helmer’s discussion of God’s silent grief can say the same. It is a declaration that 
humanity is not deserving of the evil brought on by broken relationship with God and 
others, even though humanity assumes some responsibility for these evils. God declares, 
through the self-giving action of the Incarnation and the suffering God experiences through 
human violation, that still humanity requires and receives God’s love. In the light of this 
Althaus-Reid says of following God, “We can then say that to walk with is an expression 
of solidarity, a sharing of experience of the ‘everyday nature of Otherness.’” 692 The 
redemption God brings is in this solidarity. It is the juxtaposition of wounds and 
restoration. It is the coming together of the broken pieces of the pottery, which Glissant 
says connects people in true relationship.693 This silent grief is the culmination of the 
redemption hope, in the presence of visible and healing wounds, which God participates in 
and in solidarity with us transforms us and the world. 
Again, this seems a paradox. However, I see in both Moltmann’s redefining of 
‘power’ and Tanner’s insistence on God’s non-competitive gifting a hopeful redemption of 
the imago Dei, particularly in light of Rhys’ challenges to me. There is worthiness in 
Marya, Anna, and Julia in this silent grief. There is restoring hope in Sasha. Just as God’s 
transcendence enables God’s immanence, God’s grief and suffering enable God’s 
redemption of our imago Dei. It is, as Helmer says, “hope in the face of annihilation.”694 
This hope is most clear in relation to the character of Sasha, but in enabling us to approach 
God in these ways, Rhys’ novels all hold out this same fragile hope.  
 
688 Ibid., 219. 
689 Ibid., 217. 
690 Sporre, In Search of Human Dignity, 25. 
691 See page Chapter 2, pages 59-63. 
692 Marcella Althaus-Reid, From Feminist Theology to Indecent Theology (London, SCM Press, 2004), 18. 
693 See Chapter 6, pages 145-146. 




To view God, as I have demonstrated, as defined primarily by love, I must finally 
declare that God’s power is not oppressive nor possessive. Instead, it is a power that is 
focused outward, empowering those God loves. It is the freedom to interact with the world 
in love, caring for the world and simultaneously affected by the world. I must refuse to see 
this self-giving as a weakness, and instead see that being affected by the world is the full 
demonstration of love for it. Like Tanner, I must instead view separation and oppression as 
the weaknesses. As she insists, attempts to destroy creation or to deny people the love of 
God are precisely what God works against, and therefore to be empowered by God is to 
also work against such destructive forms of “power.” This understanding leaves us with 
the hope of Moltmann—a hope that is active in acknowledging the brokenness of the 
present and yet confident in a redemption within that brokenness. Moltmann is not hoping 
for a future that is perfect. It is the reconciliation and redemption of the reality of now, 
much like the redemption Rambo argues for in her theology of suffering, and the radical 
transcendence of Tanner—this is the space of the ‘already/not yet’ redemption.695 It is the 
haunting that Rhys gives us in her characters. 
Fundamentally, Tanner’s understanding of God’s relationship to humanity changes 
completely the typical issues and questions doctrines of sovereignty and transcendence 
bring. To believe that God is non-competitively acting in creation allows for both the belief 
in God’s non-oppressive power and also affirms the freedom of the creation. To allow for 
one need not diminish the other—neither Julia nor Norah need to be in competition, but the 
fact of their broken relationships simultaneously, and paradoxically, holds hope of the 
reconciliation of God. This concept is difficult to grasp, primarily for the reasons Tanner 
states are fundamental to all attempts to conceptualize God in human terms. To say that 
God is other means God is not trapped by human understanding of characteristics, and 
therefore our language and understanding of God must engage with this challenging 
reality.  
Finally, in this understanding, the imago Dei simply cannot be understood as 
reflecting those attributes of God traditionally associated with power over others. It must 
instead be defined by the woundedness of being affected by the world, by others. It must 
be seen in the crown of thorns, not an oppressive power of domination. This does not mean 
the valorisation of needless suffering, or practices of self-martyrdom. Instead, this means 
we must replace our desires to be as God with the desire to act like God, to be in solidarity 
with others, to empower others, and to embrace the wounds suffered in the process of this. 
 




We must recognize the imago Dei as another action of love from God—that God has 
placed us in inextricable relationship with Godself and each other, and to hope that 
restoration of those relationships will be fulfilled. The imago Dei is the silent grief we 








 There are several significant movements within this thesis as I have drawn upon the 
work of a diverse group of theologians, writers and scholars in an attempt to revision an 
understanding of the imago Dei that reflects both the love of God and the deep 
woundedness of humanity and the created order. I began with the insights of Karl Barth, to 
which I remain indebted in several points, though not in the way he would have predicted. 
Firstly, God’s purpose is focused on relationship and love—it is precisely this which is 
passed to humanity, demonstrated through the incarnation and life of Christ, and it is in 
and through this that we should locate the imago Dei. Tillich’s work allows me to move 
toward a more inclusive understanding of God’s deep identification with humanity and 
particularly allowed me to begin understanding a perichoresis of relationship. However, 
his focus upon existential anxiety and its overcoming reflected a universalising perspective 
concerning the human condition that did not resonate with many of the urgent concerns of 
women 
 This is particularly well demonstrated through the work of the feminist theologians 
I considered. By rejecting a theology that did not directly address their real lives, they also 
rejected the notion of a God who stood apart from human struggles. As Rosemary Radford 
Ruether explained, God is “beneath and around us as an encompassing source of life and 
renewal.”696 God participates directly in our yearnings and actions for transformation, and 
therefore it is vital I understand God in light of this. 
 My chapter on Black Theology, Womanism, and particularly the work of Katie 
Cannon allowed me to understand better how a theology that focuses on resisting 
oppression can be empowering and liberative. Recognising the communal support that 
conveys dignity in the face of horrendous evil, I gained understanding that the imago Dei 
is not an abstract or individualized doctrine but can speak to people who join together in 
solidarity to seek justice. As Cone and Cannon both advocated, a true understanding of 
God must be an understanding of God as actively on the side of the oppressed. It is this 
solidarity with God that allows Cannon to assert the significance of silent grace in 
communal renewal. However, my attention was then drawn to the situations of those who 
are so marginalized and traumatized that they are unable to access communal resources. 
 





My thesis question thus became much clearer. How do we understand an imago Dei for the 
truly isolated, oppressed, and broken? How can God be imaged in those who hate 
themselves? Is God present to them also? 
 To engage with this question I turned to literature both in recognition of its power 
to embody occluded experience but also in its power to provoke affective responses, 
complexify understanding, enable us to be startled out of conventional theological 
perspectives and testify to trauma. I found the novels of Jean Rhys’ uniquely helpful in 
their complex portrayals of the kind of isolation and desperation I had wondered about. Far 
ahead of her time, she sought to give a voice to those who were abused—economically, 
socially, and personally. Her work in depicting traumas done, through scenes of violent 
rape and such mundane (but deeply symbolic) action s as dyeing hair, allows the reader to 
fall. In the words of Anneliese van Heijst, “In both the physical and the psychological 
senses, falling is losing one’s grip and being given up to a movement over which one no 
longer has any control.”697 Rhys’ work challenged me to truly understand how 
disconnection, oppression, and the subsequent hatred of self occurs. It is through and for 
the female figures she so powerfully portrays that I could begin to really reconstruct my 
understanding of the imago Dei. 
 Trauma and suffering should not be erased or forgotten. As I learned from 
theologians like Rambo and Jones, it is necessary that we enter into that trauma to truly 
understand people but also God’s love for people. Jesus’ life was filled with isolation, 
suffering, and a violent death. As the disciple Thomas experienced, Jesus’ wounds are 
displayed for us to see in order that we might understand the woundedness taken up into 
the heart of God. As our wounds are then connected to God they allow for a restoration 
hope to begin. 
 And so, I must understand that God’s purpose is not a controlling relationship with 
humanity. God is not interested in oppressing the creation God loves. I found much of 
value in the challenge of process and panentheistic theologies that stress God’s kenotic 
abandonment of power and identification with creation. However, they did not resolve for 
me the challenge of how to hope for and with those who have lost hope and whose wounds 
remain unhealed. This led me to seek understandings of God that affirm both God’s 
identification with our woundedness and God’s power to lovingly transform creation. As 
Kathryn Tanner explains, God is not in opposition to us, even as God is Other than us. 
Instead, God’s Otherness provides the divine support I have been searching for. Rather 
 




than looking to a community to give dignity to the suffering, I see that it is God who 
declares humanity worthy and made in God’s image. God empowers us to then mirror this 
love to others, as I glimpsed in Sasha’s decision to stop hating. Yet there is not a 
requirement upon us to become better, to achieve more or even to believe ourselves good 
or worthy of respect. God has already declared all of that by condescending to be with us, 
in creation and incarnation, in trauma and through wounds.  
 It is the knowledge that God connects to us through wounds that allows me to see 
that the imago Dei is not a doctrine of perfections, but one of risk and wounds. God has 
given us this image in order to be in relationship with us, participating in the ugliness of 
life. We hope for the restoration of these wounds, not their erasure. The imago Dei is the 
silent grief bonding God to us in love. 
 
The Journey Continues 
As I write these final pages the jury is deliberating for the murder trial of Derek 
Chauvin, the police officer killed George Floyd’s by kneeling on his neck for more than 
nine minutes. This is the farthest a trial has ever gone against a police officer for murdering 
a Black man, and so there is a feeling of hope that real change could come through it. 
There is also the familiar feeling that this public display of legal process will likely change 
nothing and that Chauvin will be acquitted. I cannot imagine how watching this feels for 
Black people who live through such experiences constantly. Yet it also seems that I have 
been living in a similar tension for many months now; the wounds of trauma fresh and 
unable to be covered up but hoping for redemption.  
 This past year, the final year working on my thesis, has been traumatic for 
everyone. The COVID-19 pandemic overturned so many lives, mine included. Last year, 
instead of another train journey, I found myself on a nearly empty plane, headed back to 
Colorado. When things began shutting down, I was watching the airline websites, trying to 
ensure I could make it home if needed. When more and more flights were canceled, I made 
the decision to go home. My parents are elderly, and I could not stop worrying about being 
unable to return if something were to happen. I booked the last ticket I could, a mere two 
days away, but with a return ticket for three months later. I assumed I would be able to 
shortly return to Glasgow and my doctoral research. It has been over a year now, and I still 
find myself looking for the items I left in the loft of my landlady’s house, because I 
couldn’t get all my belongings into my suitcases for that flight. It is now three days from 




gather my things, to see the family I made while I lived in Scotland. To see my second 
home again. 
 This past year has been so filled with uncertainty. So many people have died from 
COVID. Black Lives Matter protests dominated the news during the summer, following 
George Floyd’s death. Too many Black people have died following those protests. The 
presidential election occurred, though as many suspected, the transition between the former 
administration and the new was violent, tense, and indeed not very much of a transition. It 
feels like I have lived 10 years between my emergency flight back to the States and this 
moment.  It feels like I left Glasgow yesterday. Yet, although I have been back in my home 
state for over a year, I still haven’t seen some of my closest friends, haven’t been able to 
hug people outside of my ‘bubble’, haven’t been really welcomed back. I look now at the 
end of my postgraduate work with two visions before me—one of the celebrations I 
thought I would have, the drinks with friends post submission and post viva that I had 
anticipated. The other of what is now the reality. I will do everything online, as I have been 
doing for the past year. I will share cheers with my friends through our screens. My mother 
will probably have a cake for me. 
 It would have been inauthentic to end a thesis dealing with trauma and grief 
without mentioning the current trauma and grief we are undergoing. It also seems 
important to acknowledge how my thesis has become bookended by trauma. When I look 
back on this chapter in future I wonder how I will understand everything currently being 
experienced. 
 I started this journey hoping I would be affirmed in seeing myself in the image of 
God. A rather personal, and a bit selfish, goal for doctoral work! I also wanted to 
understand the imago Dei in terms other than the achievement of certain personal qualities 
or life outcomes. This was both to relieve the constant pressure I felt and to be able to 
answer the question of how God could be imaged in those society deems ‘failures’. 
Thinking about how Barth focused the image on Christ, and his belief that we image God 
through Christ and through behaving like Christ, I realize my academic research journey is 
much like the journey I’ve taken these past few years. I left Colorado in pain, fleeing to a 
new country hoping to heal and to recover who I had previously been. I returned to 
Colorado realizing that neither things were really the goal, nor should they be. Instead, I 
carry my wounds openly, allowing them to reshape who I am and how I interact with the 
world. I can move through this new trauma with restored understanding of how my grief 




 In Christian theology imaging God is imaging Christ. Barth was nearly there. 
However, it is not imaging Christ through works of power in the way Barth saw Christ’s 
reconciling work. Instead, the image of God is revealed in and through the shared wounds 
we bear. God’s reconciliation with the world was traumatic, forever affecting God and 
Creation. Realising a theology of the imago Dei to include the oppressed, those who suffer 
and cannot overcome, I had to look differently at how Christ revealed God to us. In this 
journey, I realized that Christ presents God as desiring, risking, loving, and suffering. God 
is constantly reaching out to those who reject reconciliation. As Katie Cannon taught me, 
God’s work in the world is in demonstrating value to those who have been denied it.  
 There is a currently a website circulating an article about the ‘problem’ of valuing 
the lives of George Floyd and a more recent victim, Daunte Wright and protesting that they 
matter. The article’s author698 believes that by affirming the lives of these men, society is 
‘elevating to hero status’699 people who should be condemned for their crimes. 
Unfortunately, I came across this article because a Facebook friend posted it. Her argument 
is that while she is ‘upset’ about the deaths of these black men,700 she believes we should 
realize that ‘scum’ like them do not deserve the attention they’re now getting. If I thought 
she would listen, I would read this thesis to her.  
 This is exactly the argument this thesis is working against, and why I believe the 
work I have done here is important. It is the denial of the imago Dei in people who are 
called scum, worthless, or worse that has led society to allow their murders with so little 
care. Rhys demonstrated how easily her women characters were tossed aside—even Anna 
or Julia’s own family did not think them worth helping as they had thrown away their 
worth. But in fact, Julia is valued and loved by the God who entered fully into our 
experiences of isolation, shame and trauma. Christ’s wounds remain to remind us that God 
is implicated in the suffering of the world.  
 As I have learned though this research journey, redemption is not erasure. The 
wounds are still present. We can still touch them. They have changed us, but they have 
also connected us. As Glissant argues, these cracks we have connect us to each other in 
deep ways that constitute true relationship. They connect God to us, and us to each other. 
 
698 In an effort to not give credit to these kinds of claims and misinformation, I am hesitant to name the 
website or author. However, in an effort to also cite sources, I will say that it is from the Daily Wire, 
particularly about Daunte Wright. 
699 This is a paraphrase. 
700 Her claim (which is clearly untrue) is that she would say these things if the men were white, but she is 




Sasha’s hope does not come because she or her situation changed. Instead, it is because 
God is present in the moment of her trauma. The hope is in the silent grief shared by Sasha 
and God. The paradox of the ‘already and not yet’ of redemption. This silent grief allows 
us to be present to our trauma while knowing that God is with us.  
 I sit at this desk in the basement room I have been living in these past twelve 
months. My parents took me in, none of us knowing for how long, and so I live surrounded 
with boxes and filing drawers. I had never lived in this house before as it was purchased 
after I left home. Where I sleep and work was not ‘my room’ - but now it is. I sit here now, 
where I have sat throughout this year, watching on my laptop breaking news about 
tragedies unfolding in my country. I watched the insurrection in the nation’s capital here. I 
watched many protests, news reports about Breonna Taylor, and I viewed almost all of the 
election coverage at this desk. I now sit here as the verdict on the Chauvin trial is read. He 








Agamben, Giorgio. Nudities. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Redwood 
City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. 
 
Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter. Feminist Epistemologies. London: Routledge, 1993. 
 
Althaus-Reid, Marcella. From Feminist Theology to Indecent Theology: Readings on 
Poverty, Sexual Identity and God. London: SCM Press, 2004. 
 
---. Indecent Theology. London: Routledge, 200. 
 
Angier, Carole. Jean Rhys Life and Work. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1990. 
 
Barter, Jane A. “A Theology of Liberation in Barth's Church Dogmatics IV/3.” Scottish 
Journal of Theology: 53 (2), pp. 154-76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000. doi:10.1017/S0036930600050717. 
 
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of The Word of God, Part 2, I/2. Edited by 
Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, translated by A.T. Mackay, et al. 
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1961 
 
---. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, Part 2, III/2. Edited by Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, translated by Harold Knight, Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, et al. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960. 
 
---. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, Part 3, III/3. Edited by Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, translated by Harold Knight, Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley, et al. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960.. 
 
---. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Creation, Part 4, III/4. Edited by Geoffrey W. 






---. Church Dogmatics: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Part 1, IV/1. Edited by Geoffrey 
W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, translated by A.T. Mackay, et al. Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1961. 
 
Betcher, Sharon V. “Becoming Flesh of My Flesh: Feminist and Disability Theologies on 
the Edge of Posthumanist Discourse.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion: 26, no. 
1 (Fall 2010): 107-118.  
 
Brunner, Emil.  Man, in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology. Translated by Olive Wyon. 
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1939. 
 
Burrow, Rufus Jr. James H. Cone and Black Liberation Theology. Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland and Company, 1994. 
 
Cannon, Katie G. Black Womanist Ethics. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988. 
 
---. Katie’s Canon: Womanism and the Soul of the Black Community. New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 1995. 
 
Carr, Helen. Jean Rhys. Devon, UK: Northcote House Publishers Ltd., 2012. 
 
Chopp, Rebecca S. “Theology and the Poetics of Testimony.” Converging on Culture: 
Theologians in Dialogue with Cultural Analysis and Criticism, edited by Delwin 
Brown, Sheila Greeve Davaney, and Kathryn Tanner. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
 
Clifford, Anne M. Introducing Feminist Theology. New York: Orbis Books, 2002. 
 
Coblentz, Jessica. Review of Resurrecting Wounds: Living in the Afterlife of Trauma, by 
Shelly Rambo. Horizons: 45, no. 2., 2018: 497-98. doi:10.1017/hor.2018.94. 
 
Cone, James, and Gayraud S. Wilmore. Black Theology: A Documentary History, Volume 





---. “The Doctrine of Man in the Theology of Karl Barth.” PhD diss., Northwestern 
University, 1965. 
 
---. God of the Oppressed. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1997. 
Copeland, M. Shawn. Enfleshing Freedom: Body, Race, and Being. Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress Press, 2010. 
 
---. “Wading through Many Sorrows: Toward a Theology of Suffering in a Womanist 
Perspective,” In Womanist Theological Ethics, edited by Katie Geneva Cannon, Emilie 
M. Townes, and Angela D. Sims, 135-54. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2011. 
 
Cooper-White, Pamela. “The Early 1990s: Whose CWR? Whose Feminism?” In Feminist 
Theologies: Legacy and Prospect, edited by Rosemary Radford Ruether. Philadelphia, 
PA: Fortress Press, 2007. 
 
Cress, Graydon. Perichoresis and Participation: Union Between the Persons of God and 
Between God and Humanity. PhD diss., St. Andrew’s University, 2019. 
https://doi.org/10.17630/10023-17852. 
 
Daly, Mary. Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation. 
Boston, Mass: Beacon Press, 1985. 
 
Earl, Riggins R., Jr. “Black theology and human purpose,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Black Theology, edited by Dwight N Hopkins and Edward P. Antonio. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 126-142. 
 
Ellmann, Maud. “James Joyce,” The Cambridge Companion to English Novelists, edited 
by Adrian Poole. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Finstuen, Andrew S. Original Sin and Everyday Protestants: The Theology of Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and Paul Tillich in an Age of Anxiety. Chapel Hill, NC: 





Florida, Richard, and Charlotta Mellander. “The Geography of Inequality: Difference and 
Determinants of Wage and Income Inequality across US Metros,” Regional 
Studies: 50, no. 1: 79-92. 2016. 
 
George, Sheldon. Trauma and Race: A Lacanian Study of African American Racial 
Identity. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2016. 
 
Glissant, Édouard. Poetics of Relation. Ann Arbor, MI:  University of Michigan Press, 
1997. 
 
Gouw, Arvin M. “Transcendence and Immanence of the Trinity in Barth and Lossky,” 
Dialogo Conferences and Journal: 2.2, pp. 27-33. 2015. doi: 10.18638. 
 
Grenz, Stanley J., & Roger E. Olson. 20th Century Theology: God and the World in a 
Transitional Age. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1992. 
 
Heller, Tamar. “Affliction in Jean Rhys and Simone Weil.” The Female Face of Shame, 
edited by Patricia Moran and Erica L. Johnson, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2013. 
 
Helmer, Christine. “A Systematic Theological Theory of Truth in Kathryn Tanner’s Jesus, 
Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology/Comment/Comment/Reply,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 57, no.2 (2004): 203. 
 
Hughes, Carl S. “‘Tehomic’ Christology? Tanner, Keller, and Kierkegaard on Writing 
Christ.” Modern Theology: 31, 2. 2015. 
 
Hughes, Krista. “Commentary and Study Questions,” In Creating Women’s Theology: A 
Movement Engaging Process Thought, edited by Monica A Coleman, Nancy R. 
Howell, and Helene Tallon Russell. 98-100. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011. 
 
Hunt, Mary E. "Katie Geneva Cannon Incarnate." Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion: 








Johnson, Erica, and Patricia Moran, eds. Jean Rhys: Twenty-First-Century Approaches.  
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015.  
Jones, Serene. Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: Cartographies of Grace. 
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000. 
 
---. Trauma and Grace: Theology in a Ruptured World. Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2009. 
 
Joyce, James. Ulysses. Toronto, Canada: Everyman’s Library, 1997. 
 
Keller, Catherine. Cloud of the Impossible: Negative Theology and Planetary 
Entanglement. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 
 
---. From a Broken Web. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1986. 
 
---. Intercarnations: Exercises in Theological Possibility. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2017. 
 
---. On The Mystery: Discerning Divinity in Process. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 
2008. 
 
Lewis, Gordon R., and Bruce A. Demarest. Integrative Theology: I. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan Publishing, 1996. 
 
Maat, Sekhmet Ra Em Kht. “Looking Back at the Evolution of James Cone’s Theological 
Anthropology: A Brief Commentary.” Religions: 10 (11). 2019. 
 
Moltmann, Jürgen. The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. London: SCM Press, 1981. 
 
---. Tveit, Olav, Nürnberger, Klaus, and Buitendag, Johan. “Tribute, hope and 






Nebeker, Helen. Jean Rhys: Woman in Passage. Montreal, Canada: Eden Press Women’s 
Publications, 1981. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
---. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Pattison, George. Paul Tillich’s Philosophical Theology: A Fifty Year Reappraisal. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
 
Pinn, Anthony B. and Katie G. Cannon. The Oxford Handbook of African American 
Theology. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
Plantinga Pauw, Amy. “Ecclesiological reflections on Kathryn Taner’s Jesus, Humanity 
and the Trinity.” Scottish Journal of Theology 57, 2, 2004. 
doi:10.1017/S0036930604000080. 
 
Plaskow, Judith. “Lessons from Mary Daly.” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion: 28, 
no. 2: 100-04. 2012. doi:10.2979/jfemistudreli.28.2.100. 
 
Plaskow, Judith. Sex, Sin and Grace: Women’s Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. New York: University Press of America, 1980. 
 
Rambo, Shelly. Resurrecting Wounds Living in the Afterlife of Trauma. Waco, Texas: 
Baylor University Press, 2017. 
 
---. Review of Poetics of the Flesh, by Mayra Rivera. The Journal of Religion 99, no. 1 
(January 2019): 125-126. doi: 10.1086/700427.  
 
Ray, Stephen G., Jr. “Black Sacred Rhetoric: Katie Cannon and the Power of Memory.” 







Rhys, Jean. After Leaving Mr. Mackenzie. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1931. 
---. Good Morning, Midnight. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1938. 
 
---. Smile Please an unfinished autobiography. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1979. 
 
---. Quartet. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1929. 
 
---. Voyage in the Dark. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982. 
 
Rivera, Mayra. Poetics of the Flesh. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015. 
 
---. The Touch of Transcendence: A Postcolonial Theology of God, First ed. Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007. 
 
Roberts, David E. “Tillich’s Doctrine of Man,” The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by 
Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. 
pp. 108-131. 
 
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. “The Development of My Theology,” Religious Studies 
Review, 15. 1989. 
 
---. Disputed Questions: On Being a Christian. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1989. 
 
---. “Feminist Theology in the Academy,” Christianity and Crisis 45/3. March 4, 1985. 
 
---. “Feminist Theology and Spirituality,” in Christian Feminism: Visions of a New 
Humanity, edited by Judith L. Weidman. New York: Harper & Row, 1984. 
 
---. Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1983. 
 
Saiving, Valerie. “The Human Situation: A Feminine View.” The Journal of Religion: 40, 
no. 2, 100-12. 1960. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/stable/1200194. 
 




---. The Cambridge Introduction to Jean Rhys. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009.  
 
Schneider, Laurel C. “From New Beginning to Meta-Being: A Critical Analysis of Paul 
Tillich’s Influence on Mary Daly,” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal: 75 (2/3) 
(1992): pp. 421-39. 
 
Smith, Aaron T. A Theology of the Third Article: Karl Barth and the Spirit of the Word. 
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014. 
 
Sporre, Karin. In Search of Human Dignity: Essays in Theology, Ethics, and Education. 
Münster, Germany: Waxmann Verlag, 2015. 
 
Stephenson, Lisa P. “Directed, ordered and related: The male and female interpersonal 
relation in Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics,” Scottish Journal of Theology: 61, 4, 
November, 2008. 
 
Tanner, Kathryn. “The Ambiguities of Transcendence,” Common Goods: Economy, 
Ecology, and Political Theology, edited byMelanie Johnson-DeBaufre, Catherine 
Keller, and Elias Ortega-Aponte. Fordham Scholarship, May 2016. 
 
---. God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment.  Minneapolis, 
MN: Fortress Press, 2005. 
 
---. Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
2001. 
 
---. The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice. Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1992. 
 
Tillich, Paul. The Courage to Be. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
 





---. “Theology and Symbolism,” Religious Symbolism, edited by F.E. Johnson. New York: 
Harper, 1955. pp. 107-108. 
 
van Heijst, Anneleise. Longing for the Fall. Kok Pharos Publishing House, 1995. 
 
Veli-Matti, Kärkkäinen. “The trinitarian doctrines of Jurgen Moltmann and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg in the context of contemporary discussion,” The Cambridge Companion to 
The Trinity, edited by Peter C. Phan, 225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011. 
 
Walker, Alice. In Search of Our Mother’s Gardens. New York: Harcourt, Inc. 1983. 
 
Wallace, Beverly Rose. “‘Black Butterfly’ Asking the Question, Womanist Reframing, 
Conscientization, and Generativity A Reminder of the Contributions of Dr Katie 
Geneva Cannon’s Life and Work to Pastoral Theology’s Grand 
Metamorphosis,” Journal of Pastoral Theology 29, no. 3 (2019): 169-79. 
doi: 10.1080/10649867.2019.1673026. 
 
Walcott, Derek. “The Antilles, Fragments of Epic Memory: The 1992 Nobel 
Lecture.” World Literature Today 67, no. 2 (1993): 261-67.  
 
Wallace, Cynthia R. Of Women Borne: A Literary Ethics of Suffering. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2016. 
 
Walton, Heather. Literature, theology and feminism. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2007. 
 
West, Cornel. The Cornel West Reader. New York: Civitas Books, 1999. 
 
Westenberg, Leonie. "‘When She Calls for Help’—Domestic Violence in Christian 
Families." Social Sciences 6 (3). July 2017. doi: 10.3390/socsci6030071.  
 
Wilson, Mary, and Kerry L Johnson, eds. Rhys Matters: New Critical Perspectives. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 
 
